# CHAPTER XIX.—_That Acquisitions made by ill-governed States and such as follow not the valiant methods of the Romans, tend rather to their Ruin than to their Aggrandizement._

To these false opinions, founded on the pernicious example first set by
the present corrupt age, we owe it, that no man thinks of departing
from the methods which are in use. It had been impossible, for
instance, some thirty years ago, to persuade an Italian that ten
thousand foot-soldiers could, on plain ground, attack ten thousand
cavalry together with an equal number of infantry; and not merely
attack, but defeat them; as we saw done by the Swiss at that battle of
Novara, to which I have already referred so often. For although history
abounds in similar examples, none would have believed them, or,
believing them, would have said that nowadays men are so much better
armed, that a squadron of cavalry could shatter a rock, to say nothing
of a column of infantry. With such false pleas would they have belied
their judgment, taking no account that with a very scanty force of
foot-soldiers, Lucullus routed a hundred and fifty thousand of the
cavalry of Tigranes, among whom were a body of horsemen very nearly
resembling our own men-at-arms. Now, however, this error is
demonstrated by the example of the northern nations.

And since what history teaches as to the superiority of foot-soldiers
is thus proved to be true, men ought likewise to believe that the other
methods practised by the ancients are in like manner salutary and
useful. And were this once accepted, both princes and commonwealths
would make fewer blunders than they do, would be stronger to resist
sudden attack, and would no longer place their sole hope of safety in
flight; while those who take in hand to provide a State with new
institutions would know better what direction to give them, whether in
the way of extending or merely of preserving; and would see that to
augment the numbers of their citizens, to assume other States as
companions rather than reduce them to subjection, to send out colonies
for the defence of acquired territories, to hold their spoils at the
credit of the common stock, to overcome enemies by inroads and pitched
battles rather than by sieges, to enrich the public purse, keep down
private wealth, and zealously, to maintain all military exercises, are
the true ways to aggrandize a State and to extend its empire. Or if
these methods for adding to their power are not to their mind, let them
remember that acquisitions made in any other way are the ruin of
republics, and so set bounds to their ambition, wisely regulating the
internal government of their country by suitable laws and ordinances,
forbidding extension, and looking only to defence, and taking heed that
their defences are in good order, as do those republics of Germany
which live and for long have lived, in freedom.

And yet, as I have said on another occasion, when speaking of the
difference between the methods suitable for acquiring and those
suitable for maintaining, it is impossible for a republic to remain
long in the peaceful enjoyment of freedom within a restricted frontier.
For should it forbear from molesting others, others are not likely to
refrain from molesting it; whence must grow at once the desire and the
necessity to make acquisitions; or should no enemies be found abroad,
they will be found at home, for this seems to be incidental to all
great States. And if the free States of Germany are, and have long been
able to maintain themselves on their present footing, this arises from
certain conditions peculiar to that country, and to be found nowhere
else, without which these communities could not go on living as they
do.

The district of Germany of which I speak was formerly subject to the
Roman Empire, in the same way as France and Spain; but on the decline
of the Empire, and when its very name came to be limited to this one
province, its more powerful cities taking advantage of the weakness and
necessities of the Emperors, began to free themselves by buying from
them their liberty, subject to the payment of a trifling yearly
tribute; until, gradually, all the cities which held directly from the
Emperor, and were not subject to any intermediate lord, had, in like
manner, purchased their freedom. While this went on, it so happened
that certain communities subject to the Duke of Austria, among which
were Friburg, the people of Schweitz, and the like, rose in rebellion
against him, and meeting at the outset with good success, by degrees
acquired such accession of strength that so far from returning under
the Austrian yoke, they are become formidable to all their neighbours
These are the States which we now name Swiss.

