# CHAPTER XXXV —_Of the Danger incurred in being the first to recommend

CHAPTER XXXV.—_Of the Danger incurred in being the first to recommend
new Measures; and that the more unusual the Measures the greater the
Danger_.


How perilous a thing it is to put one’s self at the head of changes
whereby many are affected, how difficult to guide and bring them to
perfection, and when perfected to maintain them, were too wide and
arduous a subject to be treated here. Wherefore I reserve it for a
fitter occasion, and shall now speak only of those dangers which are
incurred by the citizens of a republic or by the counsellors of a
prince in being the first to promote some grave and important measure
in such manner that the whole responsibility attending it rests with
them. For as men judge of things by their results, any evil which
ensues from such measures will be imputed to their author. And although
if good ensue he will be applauded, nevertheless in matters of this
kind, what a man may gain is as nothing to what he may lose.

Selim, the present sultan, or Grand Turk as he is called, being in
readiness, as some who come from his country relate, to set forth on an
expedition against Egypt and Syria, was urged by one of his bashaws
whom he had stationed on the confines of Persia, to make war upon the
Sofi. In compliance with which advice he went on this new enterprise
with a vast army. But coming to a great plain, wherein were many
deserts and few streams, and encountering the same difficulties as in
ancient times had proved the ruin of many Roman armies, he suffered so
much from pestilence and famine, that, although victorious in battle,
he lost a great part of his men. This so enraged him against the bashaw
on whose advice he had acted, that he forthwith put him to death.

In like manner, we read of many citizens who having strenuously
promoted various measures were banished when these turned out badly.
Certain citizens of Rome, for instance, were very active in forwarding
a law allowing the appointment of a plebeian to be consul. This law
passing, it so happened that the first plebeian consul who went forth
with the armies was routed; and had it not been that the party in whose
behalf the law was made was extremely powerful, its promoters would
have fared badly. It is plain therefore that the counsellors whether of
a republic or of a prince stand in this dilemma, that if they do not
conscientiously advise whatsoever they think advantageous for their
city or prince, they fail in their duty; if they do advise it, they
risk their places and their lives; all men being subject to this
infirmity of judging advice by the event.

When I consider in what way this reproach or this danger may best be
escaped, I find no other remedy to recommend than that in giving advice
you proceed discreetly not identifying yourself in a special manner
with the measure you would see carried out, but offering your opinion
without heat, and supporting it temperately and modestly, so that if
the prince or city follow it, they shall do so of their own good-will,
and not seem to be dragged into it by your importunity. When you act
thus, neither prince nor people can reasonably bear you a grudge in
respect of the advice given by you, since that advice was not adopted
contrary to the general opinion. For your danger lies in many having
opposed you, who afterwards, should your advice prove hurtful, combine
to ruin you. And although in taking this course you fall short of the
glory which is earned by him who stands alone against many in urging
some measure which succeeds, you have nevertheless two advantages to
make up for it: first, that you escape danger; and second, that when
you have temperately stated your views, and when, in consequence of
opposition, your advice has not been taken, should other counsels
prevail and mischief come of them, your credit will be vastly enhanced.
And although credit gained at the cost of misfortune to your prince or
city cannot be matter of rejoicing, still it is something to be taken
into account.

On this head, then, I know of no other advice to offer. For that you
should be silent and express no opinion at all, were a course hurtful
for your prince or city, and which would not absolve you from danger,
since you would soon grow to be suspected, when it might fare with you
as with the friend of Perseus the Macedonian king. For Perseus being
defeated by Paulus Emilius, and making his escape with a few
companions, it happened that one of them, in reviewing the past, began
to point out to the king many mistakes which he had made and which had
been his ruin. Whereupon Perseus turning upon him said, “_Traitor, hast
thou waited till now when there is no remedy to tell me these things_?”
and so saying, slew him with his own hand. Such was the penalty
incurred by one who was silent when he should have spoken, and who
spoke when he should have been silent; and who found no escape from
danger in having refrained from giving advice. Wherefore, I believe,
that the course which I have recommended should be observed and
followed.