# Chapter IX — Of the Civil Principality

But, coming to the other policy, when a private citizen becomes prince of his fatherland, not through crime or other intolerable violence but with the support of his fellow citizens (which one could call a civil principality; neither all virtue nor all fortune is necessary to attain it, but rather a fortunate astuteness)—I say that one ascends to this principality either with the support of the people or with the support of the great. For in every city these two diverse humors are found, which arises from this: that the people desire neither to be commanded nor oppressed by the great, and the great desire to command and oppress the people. From these two diverse appetites one of three effects occurs in cities: principality or liberty or license.

Principality is caused either by the people or by the great, according to which of these sides has the opportunity for it. For when the great see they cannot resist the people, they begin to give reputation to one of themselves, and they make him prince so that they can vent their appetite under his shadow. So too, the people, when they see they cannot resist the great, give reputation to one, and make him prince so as to be defended with his authority. He who comes to the principality with the aid of the great maintains himself with more difficulty than one who becomes prince with the aid of the people, because the former finds himself prince with many around him who appear to be his equals, and because of this he can neither command them nor manage them to suit himself. But he who arrives in the principality with popular support finds himself alone there, and around him has either no one or very few who are not ready to obey. Besides this, one cannot satisfy the great with decency and without injury to others, but one can satisfy the people; for the end of the people is more decent than that of the great, since the great want to oppress and the people want not to be oppressed. Furthermore, a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people, as they are too many; against the great, he can secure himself, as they are few. The worst that a prince can expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned by it; but from the great, when they are hostile, he must fear not only being abandoned but also that they may come against him, for since there is more foresight and more astuteness in the great, they always move in time to save themselves, and they seek rank from those they hope will win. Also, the prince always lives of necessity with the same people, but he can well do without the same great persons, since he can make and unmake them every day, and take away and give them reputation at his convenience.

And to better clarify this issue, I say that the great must be considered in two modes chiefly. Either they conduct themselves so that in their proceedings they are obligated in everything to your fortune, or not. Those who are obligated, and are not rapacious, must be honored and loved; those who are not obligated have to be examined in two modes. Either they do this out of pusillanimity and a natural defect of spirit; then you must make use especially of those who are of good counsel, because in prosperity they bring you honor and in adversity you do not have to fear them; but, when by art and for an ambitious cause, they are not obligated, it is a sign that they are thinking more for themselves than for you; and the prince must be on guard against them, and fear them as if they were open enemies, because in adversity they will always help ruin him.

Therefore, one who becomes prince through the support of the people should keep them friendly to him, which should be easy for him because they ask of him only that they not be oppressed. But one who becomes prince against the people with the support of the great must before everything else seek to gain the people to himself, which should be easy for him when he takes up its protection. And since men who receive good from someone from whom they believed they would receive evil are more obligated to their benefactor, the people immediately wish him well more than if he had been brought to the principality with their support. The prince can gain the people to himself in many modes, for which one cannot give certain rules because the modes vary according to circumstances,75 and so they will be left out. I will conclude only that for a prince it is necessary to have the people friendly; otherwise he has no remedy in adversity.

Nabis, prince of the Spartans,76 withstood a siege by all Greece and by one of Rome’s most victorious armies, and defended his fatherland and his state against them: and when danger supervened it was enough for him to secure himself only against a few, which would not have been enough if he had had a hostile people. And let no one resist my opinion on this with that trite proverb, that whoever founds on the people founds on mud. For that is true when a private citizen lays his foundation on them, and allows himself to think that the people will liberate him if he is oppressed by enemies or by the magistrates (in this case one can often be deceived, like the Gracchi in Rome77 and Messer Giorgio Scali in florence).78 But when a prince who founds on the people knows how to command and is a man full of heart, does not get frightened in adversity, does not fail to make other preparations, and with his spirit and his orders keeps the generality of people79 inspired, he will never find himself deceived by them and he will see he has laid his foundations well.

These principalities customarily run into peril when they are about to ascend from a civil order to an absolute one. For these princes either command by themselves or by means of magistrates. In the latter case their position is weaker and more dangerous because they remain altogether at the will of those citizens who have been put in the magistracies, who, especially in adverse times, can take away his state with great ease either by turning against him or by not obeying him. And the prince does not have time in the midst of danger to seize absolute authority because the citizens and subjects, who are accustomed to receive commands from the magistrates, are not ready, in these emergencies, to obey his; he will always have, in uncertain times, a shortage of those one can trust. For such a prince cannot found himself on what he sees in quiet times, when citizens have need of the state, because then everyone runs, everyone promises, and each wants to die for him when death is at a distance; but in adverse times, when the state has need of citizens, then few of them are to be found. And this test is all the more dangerous since one cannot make it but once. And so a wise prince must think of a way by which his citizens, always and in every quality of time, have need of the state and of himself; and then they will always be faithful to him.