# CHAPTER L.—_That neither any Council nor any Magistrate should have power to bring the Government of a City to a stay._

T.Q. CINCINNATUS and Cn. Julius Mento being consuls of Rome, and being
at variance with one another, brought the whole business of the city to
a stay; which the senate perceiving, were moved to create a dictator to
do what, by reason of their differences, the consuls would not. But
though opposed to one another in everything else, the consuls were of
one mind in resisting the appointment of a dictator; so that the senate
had no remedy left them but to seek the help of the tribunes, who,
supported by their authority, forced the consuls to yield.

Here we have to note, first, the usefulness of the tribunes’ authority
in checking the ambitious designs, not only of the nobles against the
commons, but also of one section of the nobles against another; and
next, that in no city ought things ever to be so ordered that it rests
with a few to decide on matters, which, if the ordinary business of the
State is to proceed at all, must be carried out. Wherefore, if you
grant authority to a council to distribute honours and offices, or to a
magistrate to administer any branch of public business, you must either
impose an obligation that the duty confided shall be performed, or
ordain that, on failure to perform, another may and shall do what has
to be done. Otherwise such an arrangement will be found defective and
dangerous; as would have been the case in Rome, had it not been
possible to oppose the authority of the tribunes to the obstinacy of
the consuls.

In the Venetian Republic, the great council distributes honours and
offices. But more than once it has happened that the council, whether
from ill-humour or from being badly advised, has declined to appoint
successors either to the magistrates of the city or to those
administering the government abroad. This gave rise to the greatest
confusion and disorder; for, on a sudden, both the city itself and the
subject provinces found themselves deprived of their lawful governors;
nor could any redress be had until the majority of the council were
pacified or undeceived. And this disorder must have brought the city to
a bad end, had not provision been made against its recurrence by
certain of the wiser citizens, who, finding a fit opportunity, passed a
law that no magistracy, whether within or without the city, should ever
be deemed to have been vacated until it was filled up by the
appointment of a successor. In this way the council was deprived of its
facilities for stopping public business to the danger of the State.