# Book V

CHAPTER I

The vicissitudes of empires--The state of Italy--The military factions
of Sforza and Braccio--The Bracceschi and the Sforzeschi attack the
pope, who is expelled by the Romans--War between the pope and the duke
of Milan--The Florentines and the Venetians assist the pope--Peace
between the pope and the duke of Milan--Tyranny practiced by the party
favorable to the Medici.

It may be observed, that provinces amid the vicissitudes to which they
are subject, pass from order into confusion, and afterward recur to a
state of order again; for the nature of mundane affairs not allowing
them to continue in an even course, when they have arrived at their
greatest perfection, they soon begin to decline. In the same manner,
having been reduced by disorder, and sunk to their utmost state of
depression, unable to descend lower, they, of necessity, reascend;
and thus from good they gradually decline to evil, and from evil again
return to good. The reason is, that valor produces peace; peace, repose;
repose, disorder; disorder, ruin; so from disorder order springs; from
order virtue, and from this, glory and good fortune. Hence, wise men
have observed, that the age of literary excellence is subsequent to that
of distinction in arms; and that in cities and provinces, great warriors
are produced before philosophers. Arms having secured victory, and
victory peace, the buoyant vigor of the martial mind cannot be enfeebled
by a more excusable indulgence than that of letters; nor can indolence,
with any greater or more dangerous deceit, enter a well regulated
community. Cato was aware of this when the philosophers, Diogenes and
Carneades, were sent ambassadors to the senate by the Athenians; for
perceiving with what earnest admiration the Roman youth began to follow
them, and knowing the evils that might result to his country from this
specious idleness, he enacted that no philosopher should be allowed
to enter Rome. Provinces by this means sink to ruin, from which, men's
sufferings having made them wiser, they again recur to order, if they
be not overwhelmed by some extraordinary force. These causes made Italy,
first under the ancient Tuscans, and afterward under the Romans, by
turns happy and unhappy; and although nothing has subsequently arisen
from the ruins of Rome at all corresponding to her ancient greatness
(which under a well-organized monarchy might have been gloriously
effected), still there was so much bravery and intelligence in some of
the new cities and governments that afterward sprang up, that although
none ever acquired dominion over the rest, they were, nevertheless, so
balanced and regulated among themselves, as to enable them to live in
freedom, and defend their country from the barbarians.

Among these governments, the Florentines, although they possessed a
smaller extent of territory, were not inferior to any in power and
authority; for being situated in the middle of Italy, wealthy, and
prepared for action, they either defended themselves against such as
thought proper to assail them, or decided victory in favor of those
to whom they became allies. From the valor, therefore, of these new
governments, if no seasons occurred of long-continued peace, neither
were any exposed to the calamities of war; for that cannot be called
peace in which states frequently assail each other with arms, nor can
those be considered wars in which no men are slain, cities plundered,
or sovereignties overthrown; for the practice of arms fell into such a
state of decay, that wars were commenced without fear, continued without
danger, and concluded without loss. Thus the military energy which is
in other countries exhausted by a long peace, was wasted in Italy by
the contemptible manner in which hostilities were carried on, as will be
clearly seen in the events to be described from 1434 to 1494, from which
it will appear how the barbarians were again admitted into Italy, and
she again sunk under subjection to them. Although the transactions of
our princes at home and abroad will not be viewed with admiration of
their virtue and greatness like those of the ancients, perhaps they may
on other accounts be regarded with no less interest, seeing what
masses of high spirited people were kept in restraint by such weak and
disorderly forces. And if, in detailing the events which took place
in this wasted world, we shall not have to record the bravery of the
soldier, the prudence of the general, or the patriotism of the citizen,
it will be seen with what artifice, deceit, and cunning, princes,
warriors, and leaders of republics conducted themselves, to support a
reputation they never deserved. This, perhaps, will not be less useful
than a knowledge of ancient history; for, if the latter excites the
liberal mind to imitation, the former will show what ought to be avoided
and decried.

Italy was reduced to such a condition by her rulers, that when, by
consent of her princes, peace was restored, it was soon disturbed by
those who retained their armies, so that glory was not gained by war nor
repose by peace. Thus when the league and the duke of Milan agreed to
lay aside their arms in 1433, the soldiers, resolved upon war, directed
their efforts against the church. There were at this time two factions
or armed parties in Italy, the Sforzesca and the Braccesca. The leader
of the former was the Count Francesco, the son of Sforza, and of the
latter, Niccolo Piccinino and Niccolo Fortebraccio. Under the banner
of one or other of these parties almost all the forces of Italy were
assembled. Of the two, the Sforzesca was in greatest repute, as well
from the bravery of the count himself, as from the promise which the
duke of Milan had made him of his natural daughter, Madonna Bianca, the
prospect of which alliance greatly strengthened his influence. After
the peace of Lombardy, these forces, from various causes attacked Pope
Eugenius. Niccolo Fortebraccio was instigated by the ancient enmity
which Braccio had always entertained against the church; the count was
induced by ambition: so that Niccolo assailed Rome, and the count took
possession of La Marca.

The Romans, in order to avoid the war, drove Pope Eugenius from their
city: and he, having with difficulty escaped, came to Florence, where
seeing the imminent danger of his situation, being abandoned by the
princes (for they were unwilling again to take up arms in his cause,
after having been so anxious to lay them aside), he came to terms with
the count, and ceded to him the sovereignty of La Marca, although, to
the injury of having occupied it, he had added insult; for in signing
the place, from which he addressed letters to his agents, he said in
Latin, according to the Latin custom, _Ex Girfalco nostro Firmiano,
invito Petro et Paulo_. Neither was he satisfied with this concession,
but insisted upon being appointed Gonfalonier of the church, which was
also granted; so much more was Eugenius alarmed at the prospect of a
dangerous war than of an ignominious peace. The count, having been
thus been reconciled to the pontiff, attacked Niccolo Fortebraccio, and
during many months various encounters took place between them, from
all which greater injury resulted to the pope and his subjects, than to
either of the belligerents. At length, by the intervention of the duke
of Milan, an arrangement, by way of a truce, was made, by which both
became princes in the territories of the church.

The war thus extinguished at Rome was rekindled in Romagna by Batista
da Canneto, who at Bologna slew some of the family of the Grifoni, and
expelled from the city the governor who resided there for the pope,
along with others who were opposed to him. To enable himself to retain
the government, he applied for assistance to Filippo; and the pope,
to avenge himself for the injury, sought the aid of the Venetians and
Florentines. Both parties obtained assistance, so that very soon two
large armies were on foot in Romagna. Niccolo Piccinino commanded for
the duke, Gattamelata and Niccolo da Tolentino for the Venetians and
Florentines. They met near Imola, where a battle ensued, in which the
Florentines and Venetians were routed, and Niccolo da Tolentino was sent
prisoner to Milan where, either through grief for his loss or by some
unfair means, he died in a few days.

The duke, on this victory, either being exhausted by the late wars, or
thinking the League after their defeat would not be in haste to resume
hostilities, did not pursue his good fortune, and thus gave the pope and
his colleagues time to recover themselves. They therefore appointed
the Count Francesco for their leader, and undertook to drive Niccolo
Fortebraccio from the territories of the church, and thus terminate
the war which had been commenced in favor of the pontiff. The Romans,
finding the pope supported by so large an army, sought a reconciliation
with him, and being successful, admitted his commissary into the
city. Among the places possessed by Niccolo Fortebraccio, were Tivoli,
Montefiascone, Citta di Castello, and Ascesi, to the last of which, not
being able to keep the field, he fled, and the count besieged him there.
Niccolo's brave defense making it probable that the war would be of
considerable duration, the duke deemed to necessary to prevent the
League from obtaining the victory, and said that if this were not
effected he would very soon have to look at the defense of his own
territories. Resolving to divert the count from the siege, he commanded
Niccolo Piccinino to pass into Tuscany by way of Romagna; and the
League, thinking it more important to defend Tuscany than to occupy
Ascesi, ordered the count to prevent the passage of Niccolo, who was
already, with his army, at Furli. The count accordingly moved with his
forces, and came to Cesena, having left the war of La Marca and the care
of his own territories to his brother Lione; and while Niccolo Piccinino
was endeavoring to pass by, and the count to prevent him, Fortebraccio
attacked Lione with great bravery, made him prisoner, routed his forces,
and pursuing the advantage of his victory, at once possessed himself of
many places in La Marca. This circumstance greatly perplexed the count,
who thought he had lost all his territories; so, leaving part of his
force to check Piccinino, with the remainder he pursued Fortebraccio,
whom he attacked and conquered. Fortebraccio was taken prisoner in the
battle, and soon after died of his wounds. This victory restored to the
pontiff all the places that had been taken from him by Fortebraccio, and
compelled the duke of Milan to sue for peace, which was concluded by the
intercession of Niccolo da Esta, marquis of Ferrara; the duke restoring
to the church the places he had taken from her, and his forces retiring
into Lombardy. Batista da Canneto, as in the case with all who retain
authority only by the consent and forces of another, when the duke's
people had quitted Romagna, unable with his own power to keep possession
of Bologna, fled, and Antonio Bentivogli, the head of the opposite
party, returned to his country.

All this took place during the exile of Cosmo, after whose return,
those who had restored him, and a great number of persons injured by the
opposite party, resolved at all events to make themselves sure of the
government; and the Signory for the months of November and December, not
content with what their predecessors had done in favor of their party
extended the term and changed the residences of several who were
banished, and increased the number of exiles. In addition to these
evils, it was observed that citizens were more annoyed on account of
their wealth, their family connections or private animosities, than
for the sake of the party to which they adhered, so that if these
prescriptions had been accompanied with bloodshed, they would have
resembled those of Octavius and Sylla, though in reality they were not
without some stains; for Antonio di Bernardo Guadagni was beheaded, and
four other citizens, among whom were Zanobi dei Belfratelli and Cosmo
Barbadori, passing the confines to which they were limited, proceeded to
Venice, where the Venetians, valuing the friendship of Cosmo de' Medici
more than their own honor, sent them prisoners to him, and they were
basely put to death. This circumstance greatly increased the influence
of that party, and struck their enemies with terror, finding that such
a powerful republic would so humble itself to the Florentines. This,
however, was supposed to have been done, not so much out of kindness to
Cosmo, as to excite dissensions in Florence, and by means of bloodshed
make greater certainty of division among the citizens, for the Venetians
knew there was no other obstacle to their ambition so great as the union
of her people.

The city being cleared of the enemies, or suspected enemies of the
state, those in possession of the government now began to strengthen
their party by conferring benefits upon such as were in a condition
to serve them, and the family of the Alberti, with all who had been
banished by the former government, were recalled. All the nobility,
with few exceptions, were reduced to the ranks of the people, and the
possessions of the exiles were divided among themselves, upon each
paying a small acknowledgment. They then fortified themselves with new
laws and provisos, made new Squittini, withdrawing the names of their
adversaries from the purses, and filling them with those of their
friends. Taking advice from the ruin of their enemies, they considered
that to allow the great offices to be filled by mere chance of drawing,
did not afford the government sufficient security, they therefore
resolved that the magistrates possessing the power of life and death
should always be chosen from among the leaders of their own party,
and therefore that the _Accoppiatori_, or persons selected for the
imborsation of the new Squittini, with the Signory who had to retire
from office, should make the new appointments. They gave to eight of the
guard authority to proceed capitally, and provided that the exiles, when
their term of banishment was complete, should not be allowed to return,
unless from the Signory and Colleagues, which were thirty-seven in
number, the consent of thirty-four was obtained. It was made unlawful
to write to or to receive letters from them; every word, sign, or action
that gave offense to the ruling party was punished with the utmost
rigor; and if there was still in Florence any suspected person whom
these regulations did not reach, he was oppressed with taxes imposed for
the occasion. Thus in a short time, having expelled or impoverished the
whole of the adverse party, they established themselves firmly in the
government. Not to be destitute of external assistance, and to deprive
others of it, who might use it against themselves, they entered into a
league, offensive and defensive, with the pope, the Venetians, and the
duke of Milan.



