# CHAPTER XVIII —_That it is the highest Quality of a Captain to be able

CHAPTER XVIII.—_That it is the highest Quality of a Captain to be able
to forestall the designs of his Adversary._


It was a saying of Epaminondas the Theban that nothing was so useful
and necessary for a commander as to be able to see through the
intentions and designs of his adversary. And because it is hard to come
at this knowledge directly, the more credit is due to him who reaches
it by conjecture. Yet sometimes it is easier to fathom an enemy’s
designs than to construe his actions; and not so much those actions
which are done at a distance from us, as those done in our presence and
under our very eyes. For instance, it has often happened that when a
battle has lasted till nightfall, the winner has believed himself the
loser, and the loser has believed himself the winner and that this
mistake has led him who made it to follow a course hurtful to himself.
It was from a mistake of this sort, that Brutus and Cassius lost the
battle of Philippi. For though Brutus was victorious with his wing of
the army Cassius, whose wing was beaten, believed the entire army to be
defeated, and under this belief gave way to despair and slew himself.
So too, in our own days, in the battle fought by Francis, king of
France, with the Swiss at Santa Cecilia in Lombardy, when night fell,
those of the Swiss who remained unbroken, not knowing that the rest had
been routed and slain, thought they had the victory; and so believing
would not retreat, but, remaining on the field, renewed the combat the
following morning to their great disadvantage. Nor were they the only
sufferers from their mistake, since the armies of the Pope and of Spain
were also misled by it, and well-nigh brought to destruction. For on
the false report of a victory they crossed the Po, and had they only
advanced a little further must have been made prisoners by the
victorious French.

An instance is recorded of a like mistake having been made in the camps
both of the Romans and of the Equians. For the Consul Sempronius being
in command against the Equians, and giving the enemy battle, the
engagement lasted with varying success till nightfall, when as both
armies had suffered what was almost a defeat, neither returned to their
camp, but each drew off to the neighboring hills where they thought
they would be safer. The Romans separated into two divisions, one of
which with the consul, the other with the centurion Tempanius by whose
valour the army had that day been saved from utter rout. At daybreak
the consul, without waiting for further tidings of the enemy, made
straight for Rome; and the Equians, in like manner, withdrew to their
own country. For as each supposed the other to be victorious, neither
thought much of leaving their camp to be plundered by the enemy. It so
chanced, however, that Tempanius, who was himself retreating with the
second division of the Roman army, fell in with certain wounded
Equians, from whom he learned that their commanders had fled,
abandoning their camp; on hearing which, he at once returned to the
Roman camp and secured it, and then, after sacking the camp of the
Equians, went back victorious to Rome. His success, as we see, turned
entirely on his being the first to be informed of the enemy’s
condition. And here we are to note that it may often happen that both
the one and the other of two opposed armies shall fall into the same
disorder, and be reduced to the same straits; in which case, that which
soonest detects the other’s distress is sure to come off best.

I shall give an instance of this which occurred recently in our own
country. In the year 1498, when the Florentines had a great army in the
territory of Pisa and had closely invested the town, the Venetians, who
had undertaken its protection, seeing no other way to save it, resolved
to make a diversion in its favour by attacking the territories of the
Florentines in another quarter. Wherefore, having assembled a strong
force, they entered Tuscany by the Val di Lamona, and seizing on the
village of Marradi, besieged the stronghold of Castiglione which stands
on the height above it. Getting word of this, the Florentines sought to
relieve Marradi, without weakening the army which lay round Pisa. They
accordingly raised a new levy of foot-soldiers, and equipped a fresh
squadron of horse, which they despatched to Marradi under the joint
command of Jacopo IV. d’Appiano, lord of Piombino, and Count Rinuccio
of Marciano. These troops taking up their position on the hill above
Marradi, the Venetians withdrew from the investment of Castiglione and
lodged themselves in the village. But when the two armies had
confronted one another for several days, both began to suffer sorely
from want of victuals and other necessaries, and neither of them daring
to attack the other, or knowing to what extremities the other was
reduced, both simultaneously resolved to strike their camps the
following morning, and to retreat, the Venetians towards Berzighella
and Faenza, the Florentines towards Casaglia and the Mugello. But at
daybreak, when both armies had begun to remove their baggage, it so
happened that an old woman, whose years and poverty permitted her to
pass unnoticed, leaving the village of Marradi, came to the Florentine
camp, where were certain of her kinsfolk whom she desired to visit.
Learning from her that the Venetians were in retreat, the Florentine
commanders took courage, and changing their plan, went in pursuit of
the enemy as though they had dislodged them, sending word to Florence
that they had repulsed the Venetians and gained a victory. But in truth
this victory was wholly due to their having notice of the enemy’s
movements before the latter had notice of theirs. For had that notice
been given to the Venetians first, it would have wrought against us the
same results as it actually wrought for us.