# CHAPTER XXXIV —_By what reports, rumours, or surmises the Citizens of a

CHAPTER XXXIV.—_By what reports, rumours, or surmises the Citizens of a
Republic are led to favour a Fellow-citizen: and-whether the
Magistracies are bestowed with better judgment by a People or by a
Prince._


I have elsewhere related how Titus Manlius, afterwards named Torquatus,
rescued his father from the charge laid against him by Marcus
Pomponius, tribune of the people. And though the means he took to
effect this were somewhat violent and irregular, so pleasing to
everyone were his filial piety and affection, that not only did he
escape rebuke, but when military tribunes had to be appointed his name
was second on the list of those chosen. To explain his good fortune, it
will, I think, be useful to consider what are the methods followed by
the citizens of a republic in estimating the character of those on whom
they bestow honours, so as to see whether what I have already said on
this head be true, namely, that a people is more discriminating in
awarding honours than a prince.

I say, then, that in conferring honours and offices, the people, when
it has no knowledge of a man from his public career, follows the
estimate given of him by the general voice, and by common report; or
else is guided by some prepossession or preconceived opinion which it
has adopted concerning him. Such impressions are formed either from
consideration of a man’s descent (it being assumed, until the contrary
appears, that where his ancestors have been great and distinguished
citizens their descendant will resemble them), or else from regard to
his manners and habits; and nothing can be more in his favour than that
he frequents the company of the grave and virtuous, and such as are
generally reputed wise. For as we can have no better clue to a man’s
character than the company he keeps, he who frequents worthy company
deservedly obtains a good name, since there can hardly fail to be some
similarity between himself and his associates. Sometimes, however, the
popular estimate of a man is founded on some remarkable and noteworthy
action, though not of public moment, in which he has acquitted himself
well. And of all the three causes which create a prepossession in a
man’s favour, none is so effectual as this last. For the presumption
that he will resemble his ancestors and kinsmen is so often misleading,
that men are slow to trust and quick to discard it, unless confirmed by
the personal worth of him of whom they are judging.

The criterion of character afforded by a man’s manners and conversation
is a safer guide than the presumption of inherited excellence, but is
far inferior to that afforded by his actions; for until he has given
actual proof of his worth, his credit is built on mere opinion, which
may readily change. But this third mode of judging, which originates in
and rests upon his actions, at once gives him a name which can only be
destroyed by his afterwards doing many actions of a contrary nature.
Those therefore who live in a republic should conform to this third
criterion, and endeavour, as did many of the Roman youth, to make their
start in life with some extraordinary achievement, either by promoting
a law conducive to the general well-being, or by accusing some powerful
citizen as a transgressor of the laws, or by performing some similar
new and notable action which cannot fail to be much spoken of.

Actions like this are necessary not only to lay a foundation for your
fame, but also to maintain and extend it. To which end, they must
continually be renewed, as we find done by Titus Manlius throughout the
whole course of his life. For after winning his earliest renown by his
bold and singular defence of his father, when some years had passed he
fought his famous duel with the Gaul, from whom, when he had slain him,
he took the twisted golden collar which gave him the name of Torquatus.
Nor was this the last of his remarkable actions, for at a later period,
when he was of ripe years, he caused his own son to be put to death,
because he had fought without leave, although successfully. Which three
actions gained for him at the time a greater name, and have made him
more renowned through after ages than all his triumphs and victories,
though of these he had as large a share as fell to the lot of any other
Roman. The explanation of which is, that while in his victories Manlius
had many who resembled him, in these particular actions he stood almost
or entirely alone.

So, too, with the elder Scipio, all whose victories together did not
obtain for him so much reputation, as did his rescue, while he was yet
young, of his father at the Ticino, and his undaunted bearing after the
rout at Cannæ, when with his naked sword he constrained a number of the
Roman youth to swear never to abandon their country, as some among them
had before been minded to do. It was these two actions, therefore,
which laid the foundation of his future fame and paved the way for his
triumphs in Spain and Africa. And the fair esteem in which men held
him, was still further heightened when in Spain he restored a daughter
to her father, a wife to her husband.

Nor is it only the citizen who seeks reputation as leading to civil
honours, who must act in this way; the prince who would maintain his
credit in his princedom must do likewise; since nothing helps so much
to make a prince esteemed as to give signal proofs of his worth,
whether by words or by deeds which tend to promote the public good, and
show him to be so magnanimous, generous, and just, that he may well
pass into a proverb among his subjects. But to return to the point
whence I digressed, I say that if a people, when they first confer
honours on a fellow-citizen, rest their judgment on any one of the
three circumstances above-mentioned, they build on a reasonable
foundation; but, when many instances of noble conduct have made a man
favourably known, that the foundation is still better, since then there
is hardly room for mistake. I speak merely of those honours which are
bestowed on a man at the outset of his career, before he has come to be
known by continued proof, or is found to have passed from one kind of
conduct to another and dissimilar kind, and I maintain that in such
cases, so far as erroneous judgments or corrupt motives are concerned,
a people will always commit fewer mistakes than a prince.

But since a people may happen to be deceived as regards the character,
reputation, and actions of a man, thinking them better or greater than
in truth they are, an error a prince is less likely to fall into from
his being informed and warned by his advisers, in order that the people
may not lack similar advice, wise founders of republics have provided,
that when the highest dignities of the State, to which it would be
dangerous to appoint incapable men, have to be filled up, and it
appears that some incapable man is the object of the popular choice, it
shall be lawful and accounted honourable for any citizen to declare in
the public assemblies the defects of the favoured candidate, that the
people, being made acquainted therewith, may be better able to judge of
his fitness. That this was the practice in Rome we have proof in the
speech made by Fabius Maximus to the people during the second Punic
war, when in the appointment of consuls public favour leaned towards
Titus Ottacilius. For Fabius judging him unequal to the duties of the
consulship at such a crisis, spoke against him and pointed out his
insufficiency, and so prevented his appointment, turning the popular
favour towards another who deserved it more.

In the choice of its magistrates, therefore, a people judges of those
among whom it has to choose, in accordance with the surest indications
it can get; and when it can be advised as princes are, makes fewer
mistakes than they. But the citizen who would make a beginning by
gaining the good-will of the people, must, to obtain it, perform, like
Titus Manlius, some noteworthy action.