CHAPTER II

Death of Giovanni II.--René of Anjou and Alfonso of Aragon aspire to
the kingdom--Alfonso is routed and taken by the Genoese--Alfonso being
a prisoner of the duke of Milan, obtains his friendship--The Genoese
disgusted with the duke of Milan--Divisions among the Genoese--The
Genoese, by means of Francesco Spinola, expel the duke's
governor--League against the duke of Milan--Rinaldo degli Albizzi
advises the duke to make war against the Florentines--His discourse to
the duke--The duke adopts measures injurious to the Florentines--Niccolo
Piccinino appointed to command the duke's forces--Preparations of the
Florentines--Piccinino routed before Barga.

The affairs of Florence being in this condition, Giovanna, queen
of Naples, died, and by her will appointed René of Anjou to be her
successor. Alfonso, king of Aragon, was at this time in Sicily, and
having obtained the concurrence of many barons, prepared to take
possession of the kingdom. The Neapolitans, with whom a greater number
of barons were also associated, favored René. The pope was unwilling
that either of them should obtain it; but desired the affairs of Naples
to be administered by a governor of his own appointing.

In the meantime Alfonso entered the kingdom, and was received by the
duke of Sessa; he brought with him some princes, whom he had engaged in
his service, with the design (already possessing Capua, which the prince
of Taranto held in his name) of subduing the Neapolitans, and sent his
fleet to attack Gaeta, which had declared itself in their favor. They
therefore demanded assistance of the duke of Milan, who persuaded the
Genoese to undertake their defense; and they, to satisfy the duke their
sovereign, and protect the merchandise they possessed, both at Naples
and Gaeta, armed a powerful fleet. Alfonso hearing of this, augmented
his own naval force, went in person to meet the Genoese, and coming up
with them near the island of Ponzio, an engagement ensued, in which the
Aragonese were defeated, and Alfonso, with many of the princes of his
suite, made prisoners, and sent by the Genoese to the Filippo.

This victory terrified the princes of Italy, who, being jealous of the
duke's power, thought it would give him a great opportunity of being
sovereign of the whole country. But so contrary are the views of men,
that he took a directly opposite course. Alfonso was a man of
great sagacity, and as soon as an opportunity presented itself
of communicating with Filippo, he proved to him how completely he
contravened his own interests, by favoring René and opposing himself;
for it would be the business of the former, on becoming king of Naples,
to introduce the French into Milan; that in an emergency he might have
assistance at hand, without the necessity of having to solicit a passage
for his friends. But he could not possibly secure this advantage without
effecting the ruin of the duke, and making his dominions a French
province; and that the contrary of all this would result from himself
becoming lord of Naples; for having only the French to fear, he would be
compelled to love and caress, nay even to obey those who had it in their
power to open a passage for his enemies. That thus the title of king
of king of Naples would be with himself (Alfonso), but the power and
authority with Filippo; so that it was much more the duke's business
than his own to consider the danger of one course and the advantage of
the other; unless he rather wished to gratify his private prejudices
than to give security to his dominions. In the one case he would be a
free prince, in the other, placed between two powerful sovereigns, he
would either be robbed of his territories or live in constant fear, and
have to obey them like a slave. These arguments so greatly influenced
the duke, that, changing his design, he set Alfonso at liberty, sent
him honorably to Genoa and then to Naples. From thence the king went
to Gaeta, which as soon as his liberation had become known, was taken
possession of by some nobles of his party.

The Genoese, seeing that the duke, without the least regard for them,
had liberated the king, and gained credit to himself through the dangers
and expense which they had incurred; that he enjoyed all the honor of
the liberation, and they were themselves exposed to the odium of the
capture, and the injuries consequent upon the king's defeat, were
greatly exasperated. In the city of Genoa, while in the enjoyment of her
liberty, a magistrate is created with the consent of the people, whom
they call the Doge; not that he is absolutely a prince, or that he alone
has the power of determining matters of government; but that, as the
head of the state, he proposes those questions or subjects which have
to be considered and determined by the magistrates and the councils. In
that city are many noble families so powerful, that they are with great
difficulty induced to submit to the authority of the law. Of these,
the most powerful are the Fregosa and the Adorna, from whom arise the
dissensions of the city, and the impotence of her civil regulations; for
the possession of this high office being contested by means inadmissible
in well-regulated communities, and most commonly with arms in their
hands, it always occurs that one party is oppressed and the other
triumphant; and sometimes those who fail in the pursuit have recourse to
the arms of strangers, and the country they are not allowed to rule they
subject to foreign authority. Hence it happens, that those who govern in
Lombardy most commonly command in Genoa, as occurred at the time Alfonso
of Aragon was made prisoner. Among the leading Genoese who had been
instrumental in subjecting the republic to Filippo, was Francesco
Spinola, who, soon after he had reduced his country to bondage, as
always happens in such cases, became suspected by the duke. Indignant at
this, he withdrew to a sort of voluntary exile at Gaeta, and being
there when the naval expedition was in preparation, and having conducted
himself with great bravery in the action, he thought he had again
merited so much of the duke's confidence as would obtain for him
permission to remain undisturbed at Genoa. But the duke still retained
his suspicions; for he could not believe that a vacillating defender of
his own country's liberty would be faithful to himself; and Francesco
Spinola resolved again to try his fortune, and if possible restore
freedom to his country, and honorable safety for himself; for he was
there was no probability of regaining the forfeited affection of
his fellow-citizens, but by resolving at his own peril to remedy the
misfortunes which he had been so instrumental in producing. Finding the
indignation against the duke universal, on account of the liberation
of the king, he thought the moment propitious for the execution of his
design. He communicated his ideas to some whom he knew to be similarly
inclined, and his arguments ensured their co-operation.

The great festival of St. John the Baptist being come, when Arismeno,
the new governor sent by the duke, was to enter Genoa, and he being
already arrived, accompanied by Opicino, the former governor, and many
Genoese citizens, Francesco Spinola thought further delay improper; and,
issuing from his house with those acquainted with his design, all armed,
they raised the cry of liberty. It was wonderful to see how eagerly the
citizens and people assembled at the word; so that those who for any
reason might be favorable to Filippo, not only had no time to arm, but
scarcely to consider the means of escape. Arismeno, with some Genoese,
fled to the fortress which was held for the duke, Opicino, thinking that
if he could reach the palace, where two thousand men were in arms, and
at his command, he might be able either to effect his own safety, or
induce his friends to defend themselves, took that direction; but before
he arrived at the piazza he was slain, his body divided into many pieces
and scattered about the city. The Genoese having placed the government
in the hands of free magistrates, in a few days recovered the castle,
and the other strongholds possessed by the duke, and delivered
themselves entirely from his yoke.

These transactions, though at first they had alarmed the princes of
Italy with the apprehension that the duke would become too powerful,
now gave them hope, seeing the turn they had taken, of being able to
restrain him; and, notwithstanding the recent league, the Florentines
and Venetians entered into alliance with the Genoese. Rinaldo degli
Albizzi and the other leading Florentine exiles, observing the altered
aspect of affairs, conceived hopes of being able to induce the duke
to make war against Florence, and having arrived at Milan, Rinaldo
addressed him in the following manner: "If we, who were once your
enemies, come now confidently to supplicate your assistance to enable
us to return to our country, neither you, nor anyone, who considers the
course and vicissitudes of human affairs, can be at all surprised; for
of our past conduct toward yourself and our present intentions toward
our country, we can adduce palpable and abundant reasons. No good man
will ever reproach another who endeavors to defend his country, whatever
be his mode of doing so; neither have we had any design of injuring
you, but only to preserve our country from detriment; and we appeal to
yourself, whether, during the greatest victories of our league, when you
were really desirous of peace, we were not even more anxious for it than
yourself; so that we do not think we have done aught to make us despair
altogether of favor from you. Nor can our country itself complain that
we now exhort you to use those arms against her, from which we have so
pertinaciously defended her; for that state alone merits the love of
all her citizens, which cares with equal affection for all; not one that
favors a few, and casts from her the great mass of her children. Nor are
the arms that men use against their country to be universally condemned;
for communities, although composed of many, resemble individual bodies;
and as in these, many infirmities arise which cannot be cured without
the application of fire or of steel, so in the former, there often occur
such numerous and great evils, that a good and merciful citizen, when
there is a necessity for the sword, would be much more to blame in
leaving her uncured, than by using this remedy for her preservation.
What greater disease can afflict a republic than slavery? and what
remedy is more desirable for adoption than the one by which alone it can
be effectually removed? No wars are just but those that are necessary;
and force is merciful when it presents the only hope of relief. I know
not what necessity can be greater than ours, or what compassion can
exceed that which rescues our country from slavery. Our cause is
therefore just, and our purpose merciful, as both yourself and we may
be easily convinced. The amplest justice is on your side; for the
Florentines have not hesitated, after a peace concluded with so much
solemnity, to enter into league with those who have rebelled against
you; so that if our cause is insufficient to excite you against them,
let your own just indignation do so; and the more so, seeing the
facility of the undertaking. You need be under no apprehension from the
memory of the past, in which you may have observed the power of
that people and their pertinency in self-defense; though these might
reasonably excite fear, if they were still animated by the valor of
former times. But now, all is entirely the reverse; for what power can
be expected in a city that has recently expelled the greatest part of
her wealth and industry? What indomitable resolution need be apprehended
from the people whom so many and such recent enmities have disunited?
The disunion which still prevails will prevent wealthy citizens
advancing money as they used to do on former occasions; for though men
willingly contribute according to their means, when they see their own
credit, glory, and private advantage dependent upon it, or when there
is a hope of regaining in peace what has been spent in war, but not when
equally oppressed under all circumstances, when in war they suffer the
injuries of the enemy, and in peace, the insolence of those who govern
them. Besides this, the people feel more deeply the avarice of their
rulers, than the rapacity of the enemy; for there is hope of being
ultimately relieved from the latter evil, but none from the former.
Thus, in the last war, you had to contend with the whole city; but now
with only a small portion. You attempted to take the government from
many good citizens; but now you oppose only a few bad ones. You then
endeavored to deprive a city of her liberty, now you come to restore
it. As it is unreasonable to suppose that under such disparity of
circumstances, the result should be the same, you have now every reason
to anticipate an easy victory; and how much it will strengthen your own
government, you may easily judge; having Tuscany friendly, and bound by
so powerful an obligation, in your enterprises, she will be even of more
service to you than Milan. And, although, on former occasions, such an
acquisition might be looked upon as ambitious and unwarrantable, it will
now be considered merciful and just. Then do not let this opportunity
escape, and be assured, that although your attempts against the city
have been attended with difficulty, expense, and disgrace, this will
with facility procure you incalculable advantage and an honorable
renown."

Many words were not requisite to induce the duke to hostilities against
the Florentines, for he was incited to it by hereditary hatred and blind
ambition, and still more, by the fresh injuries which the league with
the Genoese involved; yet his past expenses, the dangerous measures
necessary, the remembrance of his recent losses, and the vain hopes of
the exiles, alarmed him. As soon as he had learned the revolt of Genoa,
he ordered Niccolo Piccinino to proceed thither with all his cavalry
and whatever infantry he could raise, for the purpose of recovering
her, before the citizens had time to become settled and establish a
government; for he trusted greatly in the fortress within the city,
which was held for him. And although Niccolo drove the Genoese from
the mountains, took from them the valley of Pozeveri, where they had
entrenched themselves, and obliged them to seek refuge within the walls
of the city, he still found such an insurmountable obstacle in the
resolute defense of the citizens, that he was compelled to withdraw. On
this, at the suggestion of the Florentine exiles, he commanded Niccolo
to attack them on the eastern side, upon the confines of Pisa in the
Genoese territory, and to push the war with his utmost vigor, thinking
this plan would manifest and develop the course best to be adopted.
Niccolo therefore besieged and took Serezana, and having committed great
ravages, by way of further alarming the Florentines he proceeded to
Lucca, spreading a report that it was his intention to go to Naples
to render assistance to the king of Aragon. Upon these new events Pope
Eugenius left Florence and proceeded to Bologna, where he endeavored
to effect an amicable arrangement between the league and the duke,
intimating to the latter, that if he would not consent to some treaty,
the pontiff must send Francesco Sforza to assist the league, for the
latter was now his confederate, and served in his pay. Although the pope
greatly exerted himself in this affair, his endeavors were unavailing;
for the duke would not listen to any proposal that did not leave him the
possession of Genoa, and the league had resolved that she should remain
free; and, therefore, each party, having no other resource, prepared to
continue the war.

