# CHAPTER IX.—_Of the Causes which commonly give rise to Wars between States._

The occasion which led to war between the Romans and Samnites, who for
long had been in league with one another, is of common occurrence in
all powerful States, being either brought about by accident, or else
purposely contrived by some one who would set war a-foot. As between
the Romans and the Samnites, the occasion of war was accidental. For in
making war upon the Sidicinians and afterwards on the Campanians, the
Samnites had no thought of involving themselves with the Romans. But
the Campanians being overpowered, and, contrary to the expectation of
Romans and Samnites alike, resorting to Rome for aid, the Romans, on
whose protection they threw themselves, were forced to succour them as
dependants, and to accept a war which, it seemed to them, they could
not with honour decline. For though they might have thought it
unreasonable to be called on to defend the Campanians as friends
against their own friends the Samnites, it seemed to them shameful not
to defend them as subjects, or as a people who had placed themselves
under their protection. For they reasoned that to decline their defence
would close the gate against all others who at any future time might
desire to submit themselves to their power. And, accordingly, since
glory and empire, and not peace, were the ends which they always had in
view, it became impossible for them to refuse this protectorship.

A similar circumstance gave rise to the first war with the
Carthaginians, namely the protectorate assumed by the Romans of the
citizens of Messina in Sicily, and this likewise came about by chance.
But the second war with Carthage was not the result of chance. For
Hannibal the Carthaginian general attacked the Saguntans, who were the
friends of Rome in Spain, not from any desire to injure them, but in
order to set the arms of Rome in motion, and so gain an opportunity of
engaging the Romans in a war, and passing on into Italy. This method of
picking a quarrel is constantly resorted to by powerful States when
they are bound by scruples of honour or like considerations. For if I
desire to make war on a prince with whom I am under an ancient and
binding treaty, I shall find some colour or pretext for attacking the
friend of that prince, very well knowing that when I attack his friend,
either the prince will resent it, when my scheme for engaging him in
war will be realized; or that, should he not resent it, his weakness or
baseness in not defending one who is under his protection will be made
apparent; either of which alternatives will discredit him, and further
my designs.

We are to note, therefore, in connection with this submission of the
Campanians, what has just now been said as to provoking another power
to war; and also the remedy open to a State which, being unequal to its
own defence, is prepared to go all lengths to ruin its assailant,—that
remedy being to give itself up unreservedly to some one whom it selects
for its defender; as the Campanians gave themselves up to the Romans,
and as the Florentines gave themselves up to King Robert of Naples,
who, after refusing to defend them as his friends against Castruccio of
Lucca by whom they were hard pressed, defended them as his subjects.