# CHAPTER XL.—_Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what therein is to be noted. Wherein among other Matters is shown how the same Causes may lead to the Safety or to the Ruin of a Commonwealth._

It being my desire to treat fully of those disorders which arose in
Rome on the creation of the decemvirate, I think it not amiss first of
all to relate what took place at the time of that creation, and then to
discuss those circumstances attending it which seem most to deserve
notice. These are numerous, and should be well considered, both by
those who would maintain the liberties of a commonwealth and by those
who would subvert them. For in the course of our inquiry it will be
seen that many mistakes prejudicial to freedom were made by the senate
and people, and that many were likewise made by Appius, the chief
decemvir, prejudicial to that tyranny which it was his aim to establish
in Rome.

After much controversy and wrangling between the commons and the nobles
as to the framing of new laws by which the freedom of Rome might be
better secured, Spurius Posthumius and two other citizens were, by
general consent, despatched to Athens to procure copies of the laws
which Solon had drawn up for the Athenians, to the end that these might
serve as a groundwork for the laws of Rome. On their return, the next
step was to depute certain persons to examine these laws and to draft
the new code. For which purpose a commission consisting of ten members,
among whom was Appius Claudius, a crafty and ambitious citizen, was
appointed for a year; and that the commissioners in framing their laws
might act without fear or favour, all the other magistracies, and in
particular the consulate and tribuneship, were suspended, and the
appeal to the people discontinued; so that the decemvirs came to be
absolute in Rome. Very soon the whole authority of the commissioners
came to be centred in Appius, owing to the favour in which he was held
by the commons. For although before he had been regarded as the cruel
persecutor of the people, he now showed himself so conciliatory in his
bearing that men wondered at the sudden change in his character and
disposition.

This set of commissioners, then, behaved discreetly, being attended by
no more than twelve lictors, walking in front of that decemvir whom the
rest put forward as their chief; and though vested with absolute
authority, yet when a Roman citizen had to be tried for murder, they
cited him before the people and caused him to be judged by them. Their
laws they wrote upon ten tables, but before signing them they exposed
them publicly, that every one might read and consider them, and if any
defect were discovered in them, it might be corrected before they were
finally passed. At this juncture Appius caused it to be notified
throughout the city that were two other tables added to these ten, the
laws would be complete; hoping that under this belief the people would
consent to continue the decemvirate for another year. This consent the
people willingly gave, partly to prevent the consuls being reinstated,
and partly because they thought they could hold their ground without
the aid of the tribunes, who, as has already been said, were the judges
in criminal cases.

On it being resolved to reappoint the decemvirate, all the nobles set
to canvass for the office, Appius among the foremost; and such
cordiality did he display towards the commons while seeking their
votes, that the other candidates, “_unable to persuade themselves that
so much affability on the part of so proud a man was wholly
disinterested,_” began to suspect him; but fearing to oppose him
openly, sought to circumvent him, by putting him forward, though the
youngest of them all, to declare to the people the names of the
proposed decemvirs; thinking that he would not venture to name himself,
that being an unusual course in Rome, and held discreditable. “_But
what they meant as a hindrance, he turned to account,_” by proposing,
to the surprise and displeasure of the whole nobility, his own name
first, and then nominating nine others on whose support he thought he
could depend.

The new appointments, which were to last for a year, having been made,
Appius soon let both commons and nobles know the mistake they had
committed, for throwing off the mask, he allowed his innate arrogance
to appear, and speedily infected his colleagues with the same spirit;
who, to overawe the people and the senate, instead of twelve lictors,
appointed one hundred and twenty. For a time their measures were
directed against high and low alike; but presently they began to
intrigue with the senate, and to attack the commons; and if any of the
latter, on being harshly used by one decemvir, ventured to appeal to
another, he was worse handled on the appeal than in the first instance.
The commons, on discovering their error, began in their despair to turn
their eyes towards the nobles, “_and to look for a breeze of freedom
from that very quarter whence fearing slavery they had brought the
republic to its present straits._” To the nobles the sufferings of the
commons were not displeasing, from the hope “_that disgusted with the
existing state of affairs, they too might come to desire the
restoration of the consuls._”

When the year for which the decemvirs were appointed at last came to an
end, the two additional tables of the law were ready, but had not yet
been published. This was made a pretext by them for prolonging their
magistracy, which they took measures to retain by force, gathering
round them for this purpose a retinue of young noblemen, whom they
enriched with the goods of those citizens whom they had condemned.
“_Corrupted by which gifts, these youths came to prefer selfish licence
to public freedom._”