In the meantime Niccolo Piccinino arrived at Lucca, and the Florentines,
being doubtful what course to adopt, ordered Neri di Gino to lead their
forces into the Pisan territory, induced the pontiff to allow Count
Francesco to join him, and with their forces they halted at San Gonda.
Piccinino then demanded admission into the kingdom of Naples, and this
being refused, he threatened to force a passage. The armies were
equal, both in regard of numbers and the capacity of their leaders, and
unwilling to tempt fortune during the bad weather, it being the month of
December, they remained several days without attacking each other. The
first movement was made by Niccolo Piccinino, who being informed that if
he attacked Vico Pisano by night, he could easily take possession of
the place, made the attempt, and having failed, ravaged the surrounding
country, and then burned and plundered the town of San Giovanni alla
Vena. This enterprise, though of little consequence, excited him to make
further attempts, the more so from being assured that the count and Neri
were yet in their quarters, and he attacked Santa Maria in Castello and
Filetto, both which places he took. Still the Florentine forces would
not stir; not that the count entertained any fear, but because, out of
regard to the pope, who still labored to effect an accommodation, the
government of Florence had deferred giving their final consent to the
war. This course, which the Florentines adopted from prudence, was
considered by the enemy to be only the result of timidity, and with
increased boldness they led their forces up to Barga, which they
resolved to besiege. This new attack made the Florentines set aside
all other considerations, and resolve not only to relieve Barga, but
to invade the Lucchese territory. Accordingly the count proceeded in
pursuit of Niccolo, and coming up with him before Barga, an engagement
took place, in which Piccinino was overcome, and compelled to raise the
siege.

The Venetians considering the duke to have broken the peace, send Giovan
Francesco da Gonzaga, their captain, to Ghiaradadda, who, by severely
wasting the duke's territories, induced him to recall Niccolo Piccinino
from Tuscany. This circumstance, together with the victory obtained over
Niccolo, emboldened the Florentines to attempt the recovery of Lucca,
since the duke, whom alone they feared, was engaged with the Venetians,
and the Lucchese having received the enemy into their city, and allowed
him to attack them, would have no ground of complaint.



CHAPTER III

The Florentines go to war with Lucca--Discourse of a citizen of Lucca to
animate the plebeians against the Florentines--The Lucchese resolve
to defend themselves--They are assisted by the duke of Milan--Treaty
between the Florentines and the Venetians--Francesco Sforza, captain of
the league, refuses to cross the Po in the service of the Venetians
and returns to Tuscany--The bad faith of the Venetians toward the
Florentines--Cosmo de' Medici at Venice--Peace between the Florentines
and the Lucchese--The Florentines effect a reconciliation between the
pope and the Count di Poppi--The pope consecrates the church of Santa
Reparata--Council of Florence.

The count commenced operations against Lucca in April, 1437, and the
Florentines, desirous of recovering what they had themselves lost before
they attacked others, retook Santa Maria in Castello, and all the places
which Piccinino had occupied. Then, entering the Lucchese territory,
they besieged Camaiore, the inhabitants of which, although faithful
to their rulers, being influenced more by immediate danger than by
attachment to their distant friends, surrendered. In the same manner,
they obtained Massa and Serezana. Toward the end of May they proceeded
in the direction of Lucca, burning the towns, destroying the growing
crops, grain, trees, and vines, driving away the cattle, and leaving
nothing undone to injure the enemy. The Lucchese, finding themselves
abandoned by the duke, and hopeless of defending the open country,
forsook it; entrenched and fortified the city, which they doubted not,
being well garrisoned, they would be able to defend for a time, and
that, in the interim, some event would occur for their relief, as had
been the case during the former wars which the Florentines had carried
on against them. Their only apprehension arose from the fickle minds
of the plebeians, who, becoming weary of the siege, would have more
consideration of their own danger than of other's liberty, and would
thus compel them to submit to some disgraceful and ruinous capitulation.
In order to animate them to defense, they were assembled in the public
piazza, and some of the eldest and most esteemed of the citizens
addressed them in the following terms: "You are doubtless aware that
what is done from necessity involves neither censure nor applause;
therefore, if you should accuse us of having caused the present war, by
receiving the ducal forces into the city, and allowing them to commit
hostilities against the Florentines, you are greatly mistaken. You are
well acquainted with the ancient enmity of the Florentines against you,
which is not occasioned by any injuries you have done them, or by fear
on their part, but by our weakness and their own ambition; for the one
gives them hope of being able to oppress us, and the other incites them
to attempt it. It is then vain to imagine that any merit of yours can
extinguish that desire in them, or that any offense you can commit, can
provoke them to greater animosity. They endeavor to deprive you of your
liberty; you must resolve to defend it; and whatever they may undertake
against us for that purpose, although we may lament, we need not wonder.
We may well grieve, therefore, that they attack us, take possession of
our towns, burn our houses, and waste our country. But who is so simple
as to be surprised at it? for were it in our power, we should do just
the same to them, or even worse. They declare war against us now, they
say, for having received Niccolo; but if we had not received him, they
would have done the same and assigned some other ground for it; and if
the evil had been delayed, it would most probably have been greater.
Therefore, you must not imagine it to be occasioned by his arrival, but
rather by your own ill fortune and their ambition; for we could not have
refused admission to the duke's forces, and, being come, we could
not prevent their aggressions. You know, that without the aid of some
powerful ally we are incapable of self-defense, and that none can render
us this service more powerfully or faithfully than the duke. He restored
our liberty; it is reasonable to expect he will defend it. He has always
been the greatest foe of our inveterate enemies; if, therefore, to avoid
incensing the Florentines we had excited his anger, we should have lost
our best friend, and rendered our enemy more powerful and more disposed
to oppress us; so that it is far preferable to have this war upon our
hands, and enjoy the favor of the duke, than to be in peace without it.
Besides, we are justified in expecting that he will rescue us from the
dangers into which we are brought on his account, if we only do not
abandon our own cause. You all know how fiercely the Florentines have
frequently assailed us, and with what glory we have maintained our
defense. We have often been deprived of every hope, except in God
and the casualties which time might produce, and both have proved our
friends. And as they have delivered us formerly, why should they not
continue to do so. Then we were forsaken by the whole of Italy; now we
have the duke in our favor; besides we have a right to suppose that the
Venetians will not hastily attack us; for they will not willingly see
the power of Florence increased. On a former occasion the Florentines
were more at liberty; they had greater hope of assistance, and were more
powerful in themselves, while we were in every respect weaker; for then
a tyrant governed us, now we defend ourselves; then the glory of our
defense was another's, now it is our own; then they were in harmony, now
they are disunited, all Italy being filled with their banished citizens.
But were we without the hope which these favorable circumstances
present, our extreme necessity should make us firmly resolved on our
defense. It is reasonable to fear every enemy, for all seek their
own glory and your ruin; above all others, you have to dread the
Florentines, for they would not be satisfied by submission and tribute,
or the dominion of our city, but they would possess our entire substance
and persons, that they might satiate their cruelty with our blood, and
their avarice with our property, so that all ranks ought to dread them.
Therefore do not be troubled at seeing our crops destroyed, our towns
burned, our fortresses occupied; for if we preserve the city, the rest
will be saved as a matter of course; if we lose her, all else would be
of no advantage to us; for while retaining our liberty, the enemy can
hold them only with the greatest difficulty, while losing it they would
be preserved in vain. Arm, therefore; and when in the fight, remember
that the reward of victory will be safety, not only to your country, but
to your homes, your wives, and your children." The speaker's last words
were received with the utmost enthusiasm by the people, who promised one
and all to die rather than abandon their cause, or submit to any terms
that could violate their liberty. They then made arrangements for the
defense of the city.

In the meantime, the Florentine forces were not idle; and after
innumerable mischiefs done to the country took Monte Carlo by
capitulation. They then besieged Uzzano, in order that the Lucchese,
being pressed on all sides, might despair of assistance, and be
compelled to submission by famine. The fortress was very strong, and
defended by a numerous garrison, so that its capture would be by no
means an easy undertaking. The Lucchese, as might be expected, seeing
the imminent peril of their situation, had recourse to the duke, and
employed prayers and remonstrances to induce him to render them aid.
They enlarged upon their own merits and the offenses of the Florentines;
and showed how greatly it would attach the duke's friends to him to
find they were defended, and how much disaffection it would spread among
them, if they were left to be overwhelmed by the enemy; that if they
lost their liberties and their lives, he would lose his honor and his
friends, and forfeit the confidence of all who from affection might be
induced to incur dangers in his behalf; and added tears to entreaties,
so that if he were unmoved by gratitude to them, he might be induced
to their defense by motives of compassion. The duke, influenced by his
inveterate hostility against the Florentines, his new obligation to
the Lucchese, and, above all, by his desire to prevent so great
an acquisition from falling into the hands of his ancient enemies,
determined either to send a strong force into Tuscany, or vigorously to
assail the Venetians, so as to compel the Florentines to give up their
enterprise and go to their relief.

It was soon known in Florence that the duke was preparing to send forces
into Tuscany. This made the Florentines apprehensive for the success
of their enterprise; and in order to retain the duke in Lombardy, they
requested the Venetians to press him with their utmost strength. But
they also were alarmed, the marquis of Mantua having abandoned them and
gone over to the duke; and thus, finding themselves almost defenseless,
they replied, "that instead of increasing their responsibilities, they
should be unable to perform their part in the war, unless the Count
Francesco were sent to them to take the command of the army, and with
the special understanding that he should engage to cross the Po in
person. They declined to fulfil their former engagements unless he were
bound to do so; for they could not carry on the war without a leader,
or repose confidence in any except the count; and he himself would be
useless to them, unless he came under an obligation to carry on the
war whenever they might think needful." The Florentines thought the war
ought to be pushed vigorously in Lombardy; but they saw that if they
lost the count their enterprise against Lucca was ruined; and they knew
well that the demand of the Venetians arose less from any need they had
of the count, than from their desire to frustrate this expedition. The
count, on the other hand, was ready to pass into Lombardy whenever
the league might require him, but would not alter the tenor of his
engagement; for he was unwilling to sacrifice the hope of the alliance
promised to him by the duke.

The Florentines were thus embarrassed by two contrary impulses, the
wish to possess Lucca, and the dread of a war with Milan. As commonly
happens, fear was the most powerful, and they consented, after the
capture of Uzzano, that the count should go into Lombardy. There still
remained another difficulty, which, depending on circumstances beyond
the reach of their influence, created more doubts and uneasiness
than the former; the count would not consent to pass the Po, and the
Venetians refused to accept him on any other condition. Seeing no other
method of arrangement, than that each should make liberal concessions,
the Florentines induced the count to cross the river by a letter
addressed to the Signory of Florence, intimating that this private
promise did not invalidate any public engagement, and that he might
still refrain from crossing; hence it resulted that the Venetians,
having commenced the war, would be compelled to proceed, and that the
evil apprehended by the Florentines would be averted. To the
Venetians, on the other hand, they averred that this private letter was
sufficiently binding, and therefore they ought to be content; for if
they could save the count from breaking with his father-in-law, it was
well to do so, and that it could be of no advantage either to themselves
or the Venetians to publish it without some manifest necessity. It was
thus determined that the count should pass into Lombardy; and having
taken Uzzano, and raised bastions about Lucca to restrain in her
inhabitants, placed the management of the siege in the hands of the
commissaries, crossed the Apennines, and proceeded to Reggio, when
the Venetians, alarmed at his progress, and in order to discover his
intentions, insisted upon his immediately crossing the Po, and joining
the other forces. The count refused compliance, and many mutual
recriminations took place between him and Andrea Mauroceno, their
messenger on this occasion, each charging the other with arrogance
and treachery: after many protestations, the one of being under no
obligation to perform that service, and the other of not being bound to
any payment, they parted, the count to return to Tuscany, the other to
Venice.

