# CHAPTER 30 — That a Citizen in His Own Republic Who Wishes to Employ His Authority for Some Good Work Must First Extinguish Envy; and How to Organize the Defence of a City When the Enemy Is Coming

When the Roman senate had learned that all of Etruria had conducted a new levy of soldiers to do harm to Rome and that the Latins and the Hernici, who had in the past been friends of the Roman people, had sided with the Volscians, perpetual enemies of Rome, the senate decided that this war would be dangerous. Since Camillus was tribune with consular power, he was of the opinion that they could do without creating a dictator if the other tribunes, his colleagues, were willing to concede to him the supreme command. The said tribunes did so willingly (as Livy declares), ‘nor did they believe that their own dignity was in any way diminished by what they had done for his’. * Hence, Camillus, taking this obedience literally, commanded that three armies be enrolled. He wanted to be the commander of the first in order to go against the Etruscans. He made Quinctius Servil-ius commander of the second, wanting him to stay close to Rome to face the Latins and the Hernici if they moved. He placed Lucius Quinctius at the head of the third army, which he enrolled to keep the city guarded and to defend its gates and the curia in whatever situation might arise. Besides this, he ordered Horatius, one of his colleagues, to provide the arms and grain and other things required in wartime. He placed Cornelius, another of his colleagues, in charge of the senate and the public council, so that he could recommend actions that would be undertaken and executed on a daily basis; in this way, the tribunes of those times were willing to command and to obey for the well-being of the city.

This text takes note of what a good and wise man should do, of how much good it can bring about, and how great a benefit such actions can bestow upon his native city when, through his goodness and exceptional ability, he has extinguished envy, which is on many occasions the cause of men’s inability to do good deeds, since it does not permit them to enjoy the authority necessary in important matters. This envy is extinguished in two ways: either through some serious and difficult incident, where someone, seeing himself lost, defers every ambition and willingly races to obey the man he believes may, with his exceptional ability, deliver him; this happened to Camillus, who, having given so many indications of being a most excellent man, having been dictator three times, and having always conducted that office for the benefit of the public rather than for his own, had acted in such a way that men did not fear his greatness; and since he was so great and so renowned, they did not deem it shameful to be inferior to him (and for that reason, Livy wisely declares in these words: ‘nor did they believe, etc.’). * Such envy is extinguished in another way when, either through violence or the natural course of events, those men die who have been your competitors in attaining a certain reputation and a certain level of greatness; such men will never be able to acquiesce or remain patient, seeing you are more highly esteemed than they. Furthermore, when they are men accustomed to living in a corrupt city, where education has produced no good in them whatsoever, in order to fulfil their wishes and to satisfy their perversity of mind, they will be happy to see the ruin of their native city.

To conquer such envy, there is no other remedy than the death of those who feel it, and when fortune is so favourable to a man of exceptional ability that he dies in a normal fashion, he becomes illustrious without scandal from the moment that, without any obstacle or harm, he can demonstrate his exceptional skill. But when he does not have such good fortune, he must think about every means of removing the envious from his path, and before he does anything else, he needs to adopt methods that will overcome this difficulty. Anyone who reads the Bible intelligently will see that, in order to advance his laws and his institutions, Moses was forced to kill countless men, who were moved to oppose his plans by nothing more than envy. * Brother Girolamo Savonarola recognized this necessity very clearly; Piero Soderini, the standard-bearer of Florence, also recognized it. The former (that is, the priest) could not overcome envy, because he lacked sufficient authority to do so, and because he was not well understood by those who followed him and who might have possessed such authority. Nevertheless, he did what he could, and his sermons are full of accusations and invectives against the wise men of the world: for this is what he called such envious men as well as those who opposed his institutions. The latter believed he could extinguish that envy in the passing of time through kindness, his own good fortune, and favours to some; he saw himself to be rather young and with the great new popularity his mode of conduct brought him, he believed he could overcome those many who opposed him out of envy without any unusual acts, violence, or disorder, and he did not know that time does not wait, kindness is insufficient, fortune varies, and malice receives no gift that placates her. In this way both of these two men came to ruin, and their downfall was caused by not knowing how or not being able to overcome this envy.

The other noteworthy thing is the organization that Camillus dictated inside and outside Rome for its well-being. Truly, not without reason do good historians, like our own, set forth certain cases in great detail and quite clearly so that those who come afterwards may learn how they might defend themselves in similar circumstances. It must be noted in this text that there is no more dangerous nor more useless defence than one created in the midst of commotion and without order. This can be seen in the third army that Camillus had raised to leave behind in Rome for the purpose of guarding the city: many would have thought and would still think that this element was superfluous, since that people was normally armed and combative, and that, for this reason, it was not necessary to raise another army, since it was enough to arm the people when the need arose. But Camillus, and any other man who was as wise as he, thought otherwise, because he never permitted a multitude to take up arms except with a fixed order and by a fixed method. Following this example, anyone who is placed in charge of guarding a city must, therefore, avoid like a reef the arming of men in the midst of great confusion; rather, he must first have enrolled and selected those men he wishes to take up arms and who must obey him, and he must have decided where to meet and how to proceed, while ordering those who are not enrolled, each and every one, to stay in their homes to guard them. Those who will hold to such order in a city under siege will easily be able to defend themselves; anyone who will do otherwise will fail to imitate Camillus and will fail to defend himself.