# CHAPTER XVI —_That in Times of Difficulty true Worth is sought after;

CHAPTER XVI.—_That in Times of Difficulty true Worth is sought after;
whereas in quiet Times it is not the most deserving, but those who are
recommended by Wealth or Connection who are most in favour._


It always has happened and always will, that the great and admirable
men of a republic are neglected in peaceful times; because at such
seasons many citizens are found, who, envying the reputation these men
have justly earned, seek to be regarded not merely as their equals but
as their superiors. Touching this there is a notable passage in
Thucydides, the Greek historian, where he tells how the republic of
Athens coming victorious out of the Peloponessian war, wherein she had
bridled the pride of Sparta, and brought almost the whole of Greece
under her authority, was encouraged by the greatness of her renown to
propose to herself the conquest of Sicily. In Athens this scheme was
much debated, Alcibiades and certain others who had the public welfare
very little in their thoughts, but who hoped that the enterprise, were
they placed in command, might minister to their fame, recommending that
it should be undertaken. Nicias, on the other hand, one of the best
esteemed of the Athenian citizens, was against it, and in addressing
the people, gave it as the strongest reason for trusting his advice,
that in advising them not to engage in this war, he urged what was not
for his own advantage; for he knew that while Athens remained at peace
numberless citizens were ready to take precedence of him: whereas, were
war declared, he was certain that none would rank before him or even be
looked upon as his equal.

Here we see that in tranquil times republics are subject to the
infirmity of lightly esteeming their worthiest citizens. And this
offends these persons for two reasons: first, because they are not
given the place they deserve; and second, because they see unworthy men
and of abilities inferior to their own, as much or more considered than
they. Injustice such as this has caused the ruin of many republics. For
citizens who find themselves undeservedly slighted, and perceive the
cause to be that the times are tranquil and not troubled, will strive
to change the times by stirring up wars hurtful to the public welfare.
When I look for remedies for this state of things, I find two: first,
to keep the citizens poor, so that wealth without worth shall corrupt
neither them nor others; second, to be so prepared for war as always to
be ready to make war; for then there will always be a need for worthy
citizens, as was the case in Rome in early times. For as Rome
constantly kept her armies in the field, there was constant opportunity
for men to display their valour, nor was it possible to deprive a
deserving man of his post and give it to another who was not deserving.
Or if ever this were done by inadvertency, or by way of experiment,
there forthwith resulted such disorder and danger, that the city at
once retraced its steps and reverted to the true path. But other
republics which are not regulated on the same plan, and make war only
when driven to it by necessity, cannot help committing this injustice,
nay, will constantly run into it, when, if the great citizen who finds
himself slighted be vindictive, and have some credit and following in
the city, disorder will always ensue. And though Rome escaped this
danger for a time, she too, as has elsewhere been said, having no
longer, after she had conquered Carthage and Antiochus, any fear of
war, came to think she might commit her armies to whom she would,
making less account of the valour of her captains than of those other
qualities which gain favour with the people. Accordingly we find Paulus
Emilius rejected oftener than once when he sought the consulship; nor,
in fact, obtaining it until the Macedonian war broke out, which, being
judged a formidable business, was by the voice of the whole city
committed to his management. After the year 1494 our city of Florence
was involved in a series of wars, in conducting which none of our
citizens had any success until chance threw the command into the hands
of one who showed us how an army should be led. This was Antonio
Giacomini, and so long as there were dangerous wars on foot, all
rivalry on the part of other citizens was suspended; and whenever a
captain or commissary had to be appointed he was unopposed. But when a
war came to be undertaken, as to the issue of which no misgivings were
felt, and which promised both honour and preferment, so numerous were
the competitors for command, that three commissaries having to be
chosen to conduct the siege of Pisa, Antonio was left out; and though
it cannot with certainty be shown that any harm resulted to our
republic from his not having been sent on this enterprise, we may
reasonably conjecture that such was indeed the case. For as the people
of Pisa were then without means either for subsistence or defence, it
may be believed that had Antonio been there he would have reduced them
to such extremities as would have forced them to surrender at
discretion to the Florentines. But Pisa being besieged by captains who
knew neither how to blockade nor how to storm it, held out so long,
that the Florentines, who should have reduced it by force, were obliged
to buy its submission. Neglect like this might well move Antonio to
resentment; and he must needs have been both very patient and very
forgiving if he felt no desire to revenge himself when he could, by the
ruin of the city or by injuries to individual citizens. But a republic
should beware not to rouse such feelings, as I shall show in the
following Chapter.