# CHAPTER LIX.—_To what Leagues or Alliances we may most trust; whether those we make with Commonwealths or those we make with Princes._

Since leagues and alliances are every day entered into by one prince
with another, or by one commonwealth with another, and as conventions
and treaties are concluded in like manner between princes and
commonwealths, it seems to me proper to inquire whether the faith of a
commonwealth or that of a prince is the more stable and the safer to
count on. All things considered, I am disposed to believe that in most
cases they are alike, though in some they differ. Of one thing,
however, I am convinced, namely, that engagements made under duress
will never be observed either by prince or by commonwealth; and that if
menaced with the loss of their territories, both the one and the other
will break faith with you and treat you with ingratitude. Demetrius,
who was named the “City-taker,” had conferred numberless benefits upon
the Athenians; but when, afterwards, on being defeated by his enemies,
he sought shelter in Athens, as being a friendly city and under
obligations to him, it was refused him; a circumstance which grieved
him far more than the loss of his soldiers and army had done. Pompey,
in like manner, when routed by Cæsar in Thessaly, fled for refuge to
Ptolemy in Egypt, who formerly had been restored by him to his kingdom;
by whom he was put to death. In both these instances the same causes
were at work, although the inhumanity and the wrong inflicted were less
in the case of the commonwealth than of the prince. Still, wherever
there is fear, the want of faith will be the same.

And even if there be found a commonwealth or prince who, in order to
keep faith, will submit to be ruined, this is seen to result from a
like cause. For, as to the prince, it may easily happen that he is
friend to a powerful sovereign, whom, though he be at the time without
means to defend him, he may presently hope to see restored to his
dominions; or it may be that having linked his fortunes with another’s,
he despairs of finding either faith or friendship from the enemies of
his ally, as was the case with those Neapolitan princes who espoused
the interests of France. As to commonwealths, an instance similar to
that of the princes last named, is that of Saguntum in Spain, which
awaited ruin in adhering to the fortunes of Rome. A like course was
also followed by Florence when, in the year 1512, she stood steadfastly
by the cause of the French. And taking everything into account, I
believe that in cases of urgency, we shall find a certain degree of
stability sooner in commonwealths than in princes. For though
commonwealths be like-minded with princes, and influenced by the same
passions, the circumstance that their movements must be slower, makes
it harder for them to resolve than it is for a prince, for which reason
they will be less ready to break faith.

And since leagues and alliances are broken for the sake of certain
advantages, in this respect also, commonwealths observe their
engagements far more faithfully than princes; for abundant examples
might be cited of a very slight advantage having caused a prince to
break faith, and of a very great advantage having failed to induce a
commonwealth to do so. Of this we have an instance in the proposal made
to the Athenians by Themistocles, when he told them at a public meeting
that he had certain advice to offer which would prove of great
advantage to their city, but the nature of which he could not disclose
to them, lest it should become generally known, when the opportunity
for acting upon it would be lost. Whereupon the Athenians named
Aristides to receive his communication, and to act upon it as he
thought fit. To him, accordingly, Themistocles showed how the navy of
united Greece, for the safety of which the Athenians stood pledged, was
so situated that they might either gain it over or destroy it, and thus
make themselves absolute masters of the whole country. Aristides
reporting to the Athenians that the course proposed by Themistocles was
extremely advantageous but extremely dishonourable, the people utterly
refused to entertain it. But Philip of Macedon would not have so acted,
nor any of those other princes who have sought and found more profit in
breaking faith than in any other way.

As to engagements broken off on the pretext that they have not been
observed by the other side, I say nothing, since that is a matter of
everyday occurrence, and I am speaking here only of those engagements
which are broken off on extraordinary grounds; but in this respect,
likewise, I believe that commonwealths offend less than princes, and
are therefore more to be trusted.