The Florentines had sent the count to encamp in the Pisan territory, and
were in hopes of inducing him to renew the war against the Lucchese, but
found him indisposed to do so, for the duke, having been informed that
out of regard to him he had refused to cross the Po, thought that by
this means he might also save the Lucchese, and begged the count to
endeavor to effect an accommodation between the Florentines and the
Lucchese, including himself in it, if he were able, declaring, at
the same time, the promised marriage should be solemnized whenever he
thought proper. The prospect of this connection had great influence with
the count, for, as the duke had no sons, it gave him hope of becoming
sovereign of Milan. For this reason he gradually abated his exertions
in the war, declared he would not proceed unless the Venetians fulfilled
their engagement as to the payment, and also retained him in the
command; that the discharge of the debt would not alone be sufficient,
for desiring to live peaceably in his own dominions, he needed some
alliance other than that of the Florentines, and that he must regard his
own interests, shrewdly hinting that if abandoned by the Venetians, he
would come to terms with the duke.

These indirect and crafty methods of procedure were highly offensive
to the Florentines, for they found their expedition against Lucca
frustrated, and trembled for the safety of their own territories if ever
the count and the duke should enter into a mutual alliance. To induce
the Venetians to retain the count in the command, Cosmo de' Medici went
to Venice, hoping his influence would prevail with them, and discussed
the subject at great length before the senate, pointing out the
condition of the Italian states, the disposition of their armies, and
the great preponderance possessed by the duke. He concluded by saying,
that if the count and the duke were to unite their forces, they (the
Venetians) might return to the sea, and the Florentines would have to
fight for their liberty. To this the Venetians replied, that they were
acquainted with their own strength and that of the Italians, and thought
themselves able at all events to provide for their own defense; that
it was not their custom to pay soldiers for serving others; that as the
Florentines had used the count's services, they must pay him themselves;
with respect to the security of their own states, it was rather
desirable to check the count's pride than to pay him, for the ambition
of men is boundless, and if he were now paid without serving, he would
soon make some other demand, still more unreasonable and dangerous. It
therefore seemed necessary to curb his insolence, and not allow it to
increase till it became incorrigible; and that if the Florentines, from
fear or any other motive, wished to preserve his friendship, they must
pay him themselves. Cosmo returned without having effected any part of
his object.

The Florentines used the weightiest arguments they could adopt to
prevent the count from quitting the service of the League, a course he
was himself reluctant to follow, but his desire to conclude the marriage
so embarrassed him, that any trivial accident would have been sufficient
to determine his course, as indeed shortly happened. The count had
left his territories in La Marca to the care of Il Furlano, one of his
principal condottieri, who was so far influenced by the duke as to
take command under him, and quit the count's service. This circumstance
caused the latter to lay aside every idea but that of his own safety,
and to come to agreement with the duke; among the terms of which compact
was one that he should not be expected to interfere in the affairs of
Romagna and Tuscany. The count then urged the Florentines to come to
terms with the Lucchese, and so convinced them of the necessity of this,
that seeing no better course to adopt, they complied in April, 1438, by
which treaty the Lucchese retained their liberty, and the Florentines
Monte Carlo and a few other fortresses. After this, being full
of exasperation, they despatched letters to every part of Italy,
overcharged with complaints, affecting to show that since God and men
were averse to the Lucchese coming under their dominion, they had made
peace with them. And it seldom happens that any suffer so much for the
loss of their own lawful property as they did because they could not
obtain the possessions of others.

Though the Florentines had now so many affairs in hand, they did not
allow the proceedings of their neighbors to pass unnoticed, or neglect
the decoration of their city. As before observed, Niccolo Fortebraccio
was dead. He had married a daughter of the Count di Poppi, who, at
the decease of his son-in-law, held the Borgo San Sepolcro, and other
fortresses of that district, and while Niccolo lived, governed them in
his name. Claiming them as his daughter's portion, he refused to give
them up to the pope, who demanded them as property held of the church,
and who, upon his refusal, sent the patriarch with forces to take
possession of them. The count, finding himself unable to sustain the
attack, offered them to the Florentines, who declined them; but the pope
having returned to Florence, they interceded with him in the count's
behalf. Difficulties arising, the patriarch attacked the Casentino, took
Prato Vecchio, and Romena, and offered them also to the Florentines, who
refused them likewise, unless the pope would consent they should restore
them to the count, to which, after much hesitation, he acceded, on
condition that the Florentines should prevail with the Count di Poppi
to restore the Borgo to him. The pope was thus satisfied, and the
Florentines having so far completed the building of their cathedral
church of Santa Reparata, which had been commenced long ago, as to
enable them to perform divine service in it, requested his holiness
to consecrate it. To this the pontiff willingly agreed, and the
Florentines, to exhibit the wealth of the city and the splendor of the
edifice, and do greater honor to the pope, erected a platform from
Santa Maria Novella, where he resided, to the cathedral he was about to
consecrate, six feet in height and twelve feet wide, covered with rich
drapery, for the accommodation of the pontiff and his court, upon which
they proceeded to the building, accompanied by those civic magistrates,
and other officers who were appointed to take part in the procession.
The usual ceremonies of consecration having been completed, the pope, to
show his affection for the city, conferred the honor of knighthood upon
Giuliano Davanzati, their Gonfalonier of Justice, and a citizen of the
highest reputation; and the Signory, not to appear less gracious than
the pope, granted to the new created knight the government of Pisa for
one year.

There were at that time certain differences between the Roman and the
Greek churches, which prevented perfect conformity in divine service;
and at the last council of Bâle, the prelates of the Western church
having spoken at great length upon the subject, it was resolved that
efforts should be made to bring the emperor and the Greek prelates to
the council at Bâle, to endeavor to reconcile the Greek church with the
Roman. Though this resolution was derogatory to the majesty of the Greek
empire, and offensive to its clergy, yet being then oppressed by the
Turks, and fearing their inability for defense, in order to have a
better ground for requesting assistance, they submitted; and therefore,
the emperor, the patriarch, with other prelates and barons of Greece,
to comply with the resolution of the council, assembled at Bâle, came
to Venice; but being terrified by the plague then prevailing, it was
resolved to terminate their differences at Florence. The Roman and Greek
prelates having held a conference during several days, in which many
long discussions took place, the Greeks yielded, and agreed to adopt the
ritual of the church of Rome.



CHAPTER IV

New wars in Italy--Niccolo Piccinino, in concert with the duke of
Milan, deceives the pope, and takes many places from the church--Niccolo
attacks the Venetians--Fears and precautions of the Florentines--The
Venetians request assistance of the Florentines and of Sforza--League
against the duke of Milan--The Florentines resolve to send the count to
assist the Venetians--Neri di Gino Capponi at Venice--His discourse to
the senate--Extreme joy of the Venetians.

Peace being restored between the Lucchese and Florentines, and the duke
and the count having become friends, hopes were entertained that the
arms of Italy would be laid aside, although those in the kingdom of
Naples, between René of Anjou and Alfonso of Aragon, could find repose
only by the ruin of one party or the other. And though the pope was
dissatisfied with the loss of so large a portion of his territories,
and the ambition of the duke and the Venetians was obvious, still it was
thought that the pontiff, from necessity, and the others from weariness,
would be advocates of peace. However, a different state of feeling
prevailed, for neither the duke nor the Venetians were satisfied with
their condition; so that hostilities were resumed, and Lombardy and
Tuscany were again harassed by the horrors of war. The proud mind of
the duke could not endure that the Venetians should possess Bergamo and
Brescia, and he was still further annoyed, by hearing, that they were
constantly in arms, and in the daily practice of annoying some portion
of his territories. He thought, however, that he should not only be able
to restrain them, but to recover the places he had lost, if the pope,
the Florentines, and the count could be induced to forego the Venetian
alliance. He therefore resolved to take Romagna from the pontiff,
imagining that his holiness could not injure him, and that the
Florentines, finding the conflagration so near, either for their own
sake would refrain from interference, or if they did not, could not
conveniently attack him. The duke was also aware of the resentment
of the Florentines against the Venetians, on account of the affair of
Lucca, and he therefore judged they would be the less eager to take
arms against him on their behalf. With regard to the Count Francesco,
he trusted that their new friendship, and the hope of his alliance would
keep him quiet. To give as little color as possible for complaint, and
to lull suspicion, particularly, because in consequence of his treaty
with the count, the latter could not attack Romagna, he ordered Niccolo
Piccinino, as if instigated by his own ambition to do so.

When the agreement between the duke and the count was concluded, Niccolo
was in Romagna, and in pursuance of his instructions from the duke,
affected to be highly incensed, that a connection had been established
between him and the count, his inveterate enemy. He therefore withdrew
himself and his forces to Camurata, a place between Furli and Ravenna,
which he fortified, as if designing to remain there some time, or till a
new enterprise should present itself. The report of his resentment being
diffused, Niccolo gave the pope to understand how much the duke was
under obligation to him, and how ungrateful he proved; and he was
persuaded that, possessing nearly all the arms of Italy, under the
two principal generals, he could render himself sole ruler: but if
his holiness pleased, of the two principal generals whom he fancied
he possessed, one would become his enemy, and the other be rendered
useless; for, if money were provided him, and he were kept in pay, he
would attack the territories held of the church by the count, who being
compelled to look to his own interests, could not subserve the ambition
of Filippo. The pope giving entire credence to this representation,
on account of its apparent reasonableness, sent Niccolo five thousand
ducats and loaded him with promises of states for himself and his
children. And though many informed him of the deception, he could not
give credit to them, nor would he endure the conversation of any who
seemed to doubt the integrity of Niccolo's professions. The city of
Ravenna was held for the church by Ostasio da Polenta. Niccolo finding
further delay would be detrimental, since his son Francesco had, to the
pope's great dishonor, pillaged Spoleto, determined to attack Ravenna,
either because he judged the enterprise easy, or because he had a secret
understanding with Ostasio, for in a few days after the attack, the
place capitulated. He then took Bologna, Imola, and Furli; and (what
is worthy of remark) of twenty fortresses held in that country for the
pope, not one escaped falling into his hands. Not satisfied with these
injuries inflicted on the pontiff, he resolved to banter him by his
words as well as ridicule him by his deeds, and wrote, that he had only
done as his holiness deserved, for having unblushingly attempted to
divide two such attached friends as the duke and himself, and for having
dispersed over Italy letters intimating that he had quitted the duke
to take part with the Venetians. Having taken possession of Romagna,
Niccolo left it under the charge of his son, Francesco, and with the
greater part of his troops, went into Lombardy, where joining the
remainder of the duke's forces, he attacked the country about Brescia,
and having soon completely conquered it, besieged the city itself.

The duke, who desired the Venetians to be left defenseless, excused
himself to the pope, the Florentines, and the count, saying, that if the
doings of Niccolo were contrary to the terms of the treaty, they were
equally contrary to his wishes, and by secret messengers, assured them
that when an occasion presented itself, he would give them a convincing
proof that they had been performed in disobedience to his instructions.
Neither the count nor the Florentines believed him, but thought, with
reason, that these enterprises had been carried on to keep them at
bay, till he had subdued the Venetians, who, being full of pride, and
thinking themselves able alone to resist the duke, had not deigned to
ask for any assistance, but carried on the war under their captain,
Gattamelata.

Count Francesco would have wished, with the consent of the Florentines,
to go to the assistance of king René, if the events of Romagna and
Lombardy had not hindered him; and the Florentines would willingly have
consented, from their ancient friendship to the French dynasty, but the
duke was entirely in favor of Alfonso. Each being engaged in wars near
home, refrained from distant undertakings. The Florentines, finding
Romagna occupied with the duke's forces, and the Venetians defeated, as
if foreseeing their own ruin in that of others, entreated the count to
come to Tuscany, where they might consider what should be done to resist
Filippo's power, which was now greater than it had ever before been;
assuring him that if his insolence were not in some way curbed, all the
powers of Italy would soon have to submit to him. The count felt the
force of the fears entertained by the Florentines, but his desire to
secure the duke's alliance kept him in suspense; and the duke, aware
of this desire, gave him the greatest assurance that his hopes would
be realized as shortly as possible, if he abstained from hostilities
against him. As the lady was now of marriageable age, the duke had
frequently made all suitable preparations for the celebration of the
ceremony, but on one pretext or another they had always been wholly set
aside. He now, to give the count greater confidence, added deeds to his
words, and sent him thirty thousand florins, which, by the terms of the
marriage contract, he had engaged to pay.

