# CHAPTER XXXI —_That strong Republics and valiant Men preserve through

CHAPTER XXXI.—_That strong Republics and valiant Men preserve through
every change the same Spirit and Bearing._


Among other high sayings which our historian ascribes to Camillus, as
showing of what stuff a truly great man should be made, he puts in his
mouth the words, “_My courage came not with my dictatorship nor went
with my exile;_” for by these words we are taught that a great man is
constantly the same through all vicissitudes of Fortune; so that
although she change, now exalting, now depressing, he remains
unchanged, and retains always a mind so unmoved, and in such complete
accordance with his nature as declares to all that over him Fortune has
no dominion.

Very different is the behaviour of those weak-minded mortals who,
puffed up and intoxicated with their success, ascribe all their
felicity to virtues which they never knew, and thus grow hateful and
insupportable to all around them. Whence also the changes in their
fortunes. For whenever they have to look adversity in the face, they
suddenly pass to the other extreme, becoming abject and base. And thus
it happens that feeble-minded princes, when they fall into
difficulties, think rather of flight than of defence, because, having
made bad use of their prosperity, they are wholly unprepared to defend
themselves.

The same merits and defects which I say are found in individual men,
are likewise found in republics, whereof we have example in the case of
Rome and of Venice. For no reverse of fortune ever broke the spirit of
the Roman people, nor did any success ever unduly elate them; as we see
plainly after their defeat at Cannæ, and after the victory they had
over Antiochus. For the defeat at Cannæ, although most momentous, being
the third they had met with, no whit daunted them; so that they
continued to send forth armies, refused to ransom prisoners as contrary
to their custom, and despatched no envoy to Hannibal or to Carthage to
sue for peace; but without ever looking back on past humiliations,
thought always of war, though in such straits for soldiers that they
had to arm their old men and slaves. Which facts being made known to
Hanno the Carthaginian, he, as I have already related, warned the
Carthaginian senate not to lay too much stress upon their victory.
Here, therefore, we see that in times of adversity the Romans were
neither cast down nor dismayed. On the other hand, no prosperity ever
made them arrogant. Before fighting the battle wherein he was finally
routed, Antiochus sent messengers to Scipio to treat for an accord;
when Scipio offered peace on condition that he withdrew at once into
Syria, leaving all his other dominions to be dealt with by the Romans
as they thought fit. Antiochus refusing these terms, fought and was
defeated, and again sent envoys to Scipio, enjoining them to accept
whatever conditions the victor might be pleased to impose. But Scipio
proposed no different terms from those he had offered before saying
that “_the Romans, as they lost not heart on defeat, so waxed not
insolent with success._”

The contrary of all this is seen in the behaviour of the Venetians, who
thinking their good fortune due to valour of which they were devoid, in
their pride addressed the French king as “Son of St. Mark;” and making
no account of the Church, and no longer restricting their ambition to
the limits of Italy, came to dream of founding an empire like the
Roman. But afterwards, when their good fortune deserted them, and they
met at Vailà a half-defeat at the hands of the French king, they lost
their whole dominions, not altogether from revolt, but mainly by a base
and abject surrender to the Pope and the King of Spain. Nay, so low did
they stoop as to send ambassadors to the Emperor offering to become his
tributaries, and to write letters to the Pope, full of submission and
servility, in order to move his compassion. To such abasement were they
brought in four days’ time by what was in reality only a half-defeat.
For on their flight after the battle of Vailà only about a half of
their forces were engaged, and one of their two provedditori escaped to
Verona with five and twenty thousand men, horse and foot. So that had
there been a spark of valour in Venice, or any soundness in her
military system, she might easily have renewed her armies, and again
confronting fortune have stood prepared either to conquer, or, if she
must fall, to fall more gloriously; and at any rate might have obtained
for herself more honourable terms. But a pusillanimous spirit,
occasioned by the defects of her ordinances in so far as they relate to
war, caused her to lose at once her courage and her dominions. And so
will it always happen with those who behave like the Venetians. For
when men grow insolent in good fortune, and abject inn evil, the fault
lies in themselves and in the character of their training, which, when
slight and frivolous, assimilates them to itself; but when otherwise,
makes them of another temper, and giving them better acquaintance with
the world, causes them to be less disheartened by misfortunes and less
elated by success.

And while this is true of individual men, it holds good also of a
concourse of men living together in one republic, who will arrive at
that measure of perfection which the institutions of their State
permit. And although I have already said on another occasion that a
good militia is the foundation of all States, and where that is wanting
there can neither be good laws, nor aught else that is good, it seems
to me not superfluous to say the same again; because in reading this
history of Titus Livius the necessity of such a foundation is made
apparent in every page. It is likewise shown that no army can be good
unless it be thoroughly trained and exercised, and that this can only
be the case with an army raised from your own subjects. For as a State
is not and cannot always be at war, you must have opportunity to train
your army in times of peace; but this, having regard to the cost, you
can only have in respect of your own subjects.

When Camillus, as already related, went forth to meet the Etruscans,
his soldiers on seeing the great army of their enemy, were filled with
fear, thinking themselves too to withstand its onset. This untoward
disposition being reported to Camillus, he showed himself to his men
and by visiting their tents, and conversing with this and the other
among them, was able to remove their misgivings; and, finally, without
other word of command, he bade them “_each do his part as he had
learned and been accustomed_.” Now, any one who well considers the
methods followed by Camillus, and the words spoken by him to encourage
his soldiers to face their enemy, will perceive that these words and
methods could never have been used with an army which had not been
trained and disciplined in time of peace as well as of war. For no
captain can trust to untrained soldiers or look for good service at
their hands; nay, though he were another Hannibal, with such troops his
defeat were certain. For, as a captain cannot be present everywhere
while a battle is being fought, unless he have taken all measures
beforehand to render his men of the same temper as himself, and have
made sure that they perfectly understand his orders and arrangements,
he will inevitably be destroyed.

When a city therefore is armed and trained as Rome was, and when its
citizens have daily opportunity, both singly and together, to make
trial of their valour and learn what fortune can effect, it will always
happen, that at all times, and whether circumstances be adverse or
favourable, they will remain of unaltered courage and preserve the same
noble bearing. But when its citizens are unpractised in arms, and trust
not to their own valour but wholly to the arbitration of Fortune, they
will change their temper as she changes, and offer always the same
example of behaviour as was given by the Venetians.