# CHAPTER XXXVII —_Whether a general engagement should be preceded by

CHAPTER XXXVII.—_Whether a general engagement should be preceded by
skirmishes; and how, avoiding these, we may get knowledge of a new
Enemy._


Besides all the other difficulties which hinder men from bringing
anything to its utmost perfection, it appears, as I have already
observed, that in close vicinity to every good is found also an evil,
so apt to grow up along with it that it is hardly possible to have the
one without accepting the other. This we see in all human affairs, and
the result is, that unless fortune aid us to overcome this natural and
common disadvantage, we never arrive at any excellence. I am reminded
of this by the combat between Titus Manlius and the Gaul, concerning
which Livius writes that it “_determined the issue of the entire war;
since the Gauls, abandoning their camp, hastily withdrew to the country
about Tivoli, whence they presently passed into Campania._”

It may be said, therefore, on the one hand, that a prudent captain
ought absolutely to refrain from all those operations which, while of
trifling moment in themselves, may possibly produce an ill effect on
his army. Now, to engage in a combat wherein you risk your whole
fortunes without putting forth your entire strength, is, as I observed
before, when condemning the defence of a country by guarding its
defiles, an utterly foolhardy course. On the other hand, it is to be
said that a prudent captain, when he has to meet a new and redoubtable
adversary, ought, before coming to a general engagement, to accustom
his men by skirmishes and passages of arms, to the quality of their
enemy; that they may learn to know him, and how to deal with him, and
so free themselves from the feeling of dread which his name and fame
inspire.

This for a captain is a matter of the very greatest importance, and one
which it might be almost fatal for him to neglect, since to risk a
pitched battle without first giving your soldiers such opportunities to
know their enemy and shake off their fear of him, is to rush on certain
destruction. When Valerius Corvinus was sent by the Romans with their
armies against the Samnites, these being new adversaries with whom up
to that time they had not measured their strength, Titus Livius tells
us that before giving battle he made his men make trial of the enemy in
several unimportant skirmishes, “_lest they should be dismayed by a new
foe and a new method of warfare._” Nevertheless, there is very great
danger that, if your soldiers get the worst in these encounters, their
alarm and self-distrust may be increased, and a result follow contrary
to that intended, namely, that you dispirit where you meant to
reassure.

This, therefore, is one of those cases in which the evil lies so nigh
the good, and both are so mixed up together that you may readily lay
hold of the one when you think to grasp the other. And with regard to
this I say, that a good captain should do what he can that nothing
happen which might discourage his men, nor is there anything so likely
to discourage them as to begin with a defeat. For which reason
skirmishes are, as a rule, to be avoided, and only to be allowed where
you fight to great advantage and with a certainty of victory. In like
manner, no attempt should be made to defend the passes leading into
your country unless your whole army can co-operate; nor are any towns
to be defended save those whose loss necessarily involves your ruin.
And as to those towns which you do defend, you must so arrange, both in
respect of the garrison within and the army without, that in the event
of a siege your whole forces can be employed. All other towns you must
leave undefended. For, provided your army be kept together, you do not,
in losing what you voluntarily abandon, forfeit your military
reputation, or sacrifice your hopes of final success. But when you lose
what it was your purpose, and what all know it was your purpose to
hold, you suffer a real loss and injury, and, like the Gauls on the
defeat of their champion, you are ruined by a mishap of no moment in
itself.

Philip of Macedon, the father of Perseus, a great soldier in his day,
and of a great name, on being invaded by the Romans, laid waste and
relinquished much of his territory which he thought he could not
defend; rightly judging it more hurtful to his reputation to lose
territory after an attempt to defend it, than to abandon it to the
enemy as something he cared little to retain. So, likewise, after the
battle of Cannæ, when their affairs were at their worst, the Romans
refused aid to many subject and protected States, charging them to
defend themselves as best they could. And this is a better course than
to undertake to defend and then to fail; for by refusing to defend, you
lose only your friend; whereas in failing, you not only lose your
friend, but weaken yourself.

But to return to the matter in hand, I affirm, that even when a captain
is constrained by inexperience of his enemy to make trial of him by
means of skirmishes, he ought first to see that he has so much the
advantage that he runs no risk of defeat; or else, and this is his
better course, he must do as Marius did when sent against the
Cimbrians, a very courageous people who were laying Italy waste, and by
their fierceness and numbers, and from the fact of their having already
routed a Roman army, spreading terror wherever they came. For before
fighting a decisive battle, Marius judged it necessary to do something
to lessen the dread in which these enemies were held by his army; and
being a prudent commander, he, on several occasions, posted his men at
points where the Cimbrians must pass, that seeing and growing familiar
with their appearance, while themselves in safety and within the
shelter of their intrenched camp, and finding them to be a mere
disorderly rabble, encumbered with baggage, and either without weapons,
or with none that were formidable, they might at last assume courage
and grow eager to engage them in battle. The part thus prudently taken
by Marius, should be carefully imitated by others who would escape the
dangers above spoken of and not have to betake themselves like the
Gauls to a disgraceful flight, on sustaining some trifling defeat.

But since in this Discourse I have referred by name to Valerius
Corvinus, in my next Chapter I shall cite his words to show what manner
of man a captain ought to be.