# CHAPTER XXX.—_That really powerful Princes and, Commonwealths do not buy Friendships with Money, but with their Valour and the Fame of their Prowess._

When besieged in the Capitol, the Romans although expecting succour
from Veii and from Camillus, nevertheless, being straitened by famine,
entered into an agreement to buy off the Gauls with gold But at the
very moment when, in pursuance of this agreement, the gold was being
weighed out, Camillus came up with his army. This, says our historian,
was contrived by Fortune, “_that the Romans might not live thereafter
as men ransomed for a price,_” and the matter is noteworthy, not only
with reference to this particular occasion, but also as it bears on the
methods generally followed by this republic. For we never find Rome
seeking to acquire towns, or to purchase peace with money, but always
confiding in her own warlike valour, which could not, I believe, be
said of any other republic.

Now, one of the tests whereby to gauge the strength of any State, is to
observe on what terms it lives with its neighbours: for when it so
carries itself that, to secure its friendship, its neighbours pay it
tribute, this is a sure sign of its strength, but when its neighbours,
though of less reputation, receive payments from it, this is a clear
proof of its weakness In the course of the Roman history we read how
the Massilians, the Eduans, the Rhodians, Hiero of Syracuse, the Kings
Eumenes and Massinissa, all of them neighbours to the Roman frontiers,
in order to secure the friendship of Rome, submitted to imposts and
tribute whenever Rome had need of them, asking no return save her
protection. But with a weak State we find the reverse of all this
happening And, to begin with our own republic of Florence, we know that
in times past, when she was at the height of her renown, there was
never a lordling of Romagna who had not a subsidy from her, to say
nothing of what she paid to the Perugians, to the Castellans, and to
all her other neighbours But had our city been armed and strong, the
direct contrary would have been the case, for, to obtain her
protection, all would have poured money into her lap, not seeking to
sell their friendship but to purchase hers.

Nor are the Florentines the only people who have lived on this
dishonourable footing The Venetians have done the same, nay, the King
of France himself, for all his great dominions, lives tributary to the
Swiss and to the King of England; and this because the French king and
the others named, with a view to escape dangers rather imaginary than
real, have disarmed their subjects; seeking to reap a present gain by
wringing money from them, rather than follow a course which would
secure their own safety and the lasting welfare of their country. Which
ill-practices of theirs, though they quiet things for a time, must in
the end exhaust their resources, and give rise in seasons of danger to
incurable mischief and disorder. It would be tedious to count up how
often in the course of their wars, the Florentines, the Venetians, and
the kingdom of France have had to ransom themselves from their enemies,
and to submit to an ignominy to which, once only, the Romans were very
near being subjected. It would be tedious, too, to recite how many
towns have been bought by the Florentines and by the Venetians, which,
afterwards, have only been a trouble to them, from their not knowing
how to defend with iron what they had won with gold. While the Romans
continued free they adhered to this more generous and noble method, but
when they came under the emperors, and these, again, began to
deteriorate, and to love the shade rather than the sunshine, they also
took to purchasing peace, now from the Parthians, now from the Germans,
and at other times from other neighbouring nations. And this was the
beginning of the decline of their great empire.

Such are the evils that befall when you withhold arms from your
subjects; and this course is attended by the still greater
disadvantage, that the closer an enemy presses you the weaker he finds
you. For any one who follows the evil methods of which I speak, must,
in order to support troops whom he thinks can be trusted to keep off
his enemies, be very exacting in his dealings with those of his
subjects who dwell in the heart of his dominions; since, to widen the
interval between himself and his enemies, he must subsidize those
princes and peoples who adjoin his frontiers. States maintained on this
footing may make a little resistance on their confines; but when these
are passed by the enemy no further defence remains. Those who pursue
such methods as these seem not to perceive that they are opposed to
reason and common sense. For the heart and vital parts of the body, not
the extremities, are those which we should keep guarded, since we may
live on without the latter, but must die if the former be hurt. But the
States of which I speak, leaving the heart undefended, defend only the
hands and feet. The mischief which has thus been, and is at this day
wrought in Florence is plain enough to see. For so soon as an enemy
penetrates within her frontiers, and approaches her heart, all is over
with her. And the same was witnessed a few years ago in the case of the
Venetians, whose city, had it not been girdled by the sea, must then
have found its end. In France, indeed, a like result has not been seen
so often, she being so great a kingdom as to have few enemies mightier
than herself. Nevertheless, when the English invaded France in the year
1513, the whole kingdom tottered; and the King himself, as well as
every one else, had to own that a single defeat might have cost him his
dominions.

But with the Romans the reverse of all this took place. For the nearer
an enemy approached Rome, the more completely he found her armed for
resistance; and accordingly we see that on the occasion of Hannibal’s
invasion of Italy, the Romans, after three defeats, and after the
slaughter of so many of their captains and soldiers, were still able,
not merely to withstand the invader, but even, in the end, to come off
victorious. This we may ascribe to the heart being well guarded, while
the extremities were but little heeded. For the strength of Rome rested
on the Roman people themselves, on the Latin league, on the confederate
towns of Italy, and on her colonies, from all of which sources she drew
so numerous an army, as enabled her to subdue the whole world and to
keep it in subjection.

The truth of what I say may be further seen from the question put by
Hanno the Carthaginian to the messengers sent to Carthage by Hannibal
after his victory at Cannæ. For when these were vaunting the
achievements of Hannibal, they were asked by Hanno whether any one had
come forward on behalf of the Romans to propose terms of peace, and
whether any town of the Latin league or of the colonized districts had
revolted from the Romans. And when to both inquiries the envoys
answered, “No,” Hanno observed that the war was no nearer an end than
on the day it was begun.

We can understand, therefore, as well from what has now been said, as
from what I have often said before, how great a difference there is
between the methods followed by the republics of the present times, and
those followed by the republics of antiquity; and why it is that we see
every day astounding losses alternate with extraordinary gains. For
where men are weak, Fortune shows herself strong; and because she
changes, States and Governments change with her; and will continue to
change, until some one arise, who, following reverently the example of
the ancients, shall so control her, that she shall not have opportunity
with every revolution of the sun to display anew the greatness of her
power.