# CHAPTER XIII —_Whether we may trust more to a valiant Captain with a

CHAPTER XIII.—_Whether we may trust more to a valiant Captain with a
weak Army, or to a valiant Army with a weak Captain._


Coriolanus being banished from Rome betook himself to the Volscians,
and when he had got together an army wherewith to avenge himself on his
countrymen, came back to Rome; yet, again withdrew, not constrained to
retire by the might of the Roman arms, but out of reverence for his
mother. From this incident, says Titus Livius, we may learn that the
spread of the Roman power was due more to the valour of her captains
than of her soldiers. For before this the Volscians had always been
routed, and only grew successful when Coriolanus became their captain.

But though Livius be of this opinion, there are many passages in his
history to show that the Roman soldiers, even when left without
leaders, often performed astonishing feats of valour, nay, sometimes
maintained better discipline and fought with greater spirit after their
consuls were slain than they had before. For example, the army under
the Scipios in Spain, after its two leaders had fallen, was able by its
valour not merely to secure its own safety, but to overcome the enemy
and preserve the province for the Roman Republic. So that to state the
case fairly, we find many instances in which the valour of the soldiers
alone gained the day, as well as many in which success was wholly due
to the excellence of the captain. From which it may be inferred that
the one stands in need of the other.

And here the question suggests itself: which is the more formidable, a
good army badly led, or a good captain commanding an indifferent army;
though, were we to adopt the opinion of Cæsar on this head, we ought
lightly to esteem both. For when Cæsar went to Spain against Afranius
and Petreius, who were there in command of a strong army, he made
little account of them, saying, “_that he went to fight an army without
a captain_,” indicating thereby the weakness of these generals. And,
conversely, when he went to encounter Pompeius in Thessaly, he said,
“_I go against a captain without an army_.”[13]

 [13] Professus ante inter suos, ire se ad exercitum sine duce, et inde
 reversurum ad ducem sine exercitu. (_Suet. in Vita J. Caes._)


A further question may also be raised, whether it is easier for a good
captain to make a good army, or for a good army to make a good captain.
As to this it might be thought there was barely room for doubt, since
it ought to be far easier for many who are good to find one who is good
or teach him to become so, than for one who is good to find or make
many good. Lucullus when sent against Mithridates was wholly without
experience in war: but his brave army, which was provided with many
excellent officers, speedily taught him to be a good captain. On the
other hand, when the Romans, being badly off for soldiers, armed a
number of slaves and gave them over to be drilled by Sempronius
Gracchus, he in a short time made them into a serviceable army. So too,
as I have already mentioned, Pelopidas and Epaminondas after rescuing
Thebes, their native city, from Spartan thraldom, in a short time made
such valiant soldiers of the Theban peasantry, as to be able with their
aid not only to withstand, but even to defeat the Spartan armies. So
that the question may seem to be equally balanced, excellence on one
side generally finding excellence on the other.

A good army, however, when left without a good leader, as the
Macedonian army was on the death of Alexander, or as those veterans
were who had fought in the civil wars, is apt to grow restless and
turbulent. Wherefore I am convinced that it is better to trust to the
captain who has time allowed him to discipline his men, and means
wherewith to equip them, than to a tumultuary host with a chance leader
of its own choosing. But twofold is the merit and twofold the glory of
those captains who not only have had to subdue their enemies, but also
before encountering them to organize and discipline their forces. This,
however, is a task requiring qualities so seldom combined, that were
many of those captains who now enjoy a great name with the world,
called on to perform it, they would be much less thought of than they
are.