It happened that at this time the Sabines and Volscians began to stir
up a war against Rome, and it was during the alarm thereby occasioned
that the decemvirs were first made aware how weak was their position.
For without the senate they could take no warlike measures, while by
assembling the senate they seemed to put an end to their own authority.
Nevertheless, being driven to it by necessity, they took this latter
course. When the senate met, many of the senators, but particularly
Valerius and Horatius, inveighed against the insolence of the
decemvirs, whose power would forthwith have been cut short, had not the
senate through jealousy of the commons declined to exercise their
authority. For they thought that were the decemvirs to lay down office
of their own free will, tribunes might not be reappointed. Wherefore
they decided for war, and sent forth the armies under command of
certain of the decemvirs. But Appius remaining behind to govern the
city, it so fell out that he became enamoured of Virginia, and that
when he sought to lay violent hands upon her, Virginius, her father, to
save her from dishonour, slew her. Thereupon followed tumults in Rome,
and mutiny among the soldiers, who, making common cause with the rest
of the plebeians, betook themselves to the Sacred Hill, and there
remained until the decemvirs laid down their office; when tribunes and
consuls being once more appointed, Rome was restored to her ancient
freedom.

In these events we note, first of all, that the pernicious step of
creating this tyranny in Rome was due to the same causes which commonly
give rise to tyrannies in cities; namely, the excessive love of the
people for liberty, and the passionate eagerness of the nobles to
govern. For when they cannot agree to pass some measure favourable to
freedom, one faction or the other sets itself to support some one man,
and a tyranny at once springs up. Both parties in Rome consented to the
creation of the decemvirs, and to their exercising unrestricted powers,
from the desire which the one had to put an end to the consular name,
and the other to abolish the authority of the tribunes. When, on the
appointment of the decemvirate, it seemed to the commons that Appius
had become favourable to their cause, and was ready to attack the
nobles, they inclined to support him. But when a people is led to
commit this error of lending its support to some one man, in order that
he may attack those whom it holds in hatred, if he only be prudent he
will inevitably become the tyrant of that city. For he will wait until,
with the support of the people, he can deal a fatal blow to the nobles,
and will never set himself to oppress the people until the nobles have
been rooted out. But when that time comes, the people, although they
recognize their servitude, will have none to whom they can turn for
help.

Had this method, which has been followed by all who have successfully
established tyrannies in republics, been followed by Appius, his power
would have been more stable and lasting; whereas, taking the directly
opposite course, he could not have acted more unwisely than he did. For
in his eagerness to grasp the tyranny, he made himself obnoxious to
those who were in fact conferring it, and who could have maintained him
in it; and he destroyed those who were his friends, while he sought
friendship from those from whom he could not have it. For although it
be the desire of the nobles to tyrannize, that section of them which
finds itself outside the tyranny is always hostile to the tyrant, who
can never succeed in gaining over the entire body of the nobles by
reason of their greed and ambition; for no tyrant can ever have honours
or wealth enough to satisfy them all.

In abandoning the people, therefore, and siding with the nobles, Appius
committed a manifest mistake, as well for the reasons above given, as
because to hold a thing by force, he who uses force must needs be
stronger than he against whom it is used. Whence it happens that those
tyrants who have the mass of the people for their friends and the
nobles for their enemies, are more secure than those who have the
people for their enemies and the nobles for their friends; because in
the former case their authority has the stronger support. For with such
support a ruler can maintain himself by the internal strength of his
State, as did Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, when attacked by the Romans and
by the whole of Greece; for making sure work with the nobles, who were
few in number, and having the people on his side, he was able with
their assistance to defend himself; which he could not have done had
they been against him. But in the case of a city, wherein the tyrant
has few friends, its internal strength will not avail him for its
defence, and he will have to seek aid from without in one of three
shapes. For either he must hire foreign guards to defend his person; or
he must arm the peasantry, so that they may play the part which ought
to be played by the citizens; or he must league with powerful
neighbours for his defence. He who follows these methods and observes
them well, may contrive to save himself, though he has the people for
his enemy. But Appius could not follow the plan of gaining over the
peasantry, since in Rome they and the people were one. And what he
might have done he knew not how to do, and so was ruined at the very
outset.

In creating the decemvirate, therefore, both the senate and the people
made grave mistakes. For although, as already explained, when speaking
of the dictatorship, it is those magistrates who make themselves, and
not those made by the votes of the people, that are hurtful to freedom;
nevertheless the people, in creating magistrates ought to take such
precautions as will make it difficult for these to become bad. But the
Romans when they ought to have set a check on the decemvirs in order to
keep them good, dispensed with it, making them the sole magistrates of
Rome, and setting aside all others; and this from the excessive desire
of the senate to get rid of the tribunes, and of the commons to get rid
of the consuls; by which objects both were so blinded as to fall into
all the disorders which ensued. For, as King Ferrando was wont to say,
men often behave like certain of the smaller birds, which are so intent
on the prey to which nature incites them, that they discern not the
eagle hovering overhead for their destruction.

In this Discourse then the mistakes made by the Roman people in their
efforts to preserve their freedom and the mistakes made by Appius in
his endeavour to obtain the tyranny, have, as I proposed at the outset,
been plainly shown.