# CHAPTER XXVII —_How a divided City may be reunited, and how it is a

CHAPTER XXVII.—_How a divided City may be reunited, and how it is a
false opinion that to hold Cities in subjection they must be kept
divided._


From the example of the Roman consuls who reconciled the citizens of
Ardea, we are taught the method whereby the feuds of a divided city may
be composed, namely, by putting the ringleaders of the disturbances to
death; and that no other remedy should be used. Three courses, indeed,
are open to you, since you may either put to death, as these consuls
did, or banish, or bind the citizens to live at peace with one another,
taking security for their good behaviour. Of which three ways the last
is the most hurtful, the most uncertain, and the least effectual;
because when much blood has been shed, or other like outrage done, it
cannot be that a peace imposed on compulsion should endure between men
who are every day brought face to face with one another; for since
fresh cause of contention may at any moment result from their meeting,
it will be impossible for them to refrain from mutual injury. Of this
we could have no better instance than in the city of Pistoja.

Fifteen years ago this city was divided between the Panciatichi and
Cancellieri, as indeed it still continues, the only difference being
that then they were in arms, whereas, now, they have laid them aside.
After much controversy and wrangling, these factions would presently
proceed to bloodshed, to pulling down houses, plundering property, and
all the other violent courses usual in divided cities. The Florentines,
with whom it lay to compose these feuds, strove for a long time to do
so by using the third of the methods mentioned; but when this only led
to increased tumult and disorder, losing patience, they decided to try
the second method and get rid of the ringleaders of both factions by
imprisoning some and banishing others. In this way a sort of settlement
was arrived at, which continues in operation up to the present hour.
There can be no question, however, that the first of the methods named
would have been the surest. But because extreme measures have in them
an element of greatness and nobility, a weak republic, so far from
knowing how to use this first method, can with difficulty be brought to
employ even the second. This, as I said at the beginning, is the kind
of blunder made by the princes of our times when they have to decide on
matters of moment, from their not considering how those men acted who
in ancient days had to determine under like conditions. For the
weakness of the present race of men (the result of their enfeebling
education and their ignorance of affairs), makes them regard the
methods followed by the ancients as partly inhuman and partly
impracticable. Accordingly, they have their own newfangled ways of
looking at things, wholly at variance with the true, as when the sages
of our city, some time since, pronounced that _Pistoja was to be held
by feuds and Pisa by fortresses_, not perceiving how useless each of
these methods is in itself.

Having spoken of fortresses already at some length, I shall not further
refer to them here, but shall consider the futility of trying to hold
subject cities by keeping them divided. In the first place, it is
impossible for the ruling power, whether prince or republic, to be
friends with both factions. For wherever there is division, it is human
nature to take a side, and to favour one party more than another. But
if one party in a subject city be unfriendly to you, the consequence
will be that you will lose that city so soon as you are involved in
war, since it is impossible for you to hold a city where you have
enemies both within and without. Should the ruling power be a republic,
there is nothing so likely to corrupt its citizens and sow dissension
among them, as having to control a divided city. For as each faction in
that city will seek support and endeavour to make friends in a variety
of corrupt ways, two very serious evils will result: first, that the
governed city will never be contented with its governors, since there
can be no good government where you often change its form, adapting
yourself to the humours now of one party and now of another; and next,
that the factious spirit of the subject city is certain to infect your
own republic. To which Biondo testifies, when, in speaking of the
citizens of Florence and Pistoja, he says, “_In seeking to unite
Pistoja the Florentines themselves fell out_.”[15]

 [15] _Flav. Blondri Hist._, dec. ii. lib. 9. Basle ed. 1559, p. 337


It is easy, therefore, to understand how much mischief attends on such
divisions. In the year 1501, when we lost Arezzo, and when all the Val
di Tevere and Val di Chiana were occupied by the Vitelli and by Duke
Valentino, a certain M. de Lant was sent by the King of France to cause
the whole of the lost towns to be restored to the Florentines; who
finding in all these towns men who came to him claiming to be of the
party of the _Marzocco_,[16] greatly blamed this distinction,
observing, that if in France any of the king’s subjects were to say
that he was of the king’s party, he would be punished; since the
expression would imply that there was a party hostile to the king,
whereas it was his majesty’s desire that all his subjects should be his
friends and live united without any distinction of party. But all these
mistaken methods and opinions originate in the weakness of rulers, who,
seeing that they cannot hold their States by their own strength and
valour, have recourse to like devices; which, if now and then in
tranquil times they prove of some slight assistance to them, in times
of danger are shown to be worthless.

 [16] The heraldic Lion of Florence.