Still the war in Lombardy proceeded with greater vehemence than ever;
the Venetians constantly suffered fresh losses of territory, and the
fleets they equipped upon the rivers were taken by the duke's forces;
the country around Verona and Brescia was entirely occupied, and the
two cities themselves so pressed, that their speedy fall was generally
anticipated. The marquis of Mantua, who for many years had led the
forces of their republic, quite unexpectedly resigned his command, and
went over to the duke's service. Thus the course which pride prevented
them from adopting at the commencement of the war, fear compelled them
to take during its progress; for knowing there was no help for them but
in the friendship of the Florentines and the count, they began to make
overtures to obtain it, though with shame and apprehension; for they
were afraid of receiving a reply similar to that which they had
given the Florentines, when the latter applied for assistance in the
enterprise against Lucca and the count's affairs. However, they found
the Florentines more easily induced to render aid than they expected, or
their conduct deserved; so much more were the former swayed by hatred of
their ancient enemy, than by resentment of the ingratitude of their
old and habitual friends. Having foreseen the necessity into which the
Venetians must come, they had informed the count that their ruin must
involve his own; that he was deceived if he thought the duke, while
fortune, would esteem him more than if he were in adversity; that the
duke was induced to promise him his daughter by the fear he entertained
of him; that what necessity occasions to be promised, it also causes to
be performed; and it was therefore desirable to keep the duke in that
necessity, which could be done without supporting the power of the
Venetians. Therefore he might perceive, that if the Venetians were
compelled to abandon their inland territories, he would not only lose
the advantages derivable from them, but also those to be obtained from
such as feared them; and that if he considered well the powers of
Italy, he would see that some were poor, and others hostile; that the
Florentines alone were not, as he had often said, sufficient for his
support; so that on every account it was best to keep the Venetians
powerful by land. These arguments, conjoined with the hatred which the
count had conceived against Filippo, by supposing himself duped with
regard to the promised alliance, induced him to consent to a new treaty;
but still he would not consent to cross the Po. The agreement was
concluded in February, 1438; the Venetians agreeing to pay two-thirds of
the expense of the war, the Florentines one-third, and each engaging to
defend the states which the count possessed in La Marca. Nor were these
the only forces of the league, for the lord of Faenza, the sons of
Pandolfo Malatesti da Rimino and Pietro Giampagolo Orsini also joined
them. They endeavored, by very liberal offers, to gain over the marquis
of Mantua, but could not prevail against the friendship and stipend of
the duke; and the lord of Faenza, after having entered into compact with
the league, being tempted by more advantageous terms, went over to him.
This made them despair of being able to effect an early settlement of
the troubles of Romagna.

The affairs of Lombardy were in this condition: Brescia was so closely
besieged by the duke's forces, that constant apprehensions were
entertained of her being compelled by famine to a surrender; while
Verona was so pressed, that a similar fate was expected to await her,
and if one of these cities were lost, all the other preparations for the
war might be considered useless, and the expenses already incurred as
completely wasted. For this there was no remedy, but to send the count
into Lombardy; and to this measure three obstacles presented themselves.
The first was, to induce him to cross the Po, and prosecute the war in
whatever locality might be found most advisable; the second, that the
count being at a distance, the Florentines would be left almost at the
mercy of the duke, who, issuing from any of his fortresses, might with
part of his troops keep the count at bay, and with the rest introduce
into Tuscany the Florentine exiles, whom the existing government already
dreaded; the third was, to determine what route the count should take to
arrive safely in the Paduan territory, and join the Venetian forces. Of
these three difficulties, the second, which particularly regarded the
Florentines, was the most serious; but, knowing the necessity of the
case, and wearied out by the Venetians, who with unceasing importunity
demanded the count, intimating that without him they should abandon all
hope, they resolved to relieve their allies rather than listen to the
suggestions of their own fears. There still remained the question about
the route to be taken, for the safety of which they determined the
Venetians should provide; and as they had sent Neri Capponi to treat
with the count and induce him to cross the Po, they determined that the
same person should also proceed to Venice, in order to make the benefit
the more acceptable to the Signory, and see that all possible security
were given to the passage of the forces.

Neri embarked at Cesena and went to Venice; nor was any prince ever
received with so much honor as he was; for upon his arrival, and the
matters which his intervention was to decide and determine, the safety
of the republic seemed to depend. Being introduced to the senate, and
in presence of the Doge, he said, "The Signory of Florence, most serene
prince, has always perceived in the duke's greatness the source of ruin
both to this republic and our own, and that the safety of both states
depends upon their separate strength and mutual confidence. If such had
been the opinion of this illustrious Signory, we should ourselves have
been in better condition, and your republic would have been free from
the dangers that now threaten it. But as at the proper crisis you
withheld from us confidence and aid, we could not come to the relief of
your distress, nor could you, being conscious of this, freely ask us;
for neither in your prosperity nor adversity have you clearly perceived
our motives. You have not observed, that those whose deeds have once
incurred our hatred, can never become entitled to our regard; nor can
those who have once merited our affection ever after absolutely cancel
their claim. Our attachment to your most serene Signory is well known to
you all, for you have often seen Lombardy filled with our forces and
our money for your assistance. Our hereditary enmity to Filippo and his
house is universally known, and it is impossible that love or hatred,
strengthened by the growth of years, can be eradicated from our minds
by any recent act either of kindness or neglect. We have always thought,
and are still of the same opinion, that we might now remain neutral,
greatly to the duke's satisfaction, and with little hazard to ourselves;
for if by your ruin he were to become lord of Lombardy, we should still
have sufficient influence in Italy in free us from any apprehension on
our own account; for every increase of power and territory augments
that animosity and envy, from which arise wars and the dismemberment
of states. We are also aware what heavy expenses and imminent perils we
should avoid, by declining to involve ourselves in these disputes;
and how easily the field of battle may be transferred from Lombardy to
Tuscany, by our interference in your behalf. Yet all these apprehensions
are at once overborne by our ancient affection for the senate and people
of Venice, and we have resolved to come to your relief with the same
zeal with which we should have armed in our own defense, had we been
attacked. Therefore, the senate of Florence, judging it primarily
necessary to relieve Verona and Brescia, and thinking this impossible
without the count, have sent me, in the first instance, to persuade
him to pass into Lombardy, and carry on the war wherever it may be most
needful; for you are aware he is under no obligation to cross the Po. To
induce him to do so, I have advanced such arguments as are suggested by
the circumstances themselves, and which would prevail with us. He, being
invincible in arms, cannot be surpassed in courtesy, and the liberality
he sees the Florentines exercise toward you, he has resolved to outdo;
for he is well aware to what dangers Tuscany will be exposed after
his departure, and since we have made your affairs our primary
consideration, he has also resolved to make his own subservient to
yours. I come, therefore, to tender his services, with seven thousand
cavalry and two thousand infantry, ready at once to march against the
enemy, wherever he may be. And I beg of you, so do my lords at Florence
and the count, that as his forces exceed the number he has engaged to
furnish you, out of your liberality, would remunerate him, that he may
not repent of having come to your assistance, nor we, who have prevailed
with him to do so." This discourse of Neri to the senate was listened
to with that profound attention which an oracle might be imagined to
command; and his audience were so moved by it, that they could not
restrain themselves, till the prince had replied, as strict decorum
on such occasions required, but rising from their seats, with uplifted
hands, and most of them with tears in their eyes, they thanked the
Florentines for their generous conduct, and the ambassador for his
unusual dispatch; and promised that time should never cancel the
remembrance of such goodness, either in their own hearts, or their
children's; and that their country, thenceforth, should be common to the
Florentines with themselves.



CHAPTER V

Francesco Sforza marches to assist the Venetians, and relieves
Verona--He attempts to relieve Brescia but fails--The Venetians routed
by Piccinino upon the Lake of Garda--Piccinino routed by Sforza;
the method of his escape--Piccinino surprises Verona--Description of
Verona--Recovered by Sforza--The duke of Milan makes war against the
Florentines--Apprehensions of the Florentines--Cardinal Vitelleschi
their enemy.

When their demonstrations of gratitude had subsided, the Venetian
senate, by the aid of Neri di Gino, began to consider the route the
count ought to take, and how to provide him with necessaries. There were
four several roads; one by Ravenna, along the beach, which on account of
its being in many places interrupted by the sea and by marshes, was not
approved. The next was the most direct, but rendered inconvenient by a
tower called the Uccellino, which being held for the duke, it would be
necessary to capture; and to do this, would occupy more time than could
be spared with safety to Verona and Brescia. The third was by the brink
of the lake; but as the Po had overflowed its banks, to pass in this
direction was impossible. The fourth was by the way of Bologna to Ponte
Puledrano, Cento, and Pieve; then between the Bondeno and the Finale
to Ferrara, and thence they might by land or water enter the Paduan
territory, and join the Venetian forces. This route, though attended
with many difficulties, and in some parts liable to be disputed by the
enemy, was chosen as the least objectionable. The count having received
his instructions, commenced his march, and by exerting the utmost
celerity, reached the Paduan territory on the twentieth of June. The
arrival of this distinguished commander in Lombardy filled Venice and
all her dependencies with hope; for the Venetians, who only an instant
before had been in fear for their very existence, began to contemplate
new conquests.

The count, before he made any other attempt, hastened to the relief of
Verona; and to counteract his design, Niccolo led his forces to Soave, a
castle situated between the Vincentino and the Veronese, and entrenched
himself by a ditch that extended from Soave to the marshes of the Adige.
The count, finding his passage by the plain cut off, resolved to proceed
by the mountains, and thus reach Verona, thinking Niccolo would imagine
this way to be so rugged and elevated as to be impracticable, or if
he thought otherwise, he would not be in time to prevent him; so, with
provisions for eight days, he took the mountain path, and with his
forces, arrived in the plain, below Soave. Niccolo had, even upon this
route, erected some bastions for the purpose of preventing him, but they
were insufficient for the purpose; and finding the enemy had, contrary
to his expectations, effected a passage, to avoid a disadvantageous
engagement he crossed to the opposite side of the Adige, and the count
entered Verona without opposition.

Having happily succeeded in his first project, that of relieving Verona,
the count now endeavored to render a similar service to Brescia. This
city is situated so close to the Lake of Garda, that although besieged
by land, provisions may always be sent into it by water. On this account
the duke had assembled a large force in the immediate vicinity of the
lake, and at the commencement of his victories occupied all the places
which by its means might relieve Brescia. The Venetians also had galleys
upon the lake, but they were unequal to a contest with those of the
duke. The count therefore deemed it advisable to aid the Venetian fleet
with his land forces, by which means he hoped to obtain without much
difficulty those places which kept Brescia in blockade. He therefore
encamped before Bardolino, a fortress situated upon the lake, trusting
that after it was taken the others would surrender. But fortune opposed
this design, for a great part of his troops fell sick; so, giving up
the enterprise, he went to Zevio, a Veronese castle, in a healthy and
plentiful situation. Niccolo, upon the count's retreat, not to let slip
an opportunity of making himself master of the lake, left his camp at
Vegasio, and with a body of picked men took the way thither, attacked
the Venetian fleet with the utmost impetuosity, and took nearly the
whole of it. By this victory almost all the fortresses upon the lake
fell into his hands.

The Venetians, alarmed at this loss, and fearing that in consequence
of it Brescia would surrender, solicited the count, by letters and
messengers, to go to its relief; and he, perceiving that all hope of
rendering assistance from the lake was cut off, and that to attempt
an approach by land, on account of the ditches, bastions, and other
defenses erected by Niccolo, was marching to certain destruction,
determined that as the passage by the mountains had enabled him to
relieve Verona, it should also contribute to the preservation of
Brescia. Having taken this resolution, the count left Zevio, and by way
of the Val d'Acri went to the Lake of St. Andrea, and thence to Torboli
and Peneda, upon the Lake of Garda. He then proceeded to Tenna, and
besieged the fortress, which it was necessary to occupy before he could
reach Brescia.

