# CHAPTER XLVII.—_That though Men deceive themselves in Generalities, in Particulars they judge truly._

The commons of Rome having, as I have said, grown disgusted with the
consular name, and desiring either that men of plebeian birth should be
admitted to the office or its authority be restricted, the nobles, to
prevent its degradation in either of these two ways, proposed a middle
course, whereby four tribunes, who might either be plebeians or nobles,
were to be created with consular authority. This compromise satisfied
the commons, who thought they would thus get rid of the consulship, and
secure the highest offices of the State for their own order. But here a
circumstance happened worth noting. When the four tribunes came to be
chosen, the people, who had it in their power to choose all from the
commons, chose all from the nobles. With respect to which election
Titus Livius observes, that “_the result showed that the people when
declaring their honest judgment after controversy was over, were
governed by a different spirit from that which had inspired them while
contending for their liberties and for a share in public honours_.” The
reason for this I believe to be, that men deceive themselves more
readily in generals than in particulars. To the commons of Rome it
seemed, in the abstract, that they had every right to be admitted to
the consulship, since their party in the city was the more numerous,
since they bore the greater share of danger in their wars, and since it
was they who by their valour kept Rome free and made her powerful. And
because it appeared to them, as I have said, that their desire was a
reasonable one, they were resolved to satisfy it at all hazards. But
when they had to form a particular judgment on the men of their own
party, they recognized their defects, and decided that individually no
one of them was deserving of what, collectively, they seemed entitled
to; and being ashamed of them, turned to bestow their honours on those
who deserved them. Of which decision Titus Livius, speaking with due
admiration, says, “_Where shall we now find in any one man, that
modesty, moderation, and magnanimity which were then common to the
entire people?_”

As confirming what I have said, I shall cite another noteworthy
incident, which occurred in Capua after the rout of the Romans by
Hannibal at Cannæ. For all Italy being convulsed by that defeat, Capua
too was threatened with civil tumult, through the hatred which
prevailed between her people and senate. But Pacuvius Calavius, who at
this time filled the office of chief magistrate, perceiving the danger,
took upon himself to reconcile the contending factions. With this
object he assembled the Senate and pointed out to them the hatred in
which they were held by the people, and the risk they ran of being put
to death by them, and of the city, now that the Romans were in
distress, being given up to Hannibal. But he added that, were they to
consent to leave the matter with him, he thought he could contrive to
reconcile them; in the meanwhile, however, he must shut them up in the
palace, that, by putting it in the power of the people to punish them,
he might secure their safety.

The senate consenting to this proposal, he shut them up in the palace,
and summoning the people to a public meeting, told them the time had at
last come for them to trample on the insolence of the nobles, and
requite the wrongs suffered at their hands; for he had them all safe
under bolt and bar; but, as he supposed they did not wish the city to
remain without rulers, it was fit, before putting the old senators to
death, they should appoint others in their room. Wherefore he had
thrown the names of all the old senators into a bag, and would now
proceed to draw them out one by one, and as they were drawn would cause
them to be put to death, so soon as a successor was found for each.
When the first name he drew was declared, there arose a great uproar
among the people, all crying out against the cruelty, pride, and
arrogance of that senator whose name it was. But on Pacuvius desiring
them to propose a substitute, the meeting was quieted, and after a
brief pause one of the commons was nominated. No sooner, however, was
his name mentioned than one began to whistle, another to laugh, some
jeering at him in one way and some in another. And the same thing
happening in every case, each and all of those nominated were judged
unworthy of senatorial rank. Whereupon Pacuvius, profiting by the
opportunity, said, “Since you are agreed that the city would be badly
off without a senate, but are not agreed whom to appoint in the room of
the old senators, it will, perhaps, be well for you to be reconciled to
them; for the fear into which they have been thrown must have so
subdued them, that you are sure to find in them that affability which
hitherto you have looked for in vain.” This proposal being agreed to, a
reconciliation followed between the two orders; the commons having seen
their error so soon as they were obliged to come to particulars.

A people therefore is apt to err in judging of things and their
accidents in the abstract, but on becoming acquainted with particulars,
speedily discovers its mistakes. In the year 1494, when her greatest
citizens were banished from Florence, and no regular government any
longer existed there, but a spirit of licence prevailed, and matters
went continually from bad to worse, many Florentines perceiving the
decay of their city, and discerning no other cause for it, blamed the
ambition of this or the other powerful citizen, who, they thought, was
fomenting these disorders with a view to establish a government to his
own liking, and to rob them of their liberties. Those who thought thus,
would hang about the arcades and public squares, maligning many
citizens, and giving it to be understood that if ever they found
themselves in the Signory, they would expose the designs of these
citizens and have them punished. From time to time it happened that one
or another of those who used this language rose to be of the chief
magistracy, and so soon as he obtained this advancement, and saw things
nearer, became aware whence the disorders I have spoken of really came,
the dangers attending them, and the difficulty in dealing with them;
and recognizing that they were the growth of the times, and not
occasioned by particular men, suddenly altered his views and conduct; a
nearer knowledge of facts freeing him from the false impressions he had
been led into on a general view of affairs. But those who had heard him
speak as a private citizen, when they saw him remain inactive after he
was made a magistrate, believed that this arose not from his having
obtained any better knowledge of things, but from his having been
cajoled or corrupted by the great. And this happening with many men and
often, it came to be a proverb among the people, that “_men had one
mind in the market-place, another in the palace._”

Reflecting on what has been said, we see how quickly men’s eyes may be
opened, if knowing that they deceive themselves in generalities, we can
find a way to make them pass to particulars; as Pacuvius did in the
case of the Capuans, and the senate in the case of Rome. Nor do I
believe that any prudent man need shrink from the judgment of the
people in questions relating to particulars, as, for instance, in the
distribution of honours and dignities. For in such matters only, the
people are either never mistaken, or at any rate far seldomer than a
small number of persons would be, were the distribution entrusted to
them.

It seems to me, however, not out of place to notice in the following
Chapter, a method employed by the Roman senate to enlighten the people
in making this distribution.