# CHAPTER X.—_That contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not the Sinews of War._

Since any man may begin a war at his pleasure, but cannot at his
pleasure bring it to a close, a prince before he engages in any warlike
enterprise ought to measure his strength and govern himself
accordingly. But he must be prudent enough not to deceive himself as to
his strength, which he will always do, if he measure it by money, by
advantage of position, or by the good-will of his subjects, while he is
unprovided with an army of his own. These are things which may swell
your strength but do not constitute it, being in themselves null and of
no avail without an army on which you can depend.

Without such an army no amount of money will meet your wants, the
natural strength of your country will not protect you, and the fidelity
and attachment of your subjects will not endure, since it is impossible
that they should continue true to you when you cannot defend them.
Lakes, and mountains, and the most inaccessible strongholds, where
valiant defenders are wanting, become no better than the level plain;
and money, so far from being a safeguard, is more likely to leave you a
prey to your enemy; since nothing can be falser than the vulgar opinion
which affirms it to be the sinews of war.

This opinion is put forward by Quintus Curtius, where, in speaking of
the war between Antipater the Macedonian and the King of Sparta, he
relates that the latter, from want of money, was constrained to give
battle and was defeated; whereas, could he have put off fighting for a
few days the news of Alexander’s death would have reached Greece, and
he might have had a victory without a battle. But lacking money, and
fearing that on that account his soldiers might desert him, he was
forced to hazard an engagement. It was for this reason that Quintus
Curtius declared money to be the sinews of war, a maxim every day cited
and acted upon by princes less wise than they should be. For building
upon this, they think it enough for their defence to have laid up great
treasures; not reflecting that were great treasures all that is needed
for victory, Darius of old had conquered Alexander, the Greeks the
Romans, and in our own times Charles of Burgundy the Swiss; while the
pope and the Florentines together would have had little difficulty in
defeating Francesco Maria, nephew of Pope Julius II., in the recent war
of Urbino; and yet, in every one of these instances, the victory
remained with him who held the sinews of war to consist, not in money,
but in good soldiers.

Croesus, king of Lydia, after showing Solon the Athenian much besides,
at last displayed to him the boundless riches of his treasure-house,
and asked him what he thought of his power. Whereupon Solon answered
that he thought him no whit more powerful in respect of these
treasures, for as war is made with iron and not with gold, another
coming with more iron might carry off his gold. After the death of
Alexander the Great a tribe of Gauls, passing through Greece on their
way into Asia, sent envoys to the King of Macedonia to treat for terms
of accord; when the king, to dismay them by a display of his resources,
showed them great store of gold and silver. But these barbarians, when
they saw all this wealth, in their greed to possess it, though before
they had looked on peace as settled, broke off negotiations; and thus
the king was ruined by those very treasures he had amassed for his
defence. In like manner, not many years ago, the Venetians, with a full
treasury, lost their whole dominions without deriving the least
advantage from their wealth.

I maintain, therefore, that it is not gold, as is vulgarly supposed,
that is the sinews of war, but good soldiers; or while gold by itself
will not gain you good soldiers, good soldiers may readily get you
gold. Had the Romans chosen to make war with gold rather than with iron
all the treasures of the earth would not have sufficed them having
regard to the greatness of their enterprises and the difficulties they
had to overcome in carrying them out. But making their wars with iron
they never felt any want of gold; for those who stood in fear of them
brought gold into their camp.

And supposing it true that the Spartan king was forced by lack of money
to risk the chances of a battle, it only fared with him in respect of
money as it has often fared with others from other causes; since we see
that where an army is in such straits for want of victual that it must
either fight or perish by famine, it will always fight, as being the
more honourable course and that on which fortune may in some way smile.
So, too, it has often happened that a captain, seeing his enemy about
to be reinforced, has been obliged either to trust to fortune and at
once deliver battle, or else, waiting till the reinforcement is
complete, to fight then, whether he will or no, and at whatever
disadvantage. We find also, as in the case of Hasdrubal when beset, in
the March of Ancona, at once by Claudius Nero and by the other Roman
consul, that a captain, when he must either fight or fly, will always
fight, since it will seem to him that by this course, however
hazardous, he has at least a chance of victory, while by the other his
ruin is certain.

There are many circumstances, therefore, which may force a captain to
give battle contrary to his intention, among which the want of money
may sometimes be one. But this is no ground for pronouncing money to be
the sinews of war, any more than those other things from the want of
which men are reduced to the same necessity. Once more, therefore, I
repeat that not gold but good soldiers constitute the sinews of war.
Money, indeed, is most necessary in a secondary place; but this
necessity good soldiers will always be able to supply, since it is as
impossible that good soldiers should lack money, as that money by
itself should secure good soldiers. And that what I say is true is
shown by countless passages in history. When Pericles persuaded the
Athenians to declare war against the whole Peloponnesus, assuring them
that their dexterity, aided by their wealth, was sure to bring them off
victorious, the Athenians, though for a while they prospered in this
war, in the end were overpowered, the prudent counsels and good
soldiers of Sparta proving more than a match for the dexterity and
wealth of Athens. But, indeed, there can be no better witness to the
truth of my contention than Titus Livius himself. For in that passage
of his history wherein he discusses whether if Alexander the Great had
invaded Italy, he would have succeeded in vanquishing the Romans, three
things are noted by him as essential to success in war; to wit, many
and good soldiers, prudent captains, and favourable fortune; and after
examining whether the Romans or Alexander would have had the advantage
in each of these three particulars, he arrives at his conclusion
without any mention of money.

The Campanians, therefore, when asked by the Sidicinians to arm in
their behalf, must have measured their strength by wealth and not by
soldiers; for after declaring in their favour and suffering two
defeats, to save themselves they were obliged to become tributary to
Rome.