Niccolo, on being acquainted with the count's design, led his army to
Peschiera. He then, with the marquis of Mantua and a chosen body of men,
went to meet him, and coming to an engagement, was routed, his people
dispersed, and many of them taken, while others fled to the fleet, and
some to the main body of his army. It was now nightfall, and Niccolo
had escaped to Tenna, but he knew that if he were to remain there till
morning, he must inevitably fall into the enemy's hands; therefore, to
avoid a catastrophe which might be regarded as almost fatal, he resolved
to make a dangerous experiment. Of all his attendants he had only with
him a single servant, a Dutchman, of great personal strength, and who
had always been devotedly attached to him. Niccolo induced this man
to take him upon his shoulders in a sack, as if he had been carrying
property of his master's, and to bear him to a place of security. The
enemy's lines surrounded Tenna, but on account of the previous day's
victory, all was in disorder, and no guard was kept, so that the
Dutchman, disguised as a trooper, passed through them without any
opposition, and brought his master in safety to his own troops.

Had this victory been as carefully improved as it was fortunately
obtained, Brescia would have derived from it greater relief and the
Venetians more permanent advantage; but they, having thoughtlessly let
it slip, the rejoicings were soon over, and Brescia remained in her
former difficulties. Niccolo, having returned to his forces, resolved by
some extraordinary exertion to cancel the impression of his death,
and deprive the Venetians of the change of relieving Brescia. He was
acquainted with the topography of the citadel of Verona, and had learned
from prisoners whom he had taken, that it was badly guarded, and might
be very easily recovered. He perceived at once that fortune presented
him with an opportunity of regaining the laurels he had lately lost, and
of changing the joy of the enemy for their recent victory into sorrow
for a succeeding disaster. The city of Verona is situated in Lombardy,
at the foot of the mountains which divide Italy from Germany, so that
it occupies part both of hill and plain. The river Adige rises in the
valley of Trento, and entering Italy, does not immediately traverse the
country, but winding to the left, along the base of the hills, enters
Verona, and crosses the city, which it divides unequally, giving much
the larger portion to the plain. On the mountain side of the river are
two fortresses, formidable rather from their situation than from their
actual strength, for being very elevated they command the whole place.
One is called San Piero, the other San Felice. On the opposite side of
the Adige, upon the plain, with their backs against the city walls, are
two other fortresses, about a mile distant from each other, one called
the Old the other the New Citadel, and a wall extends between them that
may be compared to a bowstring, of which the city wall is the arc. The
space comprehended within this segment is very populous, and is called
the Borgo of St. Zeno. Niccolo Piccinino designed to capture these
fortresses and the Borgo, and he hoped to succeed without much
difficulty, as well on account of the ordinary negligence of the guard,
which their recent successes would probably increase, as because in
war no enterprise is more likely to be successful than one which by the
enemy is deemed impossible. With a body of picked men, and accompanied
by the marquis of Mantua, he proceeded by night to Verona, silently
scaled the walls, and took the New Citadel: then entering the place with
his troops, he forced the gate of S. Antonio, and introduced the whole
of his cavalry. The Venetian garrison of the Old Citadel hearing an
uproar, when the guards of the New were slaughtered, and again when the
gate was forced, being now aware of the presence of enemies, raised an
alarm, and called the people to arms. The citizens awaking in the
utmost confusion, some of the boldest armed and hastened to the rector's
piazza. In the meantime, Niccolo's forces had pillaged the Borgo of San
Zeno; and proceeding onward were ascertained by the people to be the
duke's forces, but being defenseless they advised the Venetian rectors
to take refuge in the fortresses, and thus save themselves and the
place; as it was more advisable to preserve their lives and so rich a
city for better fortune, than by endeavoring to repel the present evil,
encounter certain death, and incur universal pillage. Upon this the
rectors and all the Venetian party, fled to the fortress of San Felice.
Some of the first citizens, anxious to avoid being plundered by the
troops, presented themselves before Niccolo and the marquis of Mantua,
and begged they would rather take possession of a rich city, with honor
to themselves, than of a poor one to their own disgrace; particularly as
they had not induced either the favor of its former possessors, or
the animosity of its present masters, by self-defense. The marquis and
Niccolo encouraged them, and protected their property to the utmost of
their power during such a state of military license. As they felt sure
the count would endeavor to recover the city, they made every possible
exertion to gain possession of the fortresses, and those they could not
seize they cut off from the rest of the place by ditches and barricades,
so that the enemy might be shut out.

The Count Francesco was with his army at Tenna; and when the report was
first brought to him he refused to credit it; but being assured of
the fact by parties whom it would have been ridiculous to doubt, he
resolved, by the exertion of uncommon celerity, to repair the evil
negligence had occasioned; and though all his officers advised the
abandonment of Verona and Brescia, and a march to Vicenza, lest he
might be besieged by the enemy in his present situation, he refused, but
resolved to attempt the recovery of Verona. During the consultation, he
turned to the Venetian commissaries and to Bernardo de' Medici, who was
there as commissary for the Florentines, and promised them the recovery
of the place if one of the fortresses should hold out. Having collected
his forces, he proceeded with the utmost speed to Verona. Observing his
approach, Niccolo thought he designed, according to the advice he had
received, to go to Vicenza, but finding him continue to draw near, and
taking the direction of San Felice, he prepared for its defense--though
too late; for the barricades were not completed; his men were dispersed
in quest of plunder, or extorting money from the inhabitants by way of
ransom; and he could not collect them in time to prevent the count's
troops from entering the fortress. They then descended into the city,
which they happily recovered, to Niccolo's disgrace, and with the loss
of great numbers of his men. He himself, with the marquis of Mantua,
first took refuge in the citadel, and thence escaping into the country,
fled to Mantua, where, having assembled the relics of their army, they
hastened to join those who were at the siege of Brescia. Thus in four
days Verona was lost and again recovered from the duke. The count, after
this victory, it being now winter and the weather very severe, having
first with considerable difficulty thrown provisions into Brescia,
went into quarters at Verona, and ordered, that during the cold season,
galleys should be provided at Torboli, that upon the return of spring,
they might be in a condition to proceed vigorously to effect the
permanent relief of Brescia.

The duke, finding the war suspended for a time, the hope he had
entertained of occupying Brescia and Verona annihilated, and the money
and counsels of the Florentines the cause of this, and seeing that
neither the injuries they had received from the Venetians could alienate
them, nor all the promises he had made attach them to himself, he
determined, in order to make them feel more closely the effects of the
course they had adopted, to attack Tuscany; to which he was strenuously
advised by the Florentine exiles and Niccolo. The latter advocated this
from his desire to recover the states of Braccio, and expel the count
from La Marca; the former, from their wish to return home, and each
by suitable arguments endeavored to induce the duke to follow the plan
congenial to their own views. Niccolo argued that he might be sent into
Tuscany, and continue the siege of Brescia; for he was master of
the lake, the fortresses were well provided, and their officers were
qualified to oppose the count should he undertake any fresh enterprise;
which it was not likely he would do without first relieving Brescia, a
thing impossible; and thus the duke might carry on the war in Tuscany,
without giving up his attempts in Lombardy; intimating that the
Florentines would be compelled, as soon as he entered Tuscany, to recall
the count to avoid complete ruin; and whatever course they took, victory
to the duke must be the result. The exiles affirmed, that if Niccolo
with his army were to approach Florence, the people oppressed with
taxes, and wearied out by the insolence of the great, would most
assuredly not oppose him, and pointed out the facility of reaching
Florence; for the way by the Casentino would be open to them, through
the friendship of Rinaldo and the Count di Poppi; and thus the duke,
who was previously inclined to the attempt, was induced by their joint
persuasions to make it. The Venetians, on the other hand, though the
winter was severe, incessantly urged the count to relieve Brescia with
all his forces. The count questioned the possibility of so doing, and
advised them to wait the return of spring, in the meantime strengthening
their fleet as much as possible, and then assist it both by land and
water. This rendered the Venetians dissatisfied; they were dilatory in
furnishing provisions, and consequently many deserted from their army.

The Florentines, being informed of these transactions, became alarmed,
perceiving the war threatening themselves, and the little progress made
in Lombardy. Nor did the suspicion entertained by them of the troops of
the church give them less uneasiness; not that the pope was their enemy,
but because they saw those forces more under the sway of the patriarch,
who was their greatest foe. Giovanni Vitelleschi of Corneto was at first
apostolic notary, then bishop of Recanati, and afterward patriarch of
Alexandria; but at last, becoming a cardinal, he was called Cardinal of
Florence. He was bold and cunning; and, having obtained great influence,
was appointed to command all the forces of the church, and conduct all
the enterprises of the pontiff, whether in Tuscany, Romagna, the kingdom
of Naples, or in Rome. Hence he acquired so much power over the pontiff,
and the papal troops, that the former was afraid of commanding him, and
the latter obeyed no one else. The cardinal's presence at Rome, when
the report came of Niccolo's design to march into Tuscany, redoubled the
fear of the Florentines; for, since Rinaldo was expelled, he had become
an enemy of the republic, from finding that the arrangements made by his
means were not only disregarded, but converted to Rinaldo's prejudice,
and caused the laying down of arms, which had given his enemies an
opportunity of banishing him. In consequence of this, the government
thought it would be advisable to restore and indemnify Rinaldo, in case
Niccolo came into Tuscany and were joined by him. Their apprehensions
were increased by their being unable to account for Niccolo's departure
from Lombardy, and his leaving one enterprise almost completed, to
undertake another so entirely doubtful; which they could not reconcile
with their ideas of consistency, except by supposing some new design had
been adopted, or some hidden treachery intended. They communicated their
fears to the pope, who was now sensible of his error in having endowed
the cardinal with too much authority.



CHAPTER VI

The pope imprisons the cardinal and assists the Florentines--Difference
of opinion between the count and the Venetians respecting the management
of the war. The Florentines reconcile them--The count wishes to go into
Tuscany to oppose Piccinino, but is prevented by the Venetians--Niccolo
Piccinino in Tuscany--He takes Marradi, and plunders the neighborhood
of Florence--Description of Marradi--Cowardice of Bartolomeo
Orlandini--Brave resistance of Castel San Niccolo--San Niccolo
surrenders--Piccinino attempts to take Cortona, but fails.

While the Florentines were thus anxious, fortune disclosed the means of
securing themselves against the patriarch's malevolence. The republic
everywhere exercised the very closest espionage over epistolary
communication, in order to discover if any persons were plotting against
the state. It happened that letters were intercepted at Monte Pulciano,
which had been written by the patriarch to Niccolo without the pope's
knowledge; and although they were written in an unusual character, and
the sense so involved that no distinct idea could be extracted, the
obscurity itself, and the whole aspect of the matter so alarmed the
pontiff, that he resolved to seize the person of the cardinal, a duty he
committed to Antonio Rido, of Padua, who had the command of the castle
of St. Angelo, and who, after receiving his instructions, soon found
an opportunity of carrying them into effect. The patriarch, having
determined to go into Tuscany, prepared to leave Rome on the following
day, and ordered the castellan to be upon the drawbridge of the fortress
in the morning, for he wished to speak with him as he passed. Antonio
perceived this to be the favorable moment, informed his people what they
were to do, and awaited the arrival of the patriarch upon the bridge,
which adjoined the building, and might for the purpose of security be
raised or lowered as occasion required. The appointed time found him
punctual; and Antonio, having drawn him, as if for the convenience
of conversation, on to the bridge, gave a signal to his men, who
immediately raised it, and in a moment the cardinal, from being a
commander of armies, found himself a prisoner of the castellan. The
patriarch's followers at first began to use threats, but being informed
of the pope's directions they were appeased. The castellan comforting
him with kind words, he replied, that "the great do not make each other
prisoners to let them go again; and that those whom it is proper to
take, it is not well to set free." He shortly afterward died in prison.
The pope appointed Lodovico, patriarch of Aquileia, to command his
troops; and, though previously unwilling to interfere in the wars of
the league and the duke, he was now content to take part in them, and
engaged to furnish four thousand horse and two thousand foot for the
defense of Tuscany.

