# CHAPTER 22 — How the Hardness of Manlius Torquatus and the Humaneness of Valerius Corvinus Acquired for Each Man the Same Glory

Living in Rome at the same time were two excellent commanders, Manlius Torquatus and Valerius Corvinus, who were equal in ability, in triumphs, and in glory; each of them, in so far as the enemy was concerned, had acquired this glory with equal skill, but in matters concerning their armies and the treatment of soldiers they proceeded very differently. Thus, Manlius commanded his men with every kind of severity, without giving his troops any respite from their toil or pains; Valerius, on the other hand, controlled them by using every humane method and expedient, tempered by an intimate friendliness. For it can be seen that, in order to have the obedience of his troops, one man put his son to death while the other never harmed anyone. Nevertheless, with very different conduct, each man achieved the same result against the enemy and to the benefit of the republic and himself, because no soldier either ever deserted from a battle or rebelled against them or was in any way disobedient to their wishes, even though the commands of Manlius were so harsh that all the other commands that exceeded the normal method were called ‘Manlian commands’. * Here we must consider, first, how it came about that Manlius was constrained to conduct himself so rigorously; next, why Valerius was able to proceed so humanely; again, why different methods produced the same result; and finally, which of them is best and most useful to imitate. If one carefully examines Manlius’ nature, from the time Livy first mentions him one will discover him to be extremely strong, devoted to his father and his native city, and extremely respectful of his superiors. These qualities can be recognized in the killing of the Gaul, in the defence of his father against the tribune, and in what he said when he went to the consul before he went off to do battle with the Gaul: ‘Without an order from you, sir ... I would never fight out of my rank, even if I were certain of victory.’ * Thus, once a man like this comes to the rank of command, he wants to find all men similar to himself, and his great inner strength makes him give strong orders, and that same inner strength expects his commands to be carried out when they are given. It is a rule most true that when harsh orders are given, it is necessary to act harshly to ensure that they are executed; otherwise you will find yourself deceived. Here, it must be noted that in order to be obeyed, it is necessary to know how to command, and they know how to command who match their own qualities with those of the men who have to obey, and if they see a balance, they then give orders, but if they see an imbalance, they refrain from giving orders.

A prudent man * once declared that in order to hold a republic with violence, a balance has to exist between the one who exerts the force and those against whom the force is exerted. Whenever this balance exists, it can be assumed that such violence will endure, but when the person subjected to violence is more powerful than the person who employs it, we cannot doubt that one day this violence will cease.

But in returning to our discourse, let me say that to command strong measures requires a strong man, and the man who possesses such strength and orders such measures cannot later on with gentleness cause his orders to be obeyed. But anyone who does not possess such inner strength must guard against the use of extraordinary commands, and, in ordinary situations, employ his humanity, because ordinary punishments are not blamed upon the leader but, rather, upon the laws and institutional arrangements. Thus, it should be assumed that Manlius was constrained to proceed so inflexibly by the extraordinary circumstances of the commands toward which his nature inclined him; such orders are useful in a republic, because they bring the institutions of the republic back toward their beginnings and ancient excellence. If a republic were so fortunate, as we have stated above, that it could often have a man who, with his exemplary action, could renew its laws and who would not only prevent it from racing toward ruin but would pull it back, that republic would be everlasting. Manlius was just one of those men who with the harshness of his commands maintained military discipline in Rome, constrained first by his nature and then by the desire he had to ensure that what his natural inclination made him command would be accomplished. On the other hand, Valerius was able to conduct himself in a humane fashion, like a man for whom it was sufficient to observe the usual practices followed in the Roman armies. These customary practices, because they were good, were sufficient to do him honour; it was not difficult to follow them, and it did not force Valerius to punish the transgressors, both because there were none in that time and because, had there been any, as was mentioned, the men would have blamed their punishment on the institutions and not on the cruelty of their prince. In this way, Valerius was able to show that he was the source of every humane act, which enabled him to acquire the gratitude of his soldiers and their contentment. Hence, it happened that while both commanders enjoyed the same obedience, they were able, operating differently, to achieve the same result. Those who might wish to imitate them can fall into the vices of contempt and hatred that I mentioned above in the discussion of Hannibal and Scipio, two qualities that can be avoided only with enormous skill and not otherwise.

It now remains to consider which of these modes of conduct is most praiseworthy. This is, I think, open to dispute, because historians praise both methods. Nevertheless, those who write about how a prince should govern are more sympathetic to Valerius than to Manlius, and the remarks of Xenophon, whom I cited earlier, in offering numerