# CHAPTER XV —_That one and not many should head an Army: and why it is

CHAPTER XV.—_That one and not many should head an Army: and why it is
harmful to have more Leaders than one._


The men of Fidenae rising against the colonists whom the Romans had
settled among them, and putting them to the sword, the Romans to avenge
the insult appointed four tribunes with consular powers: one of whom
they retained to see to the defence of Rome, while the other three were
sent against the Fidenati and the Veientines. But these three falling
out among themselves, and being divided in their counsels, returned
from their mission with discredit though not with loss. Of which
discredit they were themselves the cause. That they sustained no loss
was due to the valour of their soldiers But the senate perceiving the
source of the mischief, to the end that one man might put to rights
what three had thrown into confusion, resorted to the appointment of a
dictator.

Here we see the disadvantage of having several leaders in one army or
in a town which has to defend itself. And the case could not be put in
clearer words than by Titus Livius, where he says, “_The three tribunes
with consular authority gave proof how hurtful it is in war to have
many leaders; for each forming a different opinion, and each abiding by
his own, they threw opportunities in the way of their enemies._” And
though this example suffice by itself to show the disadvantage in war
of divided commands, to make the matter still plainer I shall cite two
further instances, one ancient and one modern.

In the year 1500, Louis XII. of France, after recovering Milan, sent
troops to restore Pisa to the Florentines, Giovambattista Ridolfi and
Luca d’Antonio Albizzi going with them as commissaries. Now, because
Giovambattista had a great name, and was older than Luca, the latter
left the whole management of everything to him; and although he did not
show his jealousy of him by opposing him, he betrayed it by his
silence, and by being so careless and indifferent about everything,
that he gave no help in the business of the siege either by word or
deed, just as though he had been a person of no account. But when, in
consequence of an accident, Giovambattista had to return to Florence,
all this was changed; for Luca, remaining in sole charge, behaved with
the greatest courage, prudence, and zeal, all which qualities had been
hidden while he held a joint command. Further to bear me out I shall
again borrow the words of Titus Livius, who, in relating how when
Quintius and Agrippa his colleague were sent by the Romans against the
Equians, Agrippa contrived that the conduct of the war should rest with
Quintius, observes, “_Most wholesome is it that in affairs of great
moment, supreme authority be vested in one man._” Very different,
however, is the course followed by the republics and princes of our own
days, who, thinking to be better served, are used to appoint several
captains or commissioners to fill one command; a practice giving rise
to so much confusion, that were we seeking for the causes of the
overthrow of the French and Italian armies in recent times, we should
find this to be the most active of any.

Rightly, therefore, may we conclude that in sending forth an army upon
service, it is wiser to entrust it to one man of ordinary prudence,
than to two of great parts but with a divided command.