# CHAPTER 37 — Whether Small Skirmishes Before the Battle Are Necessary; and What Must Be Done to Understand a New Enemy in Order To Avoid Them

It appears that in human actions, as we previously discussed, * one finds, among other difficulties, that in the desire to bring something to a perfect conclusion, there is always some evil very near this good which arises so easily along with it that it seems impossible to avoid the one while wanting the other. This is observed in all the things that men undertake. And so this good is acquired with difficulty, if you are not assisted by fortune in such a way that with her strength she overcomes this ordinary and natural drawback. The skirmish between Manlius and the Gaul made me think about this, in the passage where Livy declares: ‘This combat had indeed great influence on the outcome of the whole war, so much so that next night the army of the Gauls left their camp in alarm and went over to the territory of Tibur. There they made a military alliance, and after being generously supplied with provisions by the Tiburtines, soon moved on to Campania.’ * Thus, I believe, on the one hand, that a good commander must avoid at all costs undertaking anything of little importance that can have bad effects on his army, because initiating a skirmish in which all your forces are not brought into play and in which you risk your entire fortune is a completely reckless thing to do, as I said above when I condemned the guarding of passes. *

On the other hand, I believe that, upon encountering a new enemy of repute, wise commanders are compelled, before engaging in battle, to show their troops, through small skirmishes, what the enemy is like, so that by beginning to know and to deal with the enemy, the troops will lose the terror that their fame and reputation have provoked in them. It is extremely important for a commander to do this. In fact, there is almost a necessity within it that constrains you to do this, since you seem to be moving toward certain defeat unless first, through small trials, you have eliminated the terror among your troops that the enemy’s reputation had placed in their hearts.

Valerius Corvinus was sent by the Romans with his armies against the Samnites, new enemies, and in the past they had never tested each other in arms; Livy writes that Valerius had the Romans engage in some light skirmishes with them, ‘bidding them have no fear of a strange war or strange enemy’. * Nevertheless, there is very grave danger that if your soldiers are defeated in such skirmishes, their fear and cowardice will increase and the results will prove contrary to your plans—that is, that you frighten them when you had planned to reassure them. Hence, this is one of those matters in which the evil is so close to the good, and they are so closely joined together that it is an easy thing to acquire one in the belief that you are gaining the other. I have said above that a good commander must take every care to ensure that nothing ever arises that, through some unforeseen event, can deprive his army of courage. Beginning to lose is what can take away courage, and it is, therefore, necessary to guard against small skirmishes and never to permit them unless you have an enormous advantage and the hope of certain victory; a commander should not undertake to guard passes where he cannot maintain his entire army; he should not garrison cities unless they are the ones whose loss would necessarily bring about his downfall; and those he garrisons should be organized both with the garrison troops and with his army in such a way that, if there is an attempt to capture them, he can utilize all his forces; other cities he should leave undefended. Thus, every time something is lost that is abandoned and the army is still intact, your reputation in war is not lost nor is the hope of winning. But when something is lost that you have planned to defend and everyone believes that you are defending it, then there is damage and loss, and like the Gauls, * through a matter of little importance, you have almost lost the war.

Philip of Macedonia, father of Persius, was a military man of great renown in his times, and upon being attacked by the Romans, he abandoned and destroyed many of his towns which he judged he could not defend, just like one who, in order to be prudent, believed it more harmful to lose his reputation by being unable to defend what he had set out to defend than to leave it as spoils for the enemy, losing it as something indifferent. After the rout of Cannae the Romans were in a sorry state, and they denied assistance to many of their dependants and subjects, ordering them to defend themselves as best they could. Such policies are much better than to establish lines of defence and, subsequently, fail to defend them, because with such a policy one loses friends and forces, whereas in the latter one only loses friends.

But returning to the matter of small skirmishes, let me say that even if a commander is forced to undertake some skirmish because the enemy is a new one, he must do so with so much advantage that there is no danger of losing it; or, indeed, he should do as Marius did (which is the best policy), who marched against the Cimbri, extremely ferocious peoples who had come to plunder Italy; their invasion had caused great terror by reason of their ferocity and their great number as well as the fact that they had already defeated one Roman army, which made Marius decide that, prior to engaging in battle, it was necessary to undertake some action through which his army could put aside the terror that the fear of the enemy had created in them; and as an extremely prudent commander, on more than one occasion, he placed his army in a spot where the Cimbri would have to pass by. Thus, from the fortifications of their camp, he wanted his troops to see the Cimbri and to accustom their eyes to the sight of this enemy, so that, when they saw a disorganized multitude, loaded down with baggage, some with arms idle and others with no arms at all, they were reassured and became eager for battle. Just as this decision was wisely taken by Marius, so must it be carefully imitated by others to avoid running the dangerous risks I have described above and to avoid having to act like the Gauls, ‘who in fear of a matter of little account, crossed into Tiburtine territory and on to Campania’. * And since we have referred to Valerius Corvinus in this discourse, I would like to demonstrate through his own words, in the following chapter, what a commander should be like.