# CHAPTER XXVII.—_That prudent Princes and Republics should be content to have obtained a Victory; for, commonly, when they are not, theft-Victory turns to Defeat._

The use of dishonouring language towards an enemy is mostly caused by
an insolent humour, bred by victory or the false hope of it, whereby
men are oftentimes led not only to speak, but also to act amiss. For
such false hopes, when they gain an entry into men’s minds, cause them
to overrun their goal, and to miss opportunities for securing a certain
good, on the chance of obtaining some thing better, but uncertain. And
this, being a matter that deserves attention, because in deceiving
themselves men often injure their country, I desire to illustrate it by
particular instances, ancient and recent, since mere argument might not
place it in so clear a light.

After routing the Romans at Cannæ, Hannibal sent messengers to Carthage
to announce his victory, and to ask support. A debate arising in the
Carthaginian senate as to what was to be done, Hanno, an aged and wise
citizen, advised that they should prudently take advantage of their
victory to make peace with the Romans, while as conquerors they might
have it on favourable terms, and not wait to make it after a defeat;
since it should be their object to show the Romans that they were
strong enough to fight them, but not to peril the victory they had won
in the hope of winning a greater. This advice was not followed by the
Carthaginian senate, but its wisdom was well seen later, when the
opportunity to act upon it was gone.

When the whole East had been overrun by Alexander of Macedon, the
citizens of Tyre (then at the height of its renown, and very strong
from being built, like Venice, in the sea), recognizing his greatness,
sent ambassadors to him to say that they desired to be his good
servants, and to yield him all obedience, yet could not consent to
receive either him or his soldiers within their walls. Whereupon,
Alexander, displeased that a single city should venture to close its
gates against him to whom all the rest of the world had thrown theirs
open, repulsed the Tyrians, and rejecting their overtures set to work
to besiege their town. But as it stood on the water, and was well
stored with victual and all other munitions needed for its defence,
after four months had gone, Alexander, perceiving that he was wasting
more time in an inglorious attempt to reduce this one city than had
sufficed for most of his other conquests, resolved to offer terms to
the Tyrians, and to make them those concessions which they themselves
had asked. But they, puffed up by their success, not merely refused the
terms offered, but put to death the envoy sent to propose them. Enraged
by this, Alexander renewed the siege, and with such vigour, that he
took and destroyed the city, and either slew or made slaves of its
inhabitants.

In the year 1512, a Spanish army entered the Florentine territory, with
the object of restoring the Medici to Florence, and of levying a
subsidy from the town; having been summoned thither by certain of the
citizens, who had promised them that so soon as they appeared within
the Florentine confines they would arm in their behalf. But when the
Spaniards had come into the plain of the Arno, and none declared in
their favour, being in sore need of supplies, they offered to make
terms. This offer the people of Florence in their pride rejected, and
so gave occasion for the sack of Prato and the overthrow of the
Florentine Republic.

A prince, therefore, who is attacked by an enemy much more powerful
than himself, can make no greater mistake than to refuse to treat,
especially when overtures are made to him; for however poor the terms
offered may be, they are sure to contain some conditions advantageous
for him who accepts them, and which he may construe as a partial
success. For which reason it ought to have been enough for the citizens
of Tyre that Alexander was brought to accept terms which he had at
first rejected; and they should have esteemed it a sufficient triumph
that, by their resistance in arms, they had forced so great a warrior
to bow to their will. And, in like manner, it should have been a
sufficient victory for the Florentines that the Spaniards had in part
yielded to their wishes, and abated something of their own demands, the
purport of which was to change the government of Florence, to sever her
from her allegiance to France, and, further, to obtain money from her.
For if of these three objects the Spaniards had succeeded in securing
the last two, while the Florentines maintained the integrity of their
government, a fair share of honour and contentment would have fallen to
each. And while preserving their political existence, the Florentines
should have made small account of the other two conditions; nor ought
they, even with the possibility and almost certainty of greater
advantages before them, to have left matters in any degree to the
arbitration of Fortune, by pushing things to extremes, and incurring
risks which no prudent man should incur, unless compelled by necessity.

Hannibal, when recalled by the Carthaginians from Italy, where for
sixteen years he had covered himself with glory, to the defence of his
native country, found on his arrival that Hasdrubal and Syphax had been
defeated, the kingdom of Numidia lost, and Carthage confined within the
limits of her walls, and left without other resource save in him and
his army. Perceiving, therefore, that this was the last stake his
country had to play, and not choosing to hazard it until he had tried
every other expedient, he felt no shame to sue for peace, judging that
in peace rather than in war lay the best hope of safety for his
country. But, when peace was refused him, no fear of defeat deterred
him from battle, being resolved either to conquer, if conquer he might,
or if he must fall, to fall gloriously. Now, if a commander so valiant
as Hannibal, at the head of an unconquered army, was willing to sue for
peace rather than appeal to battle when he saw that by defeat his
country must be enslaved, what course ought to be followed by another
commander, less valiant and with less experience than he? But men
labour under this infirmity, that they know not where to set bounds to
their hopes, and building on these without otherwise measuring their
strength, rush headlong on destruction.