Germany is, consequently, divided between the Swiss, the communities
which take the name of Free Towns, the Princes, and the Emperor; and
the reason why, amid so many conflicting interests, wars do not break
out, or breaking out are of short continuance, is the reverence in
which all hold this symbol of the Imperial authority. For although the
Emperor be without strength of his own, he has nevertheless such credit
with all these others that he alone can keep them united, and,
interposing as mediator, can speedily repress by his influence any
dissensions among them.

The greatest and most protracted wars which have taken place in this
country have been those between the Swiss and the Duke of Austria; and
although for many years past the Empire and the dukedom of Austria have
been united in the same man, he has always failed to subdue the
stubbornness of the Swiss, who are never to be brought to terms save by
force. Nor has the rest of Germany lent the Emperor much assistance in
his wars with the Swiss, the Free Towns being little disposed to attack
others whose desire is to live as they themselves do, in freedom; while
the Princes of the Empire either are so poor that they cannot, or from
jealousy of the power of the Emperor will not, take part with him
against them.

These communities, therefore, abide contented within their narrow
confines, because, having regard to the Imperial authority, they have
no occasion to desire greater; and are at the same time obliged to live
in unity within their walls, because an enemy is always at hand, and
ready to take advantage of their divisions to effect an entrance. But
were the circumstances of the country other than they are these
communities would be forced to make attempts to extend their dominions,
and be constrained to relinquish their present peaceful mode of life.
And since the same conditions are not found elsewhere, other nations
cannot adopt this way of living, but are compelled to extend their
power either by means of leagues, or else by the methods used by the
Romans; and any one who should act otherwise would find not safety but
rather death and destruction. For since in a thousand ways, and from
causes innumerable, conquests are surrounded with dangers, it may well
happen that in adding to our dominions, we add nothing to our strength;
but whosoever increases not his strength while he adds to his
dominions, must needs be ruined. He who is impoverished by his wars,
even should he come off victorious, can add nothing to his strength,
since he spends more than he gains, as the Venetians and Florentines
have done. For Venice has been far feebler since she acquired Lombardy,
and Florence since she acquired Tuscany, than when the one was content
to be mistress of the seas, and the other of the lands lying within six
miles from her walls. And this from their eagerness to acquire without
knowing what way to take. For which ignorance these States are the more
to be blamed in proportion as there is less to excuse them; since they
had seen what methods were used by the Romans, and could have followed
in their footsteps; whereas the Romans, without any example set them,
were able by their own prudence to shape a course for themselves.

But even to well-governed States, their conquests may chance to
occasion much harm; as when some city or province is acquired abounding
in luxury and delights, by whose manners the conqueror becomes
infected; as happened first to the Romans, and afterwards to Hannibal
on taking possession of Capua. And had Capua been at such a distance
from Rome that a ready remedy could not have been applied to the
disorders of the soldiery, or had Rome herself been in any degree
tainted with corruption, this acquisition had certainly proved her
ruin. To which Titus Livius bears witness when he says, “_Most
mischievous at this time to our military discipline was Capua; for
ministering to all delights, she turned away the corrupted minds of our
soldiers from the remembrance of their country_.” And, truly, cities
and provinces like this, avenge themselves on their conquerors without
blood or blow; since by infecting them with their own evil customs they
prepare them for defeat at the hands of any assailant. Nor could the
subject have been better handled than by Juvenal, where he says in his
Satires, that into the hearts of the Romans, through their conquests in
foreign lands, foreign manners found their way; and in place of
frugality and other admirable virtues—

“Came luxury more mortal than the sword,
And settling down, avenged a vanquished world.”[8]


 [8] Sævior armis
Luxuria occubuit victumque ulciscitur orbem.
          _Juv. Sat_. vi. 292.


And if their conquests were like to be fatal to the Romans at a time
when they were still animated by great virtue and prudence, how must it
fare with those who follow methods altogether different from theirs,
and who, to crown their other errors of which we have already said
enough, resort to auxiliary and mercenary arms, bringing upon
themselves those dangers whereof mention shall be made in the Chapter
following.