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Book 1
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CHAPTER I.—_Of the Beginnings of Cities in general, and in particular of that of Rome._ (.md)
CHAPTER II.—_Of the various kinds of Government; and to which of them the Roman Commonwealth belonge (.md)
CHAPTER III.—_Of the Accidents which led in Rome to the creation of Tribunes of the People; whereby (.md)
CHAPTER IV.—_That the Dissensions between the Senate and Commons of Rome, made Rome free and powerfu (.md)
CHAPTER V.—_Whether the Guardianship of public Freedom is safer in the hands of the Commons or of th (.md)
CHAPTER VI.—_Whether it was possible in Rome to contrive such a Government as would have composed th (.md)
CHAPTER VII.—_That to preserve Liberty in a State there must exist the Right to accuse._ (.md)
CHAPTER VIII.—_That Calumny is as hurtful in a Commonwealth as the power to accuse is useful._ (.md)
CHAPTER IX.—_That to give new Institutions to a Commonwealth, or to reconstruct old Institutions on (.md)
CHAPTER X.—_That in proportion as the Founder of a Kingdom or Commonwealth merits Praise, he who fou (.md)
CHAPTER XI.—_Of the Religion of the Romans._ (.md)
CHAPTER XII.—_That it is of much moment to make account of Religion; and that Italy, through the Rom (.md)
CHAPTER XIII.—_Of the use the Romans made of Religion in giving Institutions to their City, in carry (.md)
CHAPTER XIV.—_That the Romans interpreted the Auspices to meet the occasion; and made a prudent show (.md)
CHAPTER XV.—_How the Samnites, as a last resource in their broken Fortunes, had recourse to Religion (.md)
CHAPTER XVI.—_That a People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by any accident it become free, ca (.md)
CHAPTER XVII.—_That a corrupt People obtaining Freedom can hardly preserve it._ (.md)
CHAPTER XVIII.—_How a Free Government existing in a corrupt City may be preserved, or not existing m (.md)
CHAPTER XIX.—_After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain himself: but after one weak Prince no (.md)
CHAPTER XX.—_That the consecutive Reigns of two valiant Princes produce great results: and that well (.md)
CHAPTER XXI.—_That it is a great reproach to a Prince or to a Commonwealth to be without a national (.md)
CHAPTER XXII.—_What is to be noted in the combat of the three Roman Horatii and the three Alban Curi (.md)
CHAPTER XXIII.—_That we should never hazard our whole Fortunes where we put not forth our entire Str (.md)
CHAPTER XXIV.—_That well-ordered States always provide Rewards and Punishments for their Citizens; a (.md)
CHAPTER XXV.—_That he who would reform the Institutions of a free State, must retain at least the se (.md)
CHAPTER XXVI.—_A new Prince in a City or Province of which he has taken Possession, ought to make Ev (.md)
CHAPTER XXVII.—_That Men seldom know how to be wholly good or wholly bad._ (.md)
CHAPTER XXVIII.—_Whence it came that the Romans were less ungrateful to their Citizens than were the (.md)
CHAPTER XXIX.—_Whether a People or a Prince is the more ungrateful._ (.md)
CHAPTER XXX.—_How Princes and Commonwealths may avoid the vice of Ingratitude; and how a Captain or (.md)
CHAPTER XXXI.—_That the Roman Captains were never punished with extreme severity for Misconduct; and (.md)
CHAPTER XXXII.—_That a Prince or Commonwealth should not delay conferring Benefits until they are th (.md)
CHAPTER XXXIII.—_When a Mischief has grown up in, or against a State, it is safer to temporize with (.md)
CHAPTER XXXIV.—_That the authority of the Dictator did good and not harm to the Roman Republic: and (.md)
CHAPTER XXXV.—_Why the Creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, although brought about by the free and o (.md)
CHAPTER XXXVI.—_That Citizens who have held the higher Offices of a Commonwealth should not disdain (.md)
CHAPTER XXXVII.—_Of the Mischief bred in Rome by the Agrarian Law: and how it is a great source of d (.md)
CHAPTER XXXVIII.—_That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; and that the course they may tak (.md)
CHAPTER XXXIX.—_That often the same Accidents are seen to befall different Nations._ (.md)
CHAPTER XL.—_Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what therein is to be noted. Wherein am (.md)
CHAPTER XLI.—_That it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to severity, or to a haughty bearin (.md)
CHAPTER XLII.—_How easily Men become corrupted._ (.md)
CHAPTER XLIII.—_That Men fighting in their own Cause make good and resolute Soldiers._ (.md)
CHAPTER XLIV.—_That the Multitude is helpless without a Head: and that we should not with the same b (.md)
CHAPTER XLV.—_That it is of evil example, especially in the Maker of a Law, not to observe the Law w (.md)
CHAPTER XLVI.—_That Men climb from one step of Ambition to another, seeking at first to escape Injur (.md)
CHAPTER XLVII.—_That though Men deceive themselves in Generalities, in Particulars they judge truly. (.md)
CHAPTER XLVIII.—_He who would not have an Office bestowed on some worthless or wicked Person, should (.md)
CHAPTER XLIX.—_That if Cities which, like Rome, had their beginning in Freedom, have had difficulty (.md)
CHAPTER L.—_That neither any Council nor any Magistrate should have power to bring the Government of (.md)
CHAPTER LI.—_What a Prince or Republic does of Necessity, should seem to be done by Choice._ (.md)
CHAPTER LII.—_That to check the arrogance of a Citizen who is growing too powerful in a State, there (.md)
CHAPTER LIII.—_That the People, deceived by a false show of Advantage, often desire what would be th (.md)
CHAPTER LIV.—_Of the boundless Authority which a great Man may use to restrain an excited Multitude. (.md)
CHAPTER LV.—_That Government is easily carried on in a City wherein the body of the People is not co (.md)
CHAPTER LVI.—_That when great Calamities are about to befall a City or Country, Signs are seen to pr (.md)
CHAPTER LVII.—_That the People are strong collectively, but individually weak._ (.md)
CHAPTER LVIII.—_That a People is wiser and more constant than a Prince._ (.md)
CHAPTER LIX.—_To what Leagues or Alliances we may most trust; whether those we make with Commonwealt (.md)
CHAPTER LX.—_That the Consulship and all the other Magistracies in Rome were given without respect t (.md)