# CHAPTER XXVIII —_That a Republic must keep an eye on what its Citizens

CHAPTER XXVIII.—_That a Republic must keep an eye on what its Citizens
are about; since often the seeds of a Tyranny lie hidden under a
semblance of generous deeds._


The granaries of Rome not sufficing to meet a famine with which the
city was visited, a certain Spurius Melius, a very wealthy citizen for
these days, privately laid in a supply of corn wherewith to feed the
people at his own expense; gaining thereby such general favour with the
commons, that the senate, apprehending that his bounty might have
dangerous consequences, in order to crush him before he grew too
powerful, appointed a dictator to deal with him and caused him to be
put to death.

Here we have to note that actions which seem good in themselves and
unlikely to occasion harm to any one, very often become hurtful, nay,
unless corrected in time, most dangerous for a republic. And to treat
the matter with greater fulness, I say, that while a republic can never
maintain itself long, or manage its affairs to advantage, without
citizens of good reputation, on the other hand the credit enjoyed by
particular citizens often leads to the establishment of a tyranny. For
which reasons, and that things may take a safe course, it should be so
arranged that a citizen shall have credit only for such behaviour as
benefits, and not for such as injures the State and its liberties. We
must therefore examine by what ways credit is acquired. These, briefly,
are two, public or secret. Public, when a citizen gains a great name by
advising well or by acting still better for the common advantage. To
credit of this sort we should open a wide door, holding out rewards
both for good counsels and for good actions, so that he who renders
such services may be at once honoured and satisfied. Reputation
acquired honestly and openly by such means as these can never be
dangerous. But credit acquired by secret practices, which is the other
method spoken of, is most perilous and prejudicial. Of such secret
practices may be instanced, acts of kindness done to this or the other
citizen in lending him money, in assisting him to marry his daughters,
in defending him against the magistrates, and in conferring such other
private favours as gain men devoted adherents, and encourage them after
they have obtained such support, to corrupt the institutions of the
State and to violate its laws.

A well-governed republic, therefore, ought, as I have said, to throw
wide the door to all who seek public favour by open courses, and to
close it against any who would ingratiate themselves by underhand
means. And this we find was done in Rome. For the Roman republic, as a
reward to any citizen who served it well, ordained triumphs and all the
other honours which it had to bestow; while against those who sought to
aggrandize themselves by secret intrigues, it ordained accusations and
impeachment; and when, from the people being blinded by a false show of
benevolence, these proved insufficient, it provided for a dictator, who
with regal authority might bring to bounds any who had strayed beyond
them, as instanced in the case of Spurius Melius. And if conduct like
his be ever suffered to pass unchastised, it may well be the ruin of a
republic, for men when they have such examples set them are not easily
led back into the right path.