# CHAPTER XXII.—_That in matters of moment Men often judge amiss._

How falsely men often judge of things, they who are present at their
deliberations have constant occasion to know. For in many matters,
unless these deliberations be guided by men of great parts, the
conclusions come to are certain to be wrong. And because in corrupt
republics, and especially in quiet times, either through jealousy or
from other like causes, men of great ability are often obliged to stand
aloof, it follows that measures not good in themselves are by a common
error judged to be good, or are promoted by those who seek public
favour rather than the public advantage. Mistakes of this sort are
found out afterwards in seasons of adversity, when recourse must be had
to those persons who in peaceful times had been, as it were, forgotten,
as shall hereafter in its proper place be more fully explained. Cases,
moreover, arise in which those who have little experience of affairs
are sure to be misled, from the matters with which they have to deal
being attended by many deceptive appearances such as lead men to
believe whatsoever they are minded to believe.

These remarks I make with reference to the false hopes which the
Latins, after being defeated by the Romans, were led to form on the
persuasion of their prætor Numitius, and also with reference to what
was believed by many a few years ago, when Francis, king of France,
came to recover Milan from the Swiss. For Francis of Angoulême,
succeeding on the death of Louis XII. to the throne of France, and
desiring to recover for that realm the Duchy of Milan, on which, some
years before, the Swiss had seized at the instance of Pope Julius,
sought for allies in Italy to second him in his attempt; and besides
the Venetians, who had already been gained over by King Louis,
endeavoured to secure the aid of the Florentines and Pope Leo X.;
thinking that were he to succeed in getting these others to take part
with him, his enterprise would be easier. For the forces of the Spanish
king were then in Lombardy, and the army of the Emperor at Verona.

Pope Leo, however, did not fall in with the wishes of Francis, being,
it is said, persuaded by his advisers that his best course was to stand
neutral. For they urged that it was not for the advantage of the Church
to have powerful strangers, whether French or Swiss, in Italy; but that
to restore the country to its ancient freedom, it must be delivered
from the yoke of both. And since to conquer both, whether singly or
together, was impossible, it was to be desired that the one should
overthrow the other, after which the Church with her friends might fall
upon the victor. And it was averred that no better opportunity for
carrying out this design could ever be found than then presented
itself; for both the French and the Swiss were in the field; while the
Pope had his troops in readiness to appear on the Lombard frontier and
in the vicinity of the two armies, where, under colour of watching his
own interests, he could easily keep them until the opposed hosts came
to an engagement; when, as both armies were full of courage, their
encounter might be expected to be a bloody one, and likely to leave the
victor so weakened that it would be easy for the Pope to attack and
defeat him; and so, to his own great glory, remain master of Lombardy
and supreme throughout Italy.

How baseless this expectation was, was seen from the event. For the
Swiss being routed after a protracted combat, the troops of the Pope
and Spain, so far from venturing to attack the conqueror, prepared for
flight; nor would flight have saved them, had not the humanity or
indifference of the king withheld him from pursuing his victory, and
disposed him to make terms with the Church.

The arguments put forward by the Pope’s advisers had a certain show of
reason in their favour, which looked at from a distance seemed
plausible enough; but were in reality wholly contrary to truth; since
it rarely happens that the captain who wins a victory loses any great
number of his men, his loss being in battle only, and not in flight.
For in the heat of battle, while men stand face to face, but few fall,
chiefly because such combats do not last long; and even when they do
last, and many of the victorious army are slain, so splendid is the
reputation which attends a victory, and so great the terror it
inspires, as far to outweigh any loss the victor suffers by the
slaughter of his soldiers; so that an enemy who, trusting to find him
weakened, should then venture to attack him, would soon be taught his
mistake, unless strong enough to give him battle at any time, before
his victory as well as after. For in that case he might, as fortune and
valour should determine, either win or lose; though, even then, the
army which had first fought and won would have an advantage. And this
we know for a truth from what befell the Latins in consequence of the
mistake made by Numitius their prætor, and their blindness in believing
him. For when they had already suffered defeat at the hands of the
Romans, Numitius caused it to be proclaimed throughout the whole
country of Latium, that now was the time to fall upon the enemy,
exhausted by a struggle in which they were victorious only in name,
while in reality suffering all those ills which attend defeat, and who
might easily be crushed by any fresh force brought against them.
Whereupon the Latins believed him, and getting together a new army,
were forthwith routed with such loss as always awaits those who listen
to like counsels.