# CHAPTER LIII.—_That the People, deceived by a false show of Advantage, often desire what would be their Ruin; and that large Hopes and brave Promises easily move them._

When Veii fell, the commons of Rome took up the notion that it would be
to the advantage of their city were half their number to go and dwell
there. For they argued that as Veii lay in a fertile country and was a
well-built city, a moiety of the Roman people might in this way be
enriched; while, by reason of its vicinity to Rome, the management of
civil affairs would in no degree be affected. To the senate, however,
and the wiser among the citizens, the scheme appeared so rash and
mischievous that they publicly declared they would die sooner than
consent to it. The controversy continuing, the commons grew so inflamed
against the senate that violence and bloodshed must have ensued; had
not the senate for their protection put forward certain old and
esteemed citizens, respect for whom restrained the populace and put a
stop to their violence.

Two points are here to be noted. First, that a people deceived by a
false show of advantage will often labour for its own destruction; and,
unless convinced by some one whom it trusts, that the course on which
it is bent is pernicious, and that some other is to be preferred, will
bring infinite danger and injury upon the State. And should it so
happen, as sometimes is the case, that from having been deceived
before, either by men or by events, there is none in whom the people
trust, their ruin is inevitable. As to which Dante, in his treatise “De
Monarchia,” observes that the people will often raise the cry,
“_Flourish our death and perish our life_.”[5] From which distrust it
arises that often in republics the right course is not followed; as
when Venice, as has been related, on being attacked by many enemies,
could not, until her ruin was complete, resolve to make friends with
any one of them by restoring those territories she had taken from them,
on account of which war had been declared and a league of princes
formed against her.

 [5] “Viva la sua morte e muoia la sua vita.” The quotation does _not_
 seem to be from the “De Monarchia.”


In considering what courses it is easy, and what it is difficult to
persuade a people to follow, this distinction may be drawn: Either what
you would persuade them to, presents on the face of it a semblance of
gain or loss, or it seems a spirited course or a base one. When any
proposal submitted to the people holds out promise of advantage, or
seems to them a spirited course to take, though loss lie hid behind,
nay, though the ruin of their country be involved in it, they will
always be easily led to adopt it; whereas it will always be difficult
to persuade the adoption of such courses as wear the appearance of
disgrace or loss, even though safety and advantage be bound up with
them. The truth of what I say is confirmed by numberless examples both
Roman and foreign, modern and ancient. Hence grew the ill opinion
entertained in Rome of Fabius Maximus, who could never persuade the
people that it behoved them to proceed warily in their conflict with
Hannibal, and withstand his onset without fighting. For this the people
thought a base course, not discerning the advantage resulting from it,
which Fabius could by no argument make plain to them. And so blinded
are men in favour of what seems a spirited course, that although the
Romans had already committed the blunder of permitting Varro, master of
the knights to Fabius, to join battle contrary to the latter’s desire,
whereby the army must have been destroyed had not Fabius by his
prudence saved it, this lesson was not enough; for afterwards they
appointed this Varro to be consul, for no other reason than that he
gave out, in the streets and market-places, that he would make an end
of Hannibal as soon as leave was given him to do so. Whence came the
battle and defeat of Cannæ, and well-nigh the destruction of Rome.

Another example taken from Roman history may be cited to the same
effect. After Hannibal had maintained himself for eight or ten years in
Italy, during which time the whole country had been deluged with Roman
blood, a certain Marcus Centenius Penula, a man of mean origin, but who
had held some post in the army, came forward and proposed to the senate
that were leave given him to raise a force of volunteers in any part of
Italy he pleased, he would speedily deliver Hannibal into their hands,
alive or dead. To the senate this man’s offer seemed a rash one; but
reflecting that were they to refuse it, and were the people afterwards
to hear that it had been made, tumults, ill will, and resentment
against them would result, they granted the permission asked; choosing
rather to risk the lives of all who might follow Penula, than to excite
fresh discontent on the part of the people, to whom they knew that such
a proposal would be welcome, and that it would be very hard to dissuade
them from it. And so this adventurer, marching forth with an
undisciplined and disorderly rabble to meet Hannibal, was, with all his
followers, defeated and slain in the very first encounter.

In Greece, likewise, and in the city of Athens, that most grave and
prudent statesman, Nicias, could not convince the people that the
proposal to go and attack Sicily was disadvantageous; and the
expedition being resolved on, contrary to his advice and to the wishes
of the wiser among the citizens, resulted in the overthrow of the
Athenian power. Scipio, on being appointed consul, asked that the
province of Africa might be awarded to him, promising that he would
utterly efface Carthage; and when the senate, on the advice of Fabius,
refused his request, he threatened to submit the matter to the people
as very well knowing that to the people such proposals are always
acceptable.

I might cite other instances to the same effect from the history of our
own city, as when Messer Ercole Bentivoglio and Antonio Giacomini,
being in joint command of the Florentine armies, after defeating
Bartolommeo d’Alviano at San Vincenzo, proceeded to invest Pisa. For
this enterprise was resolved on by the people in consequence of the
brave promises of Messer Ercole; and though many wise citizens
disapproved of it, they could do nothing to prevent it, being carried
away by the popular will, which took its rise in the assurances of
their captain.

I say, then, that there is no readier way to bring about the ruin of a
republic, when the power is in the hands of the people, than to suggest
daring courses for their adoption. For wherever the people have a
voice, such proposals will always be well received, nor will those
persons who are opposed to them be able to apply any remedy. And as
this occasions the ruin of States, it likewise, and even more
frequently, occasions the private ruin of those to whom the execution
of these proposals is committed; because the people anticipating
victory, do not when there comes defeat ascribe it to the short means
or ill fortune of the commander, but to his cowardice and incapacity;
and commonly either put him to death, or imprison or banish him; as was
done in the case of numberless Carthaginian generals and of many
Athenian, no successes they might previously have obtained availing
them anything; for all past services are cancelled by a present loss.
And so it happened with our Antonio Giacomini, who not succeeding as
the people had expected, and as he had promised, in taking Pisa, fell
into such discredit with the people, that notwithstanding his countless
past services, his life was spared rather by the compassion of those in
authority than through any movement of the citizens in his behalf.