# CHAPTER 28 — That One Must Pay Attention to the Deeds of Citizens, Because a Worthy Act Often Conceals the Beginnings of Tyranny

When the city of Rome was afflicted with hunger and public provisions were insufficient to stop it, a certain Spurius Melius, being very rich, in the manner of those times, took it in mind to create a private supply of grain and to feed the plebeians with it at his own expense. For this reason, he had such a company of people in his favour that the senate, thinking about the difficulty that might arise from his generosity, created a dictator on his account and had him put to death * to suppress the problem before it gained more strength.

Here it is to be noted that on many occasions actions which seem worthy and cannot reasonably be condemned may become cruel and extremely dangerous for a republic, if they are not punished in time. In order to discuss this matter in more detail, I will say that a republic without citizens who have a good reputation cannot stand, nor can it conduct itself well in any way. On the other hand, the reputation of citizens is the cause of tyranny in republics. In order to regulate such a thing, it is necessary to be organized in such a way that citizens will enjoy the kind of reputation that does good and not harm to the city and to its liberty. It is necessary, therefore, to examine the methods by which reputation is obtained, of which there are, in effect, two: either public or private. Public methods are those by which a person, giving good advice and taking even better actions on behalf of the common good, acquires reputation. The path to this type of honour must be opened up to citizens, and rewards must be set up both for their advice and for their deeds, so that they will be honoured and satisfied. When such reputations, earned in these ways, are transparent and simple, they will never be dangerous, but when they are obtained by private means, which is the other method cited above, they are extremely dangerous and entirely harmful. Private means involve doing favours for this or that other private citizen, by loaning him money, marrying off his daughters, defending him from officials and magistrates, and doing him other similar personal favours, which make men partisans and give the man who is so favoured the courage to corrupt the public and to weaken the laws. Consequently, a well-organized republic must open the way, as was said, to anyone who seeks favours through public means and close it to anyone who seeks them through private means. As is evident, this is what Rome did; for to reward anyone who worked productively for the public good, the city instituted triumphs and all the other honours that it bestowed upon its citizens, and as a punishment for anyone who, under various pretexts and through private means, sought to become great, it instituted accusations, and if these were insufficient, when the people were blinded by a false appearance of good, it instituted the dictator, who with his kingly authority made anyone who had exceeded the proper bounds return within them, as Rome did in punishing Spurius Melius. One such case which goes unpunished is sufficient to ruin a republic, because it is difficult with such an example to return to the true path later on.