The Florentines, freed from this cause for anxiety, were still
apprehensive of Niccolo, and feared confusion in the affairs of
Lombardy, from the differences of opinion that existed between the count
and the Venetians. In order the better to become acquainted with the
intentions of the parties, they sent Neri di Gini Capponi and Giuliano
Davanzati to Venice, with instructions to assist in the arrangement of
the approaching campaign; and ordered that Neri, having discovered how
the Venetians were disposed, should proceed to the count, learn
his designs, and induce him to adopt the course that would be most
advantageous to the League. The ambassadors had only reached Ferrara,
when they were told that Niccolo Piccinino had crossed the Po with six
thousand horse. This made them travel with increased speed; and, having
arrived at Venice, they found the Signory fully resolved that Brescia
should be relieved without waiting for the return of spring; for they
said that "the city would be unable to hold out so long, the fleet could
not be in readiness, and that seeing no more immediate relief, she would
submit to the enemy; which would render the duke universally victorious,
and cause them to lose the whole of their inland possessions." Neri then
proceeded to Verona to ascertain the count's opinion, who argued, for
many reasons, that to march to Brescia before the return of spring would
be quite useless, or even worse; for the situation of Brescia, being
considered in conjunction with the season, nothing could be expected to
result but disorder and fruitless toil to the troops; so that, when the
suitable period should arrive, he would be compelled to return to Verona
with his army, to recover from the injuries sustained in the winter, and
provide necessaries for the summer; and thus the time available for the
war would be wasted in marching and countermarching. Orsatto Justiniani
and Giovanni Pisani were deputed on the part of Venice to the count at
Verona, having been sent to consider these affairs, and with them it was
agreed that the Venetians should pay the count ninety thousand ducats
for the coming year, and to each of the soldiers forty ducats; that he
should set out immediately with the whole army and attack the duke, in
order to compel him, for his own preservation, to recall Niccolo into
Lombardy. After this agreement the ambassadors returned to Venice; and
the Venetians, having so large an amount of money to raise, were very
remiss with their commissariat.

In the meantime, Niccolo Piccinino pursued his route, and arrived in
Romagna, where he prevailed upon the sons of Pandolfo Malatesti to
desert the Venetians and enter the duke's service. This circumstance
occasioned much uneasiness in Venice, and still more at Florence;
for they thought that with the aid of the Malatesti they might resist
Niccolo; but finding them gone over to the enemy, they were in fear lest
their captain, Piero Giampagolo Orsini, who was in the territories of
the Malatesti, should be disarmed and rendered powerless. The count also
felt alarmed, for, through Niccolo's presence in Tuscany, he was
afraid of losing La Marca; and, urged by a desire to look after his
own affairs, he hastened to Venice, and being introduced to the Doge,
informed him that the interests of the League required his presence in
Tuscany; for the war ought to be carried on where the leader and forces
of the enemy were, and not where his garrisons and towns were situated;
for when the army is vanquished the war is finished; but to take towns
and leave the armament entire, usually allowed the war to break out
again with greater virulence; that Tuscany and La Marca would be lost if
Niccolo were not vigorously resisted, and that, if lost, there would be
no possibility of the preservation of Lombardy. But supposing the
danger to Lombardy not so imminent, he did not intend to abandon his own
subjects and friends, and that having come into Lombardy as a prince, he
did not intend to return a mere condottiere. To this the Doge replied,
it was quite manifest that, if he left Lombardy, or even recrossed the
Po, all their inland territories would be lost; in that case they were
unwilling to spend any more money in their defense. For it would be
folly to attempt defending a place which must, after all, inevitably
be lost; and that it is less disgraceful and less injurious to lose
dominions only, then to lose both territory and money. That if the loss
of their inland possessions should actually result, it would then be
seen how highly important to the preservation of Romagna and Tuscany
the reputation of the Venetians had been. On these accounts they were of
quite a different opinion from the count; for they saw that whoever was
victor in Lombardy would be so everywhere else, that conquest would be
easily attainable now, when the territories of the duke were left almost
defenseless by the departure of Niccolo, and that he would be ruined
before he could order Niccolo's recall, or provide himself with any
other remedy; that whoever attentively considered these things would
see, that the duke had sent Niccolo into Tuscany for no other reason
than to withdraw the count from his enterprise, and cause the war, which
was now at his own door, to be removed to a greater distance. That if
the count were to follow Niccolo, unless at the instigation of some very
pressing necessity, he would find his plan successful, and rejoice in
the adoption of it; but if he were to remain in Lombardy, and allow
Tuscany to shift for herself, the duke would, when too late, see the
imprudence of his conduct, and find that he had lost his territories in
Lombardy and gained nothing in Tuscany. Each party having spoken, it
was determined to wait a few days to see what would result from the
agreement of the Malatesti with Niccolo; whether the Florentines could
avail themselves of Piero Giampagolo, and whether the pope intended to
join the League with all the earnestness he had promised. Not many
days after these resolutions were adopted, it was ascertained that the
Malatesti had made the agreement more from fear than any ill-will toward
the League; that Piero Giampagolo had proceeded with his force toward
Tuscany, and that the pope was more disposed than ever to assist
them. This favorable intelligence dissipated the count's fears, and he
consented to remain in Lombardy, and that Neri Capponi should return
to Florence with a thousand of his own horse, and five hundred from the
other parties. It was further agreed, that if the affairs of Tuscany
should require the count's presence, Neri should write to him, and he
would proceed thither to the exclusion of every other consideration.
Neri arrived at Florence with his forces in April, and Giampagolo joined
them the same day.

In the meantime, Niccolo Piccinino, the affairs of Romagna being
settled, purposed making a descent into Tuscany, and designing to go by
the mountain passes of San Benedetto and the valley of Montone, found
them so well guarded by the contrivance of Niccolo da Pisa, that his
utmost exertions would be useless in that direction. As the Florentines,
upon this sudden attack, were unprovided with troops and officers, they
had sent into the defiles of these hills many of their citizens,
with infantry raised upon the emergency to guard them, among whom was
Bartolomeo Orlandini, a cavaliere, to whom was intrusted the defense
of the castle of Marradi and the adjacent passes. Niccolo Piccinino,
finding the route by San Benedetto impracticable, on account of the
bravery of its commander, thought the cowardice of the officer who
defended that of Marradi would render the passage easy. Marradi is a
castle situated at the foot of the mountains which separate Tuscany from
Romagna; and, though destitute of walls, the river, the mountains, and
the inhabitants, make it a place of great strength; for the peasantry
are warlike and faithful, and the rapid current undermining the banks
has left them of such tremendous height that it is impossible to
approach it from the valley if a small bridge over the stream be
defended; while on the mountain side the precipices are so steep and
perpendicular as to render it almost impregnable. In spite of these
advantages, the pusillanimity of Bartolomeo Orlandini rendered the men
cowardly and the fortress untenable; for as soon as he heard of the
enemy's approach he abandoned the place, fled with all his forces, and
did not stop till he reached the town of San Lorenzo. Niccolo, entering
the deserted fortress, wondered it had not been defended, and, rejoicing
over his acquisition, descended into the valley of the Mugello, where
he took some castles, and halted with his army at Pulicciano. Thence he
overran the country as far as the mountains of Fiesole; and his audacity
so increased that he crossed the Arno, plundering and destroying
everything to within three miles of Florence.

The Florentines, however, were not dismayed. Their first concern was
to give security to the government, for which they had no cause for
apprehension, so universal was the good will of the people toward Cosmo;
and besides this, they had restricted the principal offices to a few
citizens of the highest class, who with their vigilance would have kept
the populace in order, even if they had been discontented or desirous of
change. They also knew by the compact made in Lombardy what forces
Neri would bring with him, and expected the troops of the pope. These
prospects sustained their courage till the arrival of Neri di Gino, who,
on account of the disorders and fears of the city, determined to set out
immediately and check Niccolo. With the cavalry he possessed, and a body
of infantry raised entirely from the people, he recovered Remole from
the hands of the enemy, where having encamped, he put a stop to all
further depredations, and gave the inhabitants hopes of repelling
the enemy from the neighborhood. Niccolo finding that, although the
Florentines were without troops, no disturbance had arisen, and learning
what entire composure prevailed in the city, thought he was wasting
time, and resolved to undertake some other enterprise to induce them to
send forces after him, and give him a chance of coming to an engagement,
by means of which, if victorious, he trusted everything would succeed to
his wishes.

Francesco, Count di Poppi, was in the army of Niccolo, having deserted
the Florentines, with whom he was in league, when the enemy entered the
Mugello; and though with the intention of securing him as soon as they
had an idea of his design, they increased his appointments, and made him
commissary over all the places in his vicinity; still, so powerful is
the attachment to party, that no benefit or fear could eradicate the
affection he bore toward Rinaldo and the late government; so that as
soon as he knew Niccolo was at hand he joined him, and with the utmost
solicitude entreated him to leave the city and pass into the Casentino,
pointing out to him the strength of the country, and how easily he might
thence harass his enemies. Niccolo followed his advice, and arriving
in the Casentino, took Romena and Bibbiena, and then pitched his camp
before Castel San Niccolo. This fortress is situated at the foot of the
mountains which divide the Casentino from the Val d'Arno; and being in
an elevated situation, and well garrisoned, it was difficult to take,
though Niccolo, with catapults and other engines, assailed it without
intermission. The siege had continued more than twenty days, during
which the Florentines had collected all their forces, having assembled
under several leaders, three thousand horse, at Fegghine, commanded by
Piero Giampagolo Orsini, their captain, and Neri Capponi and Bernardo
de' Medici, commissaries. Four messengers, from Castel San Niccolo, were
sent to them to entreat succor. The commissaries having examined the
site, found it could not be relieved, except from the Alpine regions,
in the direction of the Val d'Arno, the summit of which was more easily
attainable by the enemy than by themselves, on account of their greater
proximity, and because the Florentines could not approach without
observation; so that it would be making a desperate attempt, and might
occasion the destruction of the forces. The commissaries, therefore,
commended their fidelity, and ordered that when they could hold out no
longer, they should surrender. Niccolo took the fortress after a siege
of thirty-two days; and the loss of so much time, for the attainment
of so small an advantage, was the principle cause of the failure of his
expedition; for had he remained with his forces near Florence, he would
have almost deprived the government of all power to compel the citizens
to furnish money: nor would they so easily have assembled forces and
taken other precautions, if the enemy had been close upon them, as
they did while he was at a distance. Besides this, many would have been
disposed to quiet their apprehensions of Niccolo, by concluding a peace;
particularly, as the contest was likely to be of some duration. The
desire of the Count di Poppi to avenge himself on the inhabitants of
San Niccolo, long his enemies, occasioned his advice to Piccinino, who
adopted it for the purpose of pleasing him; and this caused the ruin
of both. It seldom happens, that the gratification of private feelings,
fails to be injurious to the general convenience.

Niccolo, pursuing his good fortune, took Rassina and Chiusi. The Count
di Poppi advised him to halt in these parts, arguing that he might
divide his people between Chiusi, Caprese, and the Pieve, render himself
master of this branch of the Apennines, and descend at pleasure into the
Casentino, the Val d'Arno, the Val di Chiane, or the Val di Tavere,
as well as be prepared for every movement of the enemy. But Niccolo,
considering the sterility of these places, told him, "his horses could
not eat stones," and went to the Borgo San Sepolcro, where he was
amicably received, but found that the people of Citta di Castello, who
were friendly to the Florentines, could not be induced to yield to his
overtures. Wishing to have Perugia at his disposal, he proceeded
thither with forty horse, and being one of her citizens, met with a kind
reception. But in a few days he became suspected, and having attempted
unsuccessfully to tamper with the legate and people of Perugia, he took
eight thousand ducats from them, and returned to his army. He then set
on foot secret measures, to seduce Cortona from the Florentines, but
the affair being discovered, his attempts were fruitless. Among the
principal citizens was Bartolomeo di Senso, who being appointed to the
evening watch of one of the gates, a countryman, his friend, told him,
that if he went he would be slain. Bartolomeo, requesting to know what
was meant, he became acquainted with the whole affair, and revealed it
to the governor of the place, who, having secured the leaders of the
conspiracy, and doubled the guards at the gates, waited till the time
appointed for the coming of Niccolo, who finding his purpose discovered,
returned to his encampment.



