# CHAPTER XV.—_That weak States are always dubious in their Resolves; and that tardy Resolves are always hurtful._

Touching this very matter, and with regard to these earliest beginnings
of war between the Latins and the Romans, it may be noted, that in all
our deliberations it behoves us to come quickly to a definite resolve,
and not to remain always in dubiety and suspense. This is plainly seen
in connection with the council convened by the Latins when they thought
to separate themselves from the Romans. For the Romans suspecting the
hostile humour wherewith the Latins were infected, in order to learn
how things really stood, and see whether they could not win back the
malcontents without recourse to arms, gave them to know that they must
send eight of their citizens to Rome, as they had occasion to consult
with them. On receiving which message the Latins, knowing that they had
done many things contrary to the wishes of the Romans, called a council
to determine who of their number should be sent, and to instruct them
what they were to say. But Annius, their prætor, being present in the
council when these matters were being discussed, told them “_that he
thought it of far greater moment for them to consider what they were to
do than what they were to say; for when their resolves were formed, it
would be easy to clothe them in fit words_.” This, in truth, was sound
advice and such as every prince and republic should lay to heart.
Because, where there is doubt and uncertainty as to what we may decide
on doing, we know not how to suit our words to our conduct; whereas,
with our minds made up, and the course we are to follow fixed, it is an
easy matter to find words to declare our resolves. I have noticed this
point the more readily, because I have often found such uncertainty
hinder the public business of our own republic, to its detriment and
discredit. And in all matters of difficulty, wherein courage is needed
for resolving, this uncertainty will always be met with, whenever those
who have to deliberate and decide are weak.

Not less mischievous than doubtful resolves are those which are late
and tardy, especially when they have to be made in behalf of a friend.
For from their lateness they help none, and hurt ourselves. Tardy
resolves are due to want of spirit or want of strength, or to the
perversity of those who have to determine, who being moved by a secret
desire to overthrow the government, or to carry out some selfish
purpose of their own, suffer no decision to be come to, but only thwart
and hinder. Whereas, good citizens, even when they see the popular mind
to be bent on dangerous courses, will never oppose the adoption of a
fixed plan, more particularly in matters which do not brook delay.

After Hieronymus, the Syracusan tyrant, was put to death, there being
at that time a great war between the Romans and the Carthaginians, the
citizens of Syracuse fell to disputing among themselves with which
nation they should take part; and so fierce grew the controversy
between the partisans of the two alliances, that no course could be
agreed on, and they took part with neither; until Apollonides, one of
the foremost of the Syracusan citizens, told them in a speech replete
with wisdom, that neither those who inclined to hold by the Romans, nor
those who chose rather to side with the Carthaginians, were deserving
of blame; but that what was utterly to be condemned was doubt and delay
in taking one side or other; for from such uncertainty he clearly
foresaw the ruin of their republic; whereas, by taking a decided
course, whatever it might be, some good might come. Now Titus Livius
could not show more clearly than he does in this passage, the mischief
which results from resting in suspense. He shows it, likewise, in the
case of the Lavinians, of whom he relates, that being urged by the
Latins to aid them against Rome, they were so long in making up their
minds, that when the army which they at last sent to succour the Latins
was issuing from their gates, word came that the Latins were defeated.
Whereupon Millionius, their prætor, said, “_With the Romans this short
march will cost us dear_.” But had the Lavinians resolved at once
either to grant aid or to refuse it, taking a latter course they would
not have given offence to the Romans, taking the former, and rendering
timely help, they and the Latins together might have had a victory. But
by delay they stood to lose in every way, as the event showed.

This example, had it been remembered by the Florentines, might have
saved them from all that loss and vexation which they underwent at the
hands of the French, at the time King Louis XII. of France came into
Italy against Lodovico, duke of Milan. For when Louis first proposed to
pass through Tuscany he met with no objection from the Florentines,
whose envoys at his court arranged with him that they should stand
neutral, while the king, on his arrival in Italy, was to maintain their
government and take them under his protection; a month’s time being
allowed the republic to ratify these terms. But certain persons, who,
in their folly, favoured the cause of Lodovico, delayed this
ratification until the king was already on the eve of victory; when the
Florentines suddenly becoming eager to ratify, the king would not
accept their ratification, perceiving their consent to be given under
constraint and not of their own good-will. This cost the city of
Florence dear, and went near to lose her freedom, whereof she was
afterwards deprived on another like occasion. And the course taken by
the Florentines was the more to be blamed in that it was of no sort of
service to Duke Lodovico, who, had he been victorious, would have shown
the Florentines many more signs of his displeasure than did the king.

Although the hurt which results to republics from weakness of this sort
has already been discussed in another Chapter, nevertheless, since an
opportunity offered for touching upon it again, I have willingly
availed myself of it, because to me it seems a matter of which
republics like ours should take special heed.