# CHAPTER XII —_A prudent Captain will do what he can to make it

CHAPTER XII.—_A prudent Captain will do what he can to make it
necessary for his own Soldiers to fight, and to relieve his Enemy from
that necessity._


Elsewhere I have noted how greatly men are governed in what they do by
Necessity, and how much of their renown is due to her guidance, so that
it has even been said by some philosophers, that the hands and tongues
of men, the two noblest instruments of their fame, would never have
worked to perfection, nor have brought their labours to that pitch of
excellence we see them to have reached, had they not been impelled by
this cause. The captains of antiquity, therefore, knowing the virtues
of this necessity, and seeing the steadfast courage which it gave their
soldiers in battle, spared no effort to bring their armies under its
influence, while using all their address to loosen its hold upon their
enemies. For which reason, they would often leave open to an adversary
some way which they might have closed, and close against their own men
some way they might have left open.

Whosoever, therefore, would have a city defend itself stubbornly, or an
army fight resolutely in the field, must before all things endeavour to
impress the minds of those whom he commands with the belief that no
other course is open to them. In like manner a prudent captain who
undertakes the attack of a city, will measure the ease or difficulty of
his enterprise, by knowing and considering the nature of the necessity
which compels the inhabitants to defend it; and where he finds that
necessity to be strong, he may infer that his task will be difficult,
but if otherwise, that it will be easy.

And hence it happens that cities are harder to be recovered after a
revolt than to be taken for the first time. Because on a first attack,
having no occasion to fear punishment, since they have given no ground
of offence, they readily surrender; but when they have revolted, they
know that they have given ground of offence, and, fearing punishment,
are not so easily brought under. A like stubbornness grows from the
natural hostility with which princes or republics who are neighbours
regard one another; which again is caused by the desire to dominate
over those who live near, or from jealousy of their power. This is more
particularly the case with republics, as in Tuscany for example; for
contention and rivalry have always made, and always will make it
extremely hard for one republic to bring another into subjection. And
for this reason any one who considers attentively who are the
neighbours of Florence, and who of Venice, will not marvel so much as
some have done, that Florence should have spent more than Venice on her
wars and gained less; since this results entirely from the Venetians
finding their neighbouring towns less obstinate in their resistance
than the Florentines theirs. For all the towns in the neighbourhood of
Venice have been used to live under princes and not in freedom; and
those who are used to servitude commonly think little of changing
masters, nay are often eager for the change. In this way Venice, though
she has had more powerful neighbours than Florence, has been able, from
finding their towns less stubborn, to subdue them more easily than the
latter, surrounded exclusively by free cities, has had it in her power
to do.

But, to return to the matter in hand, the captain who attacks a town
should use what care he can, not to drive the defenders to extremities,
lest he render them stubborn; but when they fear punishment should
promise them pardon, and when they fear for their freedom should assure
them that he has no designs against the common welfare, but only
against a few ambitious men in their city; for such assurances have
often smoothed the way to the surrender of towns. And although pretexts
of this sort are easily seen through, especially by the wise, the mass
of the people are often beguiled by them, because desiring present
tranquillity, they shut their eyes to the snares hidden behind these
specious promises. By means such as these, therefore, cities
innumerable have been brought into subjection, as recently was the case
with Florence. The ruin of Crassus and his army was similarly caused:
for although he himself saw through the empty promises of the
Parthians, as meant only to blind the Roman soldiers to the necessity
of defending themselves, yet he could not keep his men steadfast, they,
as we clearly gather in reading the life of this captain, being
deceived by the offers of peace held out to them by their enemies.

On the other hand, when the Samnites, who, at the instance of a few
ambitious men, and in violation of the terms of the truce made with
them, had overrun and pillaged lands belonging to the allies of Rome,
afterwards sent envoys to Rome to implore peace, offering to restore
whatever they had taken, and to surrender the authors of these injuries
and outrages as prisoners, and these offers were rejected by the
Romans, and the envoys returned to Samnium bringing with them no hope
of an adjustment, Claudius Pontius, who then commanded the army of the
Samnites, showed them in a remarkable speech, that the Romans desired
war at all hazards, and declared that, although for the sake of his
country he wished for peace, necessity constrained him to prepare for
war; telling them “_that was a just war which could not be escaped, and
those arms sacred in which lay their only hopes._” And building on this
necessity, he raised in the minds of his soldiers a confident
expectation of success. That I may not have to revert to this matter
again, it will be convenient to notice here those examples from Roman
history which most merit attention. When Caius Manilius was in command
of the legions encamped against Veii, a division of the Veientine army
having got within the Roman intrenchments, Manilius ran forward with a
company of his men to defend them, and, to prevent the escape of the
Veientines, guarded all the approaches to the camp. The Veientines
finding themselves thus shut in, began to fight with such fury that
they slew Manilius, and would have destroyed all the rest of the Roman
army, had not the prudence of one of the tribunes opened a way for the
Veientines to retreat. Here we see that so long as necessity compelled,
the Veientines fought most fiercely, but on finding a path opened for
escape, preferred flight to combat. On another occasion when the
Volscians and Equians passed with their armies across the Roman
frontier, the consuls were sent out to oppose them, and an engagement
ensued. It so happened that when the combat was at its height, the army
of the Volscians, commanded by Vectius Mescius, suddenly found
themselves shut in between their own camp, which a division of the
Romans had occupied, and the body of the Roman army; when seeing that
they must either perish or cut a way for themselves with their swords,
Vectius said to them, “_Come on, my men, here is no wall or rampart to
be scaled: we fight man with man; in valour we are their equals, and
necessity, that last and mightiest weapon, gives us the advantage._”
Here, then, necessity is spoken of by Titus Livius as _the last and
mightiest weapon_.

Camillus, the wisest and most prudent of all the Roman commanders, when
he had got within the town of Veii with his army, to make its surrender
easier and not to drive its inhabitants to desperation, called out to
his men, so that the Veientines might hear, to spare all whom they
found unarmed. Whereupon the defenders throwing away their weapons, the
town was taken almost without bloodshed. And this device was afterwards
followed by many other captains.