CHAPTER VII

Brescia relieved by Sforza--His other victories--Piccinino is
recalled into Lombardy--He endeavors to bring the Florentines to an
engagement--He is routed before Anghiari--Serious disorders in the
camp of the Florentines after the victory--Death of Rinaldo degli
Albizzi--His character--Neri Capponi goes to recover the Casentino--The
Count di Poppi surrenders--His discourse upon quitting his possessions.

While these events were taking place in Tuscany, so little to the
advantage of the duke, his affairs in Lombardy were in a still worse
condition. The Count Francesco, as soon as the season would permit, took
the field with his army, and the Venetians having again covered the lake
with their galleys, he determined first of all to drive the duke from
the water; judging, that this once effected, his remaining task would be
easy. He therefore, with the Venetian fleet, attacked that of the duke,
and destroyed it. His land forces took the castles held for Filippo,
and the ducal troops who were besieging Brescia, being informed of
these transactions, withdrew; and thus, the city, after standing a three
years' siege, was at length relieved. The count then went in quest
of the enemy, whose forces were encamped before Soncino, a fortress
situated upon the River Oglio; these he dislodged and compelled to
retreat to Cremona, where the duke again collected his forces, and
prepared for his defense. But the count constantly pressing him more
closely, he became apprehensive of losing either the whole, or the
greater part, of his territories; and perceiving the unfortunate step
he had taken, in sending Niccolo into Tuscany, in order to correct his
error, he wrote to acquaint him with what had transpired, desiring him,
with all possible dispatch, to leave Tuscany and return to Lombardy.

In the meantime, the Florentines, under their commissaries, had drawn
together their forces, and being joined by those of the pope, halted at
Anghiari, a castle placed at the foot of the mountains that divide the
Val di Tavere from the Val di Chiane, distant four miles from the
Borgo San Sepolcro, on a level road, and in a country suitable for the
evolutions of cavalry or a battlefield. As the Signory had heard of the
count's victory and the recall of Niccolo, they imagined that without
again drawing a sword or disturbing the dust under their horses' feet,
the victory was their own, and the war at an end, they wrote to the
commissaries, desiring them to avoid an engagement, as Niccolo could
not remain much longer in Tuscany. These instructions coming to the
knowledge of Piccinino, and perceiving the necessity of his speedy
return, to leave nothing unattempted, he determined to engage the enemy,
expecting to find them unprepared, and not disposed for battle. In this
determination he was confirmed by Rinaldo, the Count di Poppi, and other
Florentine exiles, who saw their inevitable ruin in the departure of
Niccolo, and hoped, that if he engaged the enemy, they would either
be victorious, or vanquished without dishonor. This resolution being
adopted, Niccolo led his army, unperceived by the enemy, from Citta di
Castello to the Borgo, where he enlisted two thousand men, who, trusting
the general's talents and promises, followed him in hope of plunder.
Niccolo then led his forces in battle array toward Anghiari, and
had arrived within two miles of the place, when Micheletto Attendulo
observed great clouds of dust, and conjecturing at once, that it must
be occasioned by the enemy's approach, immediately called the troops to
arms. Great confusion prevailed in the Florentine camp, for the ordinary
negligence and want of discipline were now increased by their presuming
the enemy to be at a distance, and they were more disposed to fight than
to battle; so that everyone was unarmed, and some wandering from the
camp, either led by their desire to avoid the excessive heat, or in
pursuit of amusement. So great was the diligence of the commissaries and
of the captain, that before the enemy's arrival, the men were mounted
and prepared to resist their attack; and as Micheletto was the first to
observe their approach, he was also first armed and ready to meet them,
and with his troops hastened to the bridge which crosses the river at a
short distance from Anghiari. Pietro Giampagolo having previous to the
surprise, filled up the ditches on either side of the road, and leveled
the ground between the bridge and Anghiari, and Micheletto having taken
his position in front of the former, the legate and Simoncino, who led
the troops of the church, took post on the right, and the commissaries
of the Florentines, with Pietro Giampagolo, their captain, on the left;
the infantry being drawn up along the banks of the river. Thus, the only
course the enemy could take, was the direct one over the bridge; nor
had the Florentines any other field for their exertions, excepting that
their infantry were ordered, in case their cavalry were attacked in
flank by the hostile infantry, to assail them with their cross bows, and
prevent them from wounding the flanks of the horses crossing the bridge.
Micheletto bravely withstood the enemy's charge upon the bridge; but
Astorre and Francesco Piccinino coming up, with a picked body of men,
attacked him so vigorously, that he was compelled to give way, and
was pushed as far as the foot of the hill which rises toward the Borgo
d'Anghiari; but they were in turn repulsed and driven over the bridge,
by the troops that took them in flank. The battle continued two hours,
during which each side had frequent possession of the bridge, and their
attempts upon it were attended with equal success; but on both sides of
the river, the disadvantage of Niccolo was manifest; for when his people
crossed the bridge, they found the enemy unbroken, and the ground
being leveled, they could manoeuvre without difficulty, and the weary
be relieved by such as were fresh. But when the Florentines crossed,
Niccolo could not relieve those that were harassed, on account of the
hindrance interposed by the ditches and embankments on each side of the
road; thus whenever his troops got possession of the bridge, they were
soon repulsed by the fresh forces of the Florentines; but when the
bridge was taken by the Florentines, and they passed over and proceeded
upon the road, Niccolo having no opportunity to reinforce his troops,
being prevented by the impetuosity of the enemy and the inconvenience of
the ground, the rear guard became mingled with the van, and occasioned
the utmost confusion and disorder; they were forced to flee, and
hastened at full speed toward the Borgo. The Florentine troops fell upon
the plunder, which was very valuable in horses, prisoners, and military
stores, for not more than a thousand of the enemy's cavalry reached the
town. The people of the Borgo, who had followed Niccolo in the hope of
plunder, became booty themselves, all of them being taken, and obliged
to pay a ransom. The colors and carriages were also captured. This
victory was much more advantageous to the Florentines than injurious to
the duke; for, had they been conquered, Tuscany would have been his own;
but he, by his defeat, only lost the horses and accoutrements of his
army, which could be replaced without any very serious expense. Nor was
there ever an instance of wars being carried on in an enemy's country
with less injury to the assailants than at this; for in so great a
defeat, and in a battle which continued four hours, only one man died,
and he, not from wounds inflicted by hostile weapons, or any honorable
means, but, having fallen from his horse, was trampled to death.
Combatants then engaged with little danger; being nearly all mounted,
covered with armor, and preserved from death whenever they chose
to surrender, there was no necessity for risking their lives; while
fighting, their armor defended them, and when they could resist no
longer, they yielded and were safe.

This battle, from the circumstances which attended and followed it,
presents a striking example of the wretched state of military discipline
in those times. The enemy's forces being defeated and driven into the
Borgo, the commissaries desired to pursue them, in order to make the
victory complete, but not a single condottiere or soldier would obey,
alleging, as a sufficient reason for their refusal, that they must take
care of the booty and attend to their wounded; and, what is still more
surprising, the next day, without permission from the commissaries, or
the least regard for their commanders, they went to Arezzo, and, having
secured their plunder, returned to Anghiari; a thing so contrary to
military order and all subordination, that the merest shadow of a
regular army would easily and most justly have wrested from them
the victory they had so undeservedly obtained. Added to this, the
men-at-arms, or heavy-armed horse, who had been taken prisoners, whom
the commissaries wished to be detained that they might not rejoin the
enemy, were set at liberty, contrary to their orders. It is astonishing,
that an army so constructed should have sufficient energy to obtain
the victory, or that any should be found so imbecile as to allow such a
disorderly rabble to vanquish them. The time occupied by the Florentine
forces in going and returning from Arezzo, gave Niccolo opportunity of
escaping from the Borgo, and proceeding toward Romagna. Along with him
also fled the Florentine exiles, who, finding no hope of their return
home, took up their abodes in various parts of Italy, each according
to his own convenience. Rinaldo made choice of Ancona; and, to gain
admission to the celestial country, having lost the terrestrial, he
performed a pilgrimage to the holy sepulcher; whence having returned, he
died suddenly while at table at the celebration of the marriage of one
of his daughters; an instance of fortune's favor, in removing him from
the troubles of this world upon the least sorrowful day of his exile.
Rinaldo d'Albizzi appeared respectable under every change of condition;
and would have been more so had he lived in a united city, for many
qualities were injurious to him in a factious community, which in an
harmonious one would have done him honor.

When the forces returned from Arezzo, Niccolo being then gone, the
commissaries presented themselves at the Borgo, the people of which were
willing to submit to the Florentines; but their offer was declined,
and while negotiations were pending, the pope's legate imagined the
commissaries designed to take it from the church. Hard words were
exchanged and hostilities might have ensued between the Florentine
and ecclesiastical forces, if the misunderstanding had continued much
longer; but as it was brought to the conclusion desired by the legate,
peace was restored.

While the affair of the Borgo San Sepolcro was in progress, Niccolo
Piccinino was supposed to have marched toward Rome; other accounts
said La Marca, and hence the legate and the count's forces moved toward
Perugia to relieve La Marca or Rome, as the case might be, and Bernardo
de Medici accompanied them. Neri led the Florentine forces to recover
the Casentino, and pitched his camp before Rassina, which he took,
together with Bibbiena, Prato Vecchio, and Romena. From thence he
proceeded to Poppi and invested it on two sides with his forces, in one
direction toward the plain of Certomondo, in the other upon the hill
extending to Fronzole. The count finding himself abandoned to his fate,
had shut himself up in Poppi, not with any hope of assistance, but with
a view to make the best terms he could. Neri pressing him, he offered
to capitulate, and obtained reasonable conditions, namely, security for
himself and family, with leave to take whatever he could carry away, on
condition of ceding his territories and government to the Florentines.
When he perceived the full extent of his misfortune, standing upon the
bridge which crosses the Arno, close to Poppi, he turned to Neri in
great distress, and said, "Had I well considered my own position and
the power of the Florentines, I should now have been a friend of the
republic and congratulating you on your victory, not an enemy compelled
to supplicate some alleviation of my woe. The recent events which to you
bring glory and joy, to me are full of wretchedness and sorrow. Once
I possessed horses, arms, subjects, grandeur and wealth: can it be
surprising that I part with them reluctantly? But as you possess both
the power and the inclination to command the whole of Tuscany, we must
of necessity obey you; and had I not committed this error, my misfortune
would not have occurred, and your liberality could not have been
exercised; so, that if you were to rescue me from entire ruin, you would
give the world a lasting proof of your clemency. Therefore, let your
pity pass by my fault, and allow me to retain this single house to
leave to the descendants of those from whom your fathers have received
innumerable benefits." To this Neri replied: "That his having expected
great results from men who were capable of doing only very little, had
led him to commit so great a fault against the republic of Florence;
that, every circumstance considered, he must surrender all those places
to the Florentines, as an enemy, which he was unwilling to hold as a
friend: that he had set such an example, as it would be most highly
impolitic to encourage; for, upon a change of fortune, it might injure
the republic, and it was not himself they feared, but his power while
lord of the Casentino. If, however, he could live as a prince in
Germany, the citizens would be very much gratified; and out of love
to those ancestors of whom he had spoken, they would be glad to assist
him." To this, the count, in great anger, replied: "He wished the
Florentines at a much greater distance." Attempting no longer to
preserve the least urbanity of demeanor, he ceded the place and all
its dependencies to the Florentines, and with his treasure, wife, and
children, took his departure, mourning the loss of a territory which his
forefathers had held during four hundred years. When all these victories
were known at Florence, the government and people were transported
with joy. Benedetto de' Medici, finding the report of Niccolo having
proceeded either to Rome or to La Marca, incorrect, returned with his
forces to Neri, and they proceeded together to Florence, where the
highest honors were decreed to them which it was customary with the city
to bestow upon her victorious citizens, and they were received by the
Signory, the Capitani di Parte, and the whole city, in triumphal pomp.