# CHAPTER XXX —_That a Citizen who seeks by his personal influence to

CHAPTER XXX.—_That a Citizen who seeks by his personal influence to
render signal service to his Country, must first stand clear of Envy.
How a City should prepare for its defence on the approach of an Enemy._


When the Roman senate learned that all Etruria was assembled in arms to
march against Rome, and that the Latins and Hernicians, who before had
been the friends of the Romans, had ranged themselves with the
Volscians the ancient enemies of the Roman name, they foresaw that a
perilous contest awaited them. But because Camillus was at that time
tribune with consular authority they thought all might be managed
without the appointment of a dictator, provided the other tribunes, his
colleagues would agree to his assuming the sole direction of affairs.
This they willingly did; “_nor_,” says Titus Livius, “_did they account
anything as taken from their own dignity which was added to his._”

On receiving their promise of obedience, Camillus gave orders that
three armies should be enrolled. Of the first, which was to be directed
against the Etruscans, he himself assumed command. The command of the
second, which he meant to remain near Rome and meet any movement of the
Latins and Hernicians, he gave to Quintius Servilius. The third army,
which he designed for the protection of the city, and the defence of
the gates and Curia, he entrusted to Lucius Quintius. And he further
directed, that Horatius, one of his colleagues, should furnish supplies
of arms, and corn, and of all else needful in time of war. Finally he
put forward his colleague Cornelius to preside in the senate and public
council, that from day to day he might advise what should be done. For
in those times these tribunes were ready either to command or obey as
the welfare of their country might require.

We may gather from this passage how a brave and prudent man should act,
how much good he may effect, and how serviceable he may be to his
country, when by the force of his character and worth he succeeds in
extinguishing envy. For this often disables men from acting to the best
advantage, not permitting them to obtain that authority which it is
essential they should have in matters of importance. Now, envy may be
extinguished in one or other of two ways: first, by the approach of
some flagrant danger, whereby seeing themselves like to be overwhelmed,
all forego their own private ambition and lend a willing obedience to
him who counts on his valour to rescue them. As in the case of
Camillas, who from having given many proofs of surpassing ability, and
from having been three times dictator and always exercised the office
for the public good and not for his private advantage, had brought men
to fear nothing from his advancement; while his fame and reputation
made it no shame for them to recognize him as their superior. Wisely,
therefore, does Titus Livius use concerning him the words which I have
cited.

The other way in which envy may be extinguished, is by the death,
whether by violence or in the ordinary course of nature, of those who
have been your rivals in the pursuit of fame or power, and who seeing
you better esteemed than themselves, could never acquiesce in your
superiority or put up with it in patience. For when these men have been
brought up in a corrupt city, where their training is little likely to
improve them, nothing that can happen will induce them to withdraw
their pretensions; nay, to have their own way and satisfy their
perverse humour, they will be content to look on while their country is
ruined. For envy such as this there is no cure save by the death of
those of whom it has taken possession. And when fortune so befriends a
great man that his rivals are removed from his path by a natural death,
his glory is established without scandal or offence, since he is then
able to display his great qualities unhindered. But when fortune is not
thus propitious to him, he must contrive other means to rid himself of
rivals, and must do so successfully before he can accomplish anything.
Any one who reads with intelligence the lessons of Holy Writ, will
remember how Moses, to give effect to his laws and ordinances, was
constrained to put to death an endless number of those who out of mere
envy withstood his designs. The necessity of this course was well
understood by the Friar Girolamo Savonarola, and by the Gonfalonier
Piero Soderini. But the former could not comply with it, because, as a
friar, he himself lacked the needful authority; while those of his
followers who might have exercised that authority, did not rightly
comprehend his teaching. This, however, was no fault of his; for his
sermons are full of invectives and attacks against “_the wise of this
world_,” that being the name he gave to envious rivals and to all who
opposed his reforms. As for Piero Soderini, he was possessed by the
belief that in time and with favourable fortune he could allay envy by
gentleness-and by benefits conferred on particular men; for as he was
still in the prime of life, and in the fresh enjoyment of that
good-will which his character and opinions had gained for him, he
thought to get the better of all who out of jealousy opposed him,
without giving occasion for tumult, violence, or disorder; not knowing
how time stays not, worth suffices not, fortune shifts, and malice will
not be won over by any benefit Wherefore, because they could not or
knew not how to vanquish this envy, the two whom I have named came to
their downfall.

Another point to be noted in the passage we are considering, is the
careful provision made by Camillus for the safety of Rome both within
and without the city. And, truly, not without reason do wise
historians, like our author, set forth certain events with much
minuteness and detail, to the end that those who come after may learn
how to protect themselves in like dangers. Further, we have to note
that there is no more hazardous or less useful defence than one
conducted without method or system. This is shown in Camillus causing a
third army to be enrolled that it might be left in Rome for the
protection of the city. Many persons, doubtless, both then and now,
would esteem this precaution superfluous, thinking that as the Romans
were a warlike people and constantly under arms, there could be no
occasion for a special levy, and that it was time enough to arm when
the need came. But Camillus, and any other equally prudent captain
would be of the same mind, judged otherwise, not permitting the
multitude to take up arms unless they were to be bound by the rules and
discipline of military service. Let him, therefore, who is called on to
defend a city, taking example by Camillus, before all things avoid
placing arms in the hands of an undisciplined multitude, but first of
all select and enroll those whom he proposes to arm, so that they may
be wholly governed by him as to where they shall assemble and whither
they shall march; and then let him direct those who are not enrolled,
to abide every man in his own house for its defence. Whosoever observes
this method in a city which is attacked, will be able to defend it with
ease; but whosoever disregards it, and follows not the example of
Camillus, shall never succeed.