# CHAPTER LVIII.—_That a People is wiser and more constant than a Prince._

That “_nothing is more fickle and inconstant than the multitude_” is
affirmed not by Titus Livius only, but by all other historians, in
whose chronicles of human actions we often find the multitude
condemning some citizen to death, and afterwards lamenting him and
grieving greatly for his loss, as the Romans grieved and lamented for
Manlius Capitolinus, whom they had themselves condemned to die. In
relating which circumstance our author observes “_In a short time the
people, having no longer cause to fear him, began to deplore his
death_” And elsewhere, when speaking of what took place in Syracuse
after the murder of Hieronymus, grandson of Hiero, he says, “_It is the
nature of the multitude to be an abject slave, or a domineering
master_”

It may be that in attempting to defend a cause, which, as I have said,
all writers are agreed to condemn, I take upon me a task so hard and
difficult that I shall either have to relinquish it with shame or
pursue it with opprobrium. Be that as it may, I neither do, nor ever
shall judge it a fault, to support opinion by arguments, where it is
not sought to impose them by violence or authority I maintain, then,
that this infirmity with which historians tax the multitude, may with
equal reason be charged against every individual man, but most of all
against princes, since all who are not controlled by the laws, will
commit the very same faults as are committed by an uncontrolled
multitude. Proof whereof were easy, since of all the many princes
existing, or who have existed, few indeed are or have been either wise
or good.

I speak of such princes as have had it in their power to break the
reins by which they are controlled, among whom I do not reckon those
kings who reigned in Egypt in the most remote antiquity when that
country was governed in conformity with its laws; nor do I include
those kings who reigned in Sparta, nor those who in our own times reign
in France, which kingdom, more than any other whereof we have knowledge
at the present day, is under the government of its laws. For kings who
live, as these do, subject to constitutional restraint, are not to be
counted when we have to consider each man’s proper nature, and to see
whether he resembles the multitude. For to draw a comparison with such
princes as these, we must take the case of a multitude controlled as
they are, and regulated by the laws, when we shall find it to possess
the same virtues which we see in them, and neither conducting itself as
an abject slave nor as a domineering master.

Such was the people of Rome, who, while the commonwealth continued
uncorrupted, never either served abjectly nor domineered haughtily;
but, on the contrary, by means of their magistrates and their
ordinances, maintained their place, and when forced to put forth their
strength against some powerful citizen, as in the case of Manlius, the
decemvirs, and others who sought to oppress them, did so; but when it
was necessary for the public welfare to yield obedience to the dictator
or consuls, obeyed. And if the Roman people mourned the loss of the
dead Manlius, it is no wonder; for they mourned his virtues, which had
been of such a sort that their memory stirred the regret of all, and
would have had power to produce the same feelings even in a prince; all
writers being agreed that excellence is praised and admired even by its
enemies. But if Manlius when he was so greatly mourned, could have
risen once more from the dead, the Roman people would have pronounced
the same sentence against him which they pronounced when they led him
forth from the prison-house, and straightway condemned him to die. And
in like manner we see that princes, accounted wise, have put men to
death, and afterwards greatly lamented them, as Alexander mourned for
Clitus and others of his friends, and Herod for Mariamne.

But what our historian says of the multitude, he says not of a
multitude which like the people of Rome is controlled by the laws, but
of an uncontrolled multitude like the Syracusans, who were guilty of
all these crimes which infuriated and ungoverned men commit, and which
were equally committed by Alexander and Herod in the cases mentioned.
Wherefore the nature of a multitude is no more to be blamed than the
nature of princes, since both equally err when they can do so without
regard to consequences. Of which many instances, besides those already
given, might be cited from the history of the Roman emperors, and of
other princes and tyrants, in whose lives we find such inconstancy and
fickleness, as we might look in vain for in a people.

I maintain, therefore, contrary to the common opinion which avers that
a people when they have the management of affairs are changeable,
fickle, and ungrateful, that these faults exist not in them otherwise
than as they exist in individual princes; so that were any to accuse
both princes and peoples, the charge might be true, but that to make
exception in favour of princes is a mistake; for a people in command,
if it be duly restrained, will have the same prudence and the same
gratitude as a prince has, or even more, however wise he may be
reckoned; and a prince on the other hand, if freed from the control of
the laws, will be more ungrateful, fickle, and short-sighted than a
people. And further, I say that any difference in their methods of
acting results not from any difference in their nature, that being the
same in both, or, if there be advantage on either side, the advantage
resting with the people, but from their having more or less respect for
the laws under which each lives. And whosoever attentively considers
the history of the Roman people, may see that for four hundred years
they never relaxed in their hatred of the regal name, and were
constantly devoted to the glory and welfare of their country, and will
find numberless proofs given by them of their consistency in both
particulars. And should any allege against me the ingratitude they
showed to Scipio, I reply by what has already been said at length on
that head, where I proved that peoples are less ungrateful than
princes. But as for prudence and stability of purpose, I affirm that a
people is more prudent, more stable, and of better judgment than a
prince. Nor is it without reason that the voice of the people has been
likened to the voice of God; for we see that wide-spread beliefs fulfil
themselves, and bring about marvellous results, so as to have the
appearance of presaging by some occult quality either weal or woe.
Again, as to the justice of their opinions on public affairs, seldom
find that after hearing two speakers of equal ability urging them in
opposite directions, they do not adopt the sounder view, or are unable
to decide on the truth of what they hear. And if, as I have said, a
people errs in adopting courses which appear to it bold and
advantageous, princes will likewise err when their passions are
touched, as is far oftener the case with them than with a people.

We see, too, that in the choice of magistrates a people will choose far
more honestly than a prince; so that while you shall never persuade a
people that it is advantageous to confer dignities on the infamous and
profligate, a prince may readily, and in a thousand ways, be drawn to
do so. Again, it may be seen that a people, when once they have come to
hold a thing in abhorrence, remain for many ages of the same mind;
which we do not find happen with princes. For the truth of both of
which assertions the Roman people are my sufficient witness, who, in
the course of so many hundred years, and in so many elections of
consuls and tribunes, never made four appointments of which they had
reason to repent; and, as I have said, so detested the name of king,
that no obligation they might be under to any citizen who affected that
name, could shield him from the appointed penalty.

Further, we find that those cities wherein the government is in the
hands of the people, in a very short space of time, make marvellous
progress, far exceeding that made by cities which have been always
ruled by princes; as Rome grew after the expulsion of her kings, and
Athens after she freed herself from Pisistratus; and this we can
ascribe to no other cause than that the rule of a people is better than
the rule of a prince.

Nor would I have it thought that anything our historian may have
affirmed in the passage cited, or elsewhere, controverts these my
opinions. For if all the glories and all the defects both of peoples
and of princes be carefully weighed, it will appear that both for
goodness and for glory a people is to be preferred. And if princes
surpass peoples in the work of legislation, in shaping civil
institutions, in moulding statutes, and framing new ordinances, so far
do the latter surpass the former in maintaining what has once been
established, as to merit no less praise than they.

And to state the sum of the whole matter shortly, I say that popular
governments have endured for long periods in the same way as the
governments of princes, and that both have need to be regulated by the
laws; because the prince who can do what he pleases is a madman, and
the people which can do as it pleases is never wise. If, then, we
assume the case of a prince bound, and of a people chained down by the
laws, greater virtue will appear in the people than in the prince;
while if we assume the case of each of them freed from all control, it
will be seen that the people commits fewer errors than the prince, and
less serious errors, and such as admit of readier cure. For a turbulent
and unruly people may be spoken to by a good man, and readily brought
back to good ways; but none can speak to a wicked prince, nor any
remedy be found against him but by the sword. And from this we may
infer which of the two suffers from the worse disease; for if the
disease of the people may be healed by words, while that of the prince
must be dealt with by the sword, there is none but will judge that evil
to be the greater which demands the more violent remedy.

When a people is absolutely uncontrolled, it is not so much the follies
which it commits or the evil which it actually does that excites alarm,
as the mischief which may thence result, since in such disorders it
becomes possible for a tyrant to spring up. But with a wicked prince
the contrary is the case; for we dread present ill, and place our hopes
in the future, persuading ourselves that the evil life of the prince
may bring about our freedom. So that there is this distinction between
the two, that with the one we fear what is, with the other what is
likely to be. Again, the cruelties of a people are turned against him
who it fears will encroach upon the common rights, but the cruelties of
the prince against those who he fears may assert those rights.

The prejudice which is entertained against the people arises from this,
that any man may speak ill of them openly and fearlessly, even when the
government is in their hands; whereas princes are always spoken of with
a thousand reserves and a constant eye to consequences.

But since the subject suggests it, it seems to me not out of place to
consider what alliances we can most trust, whether those made with
commonwealths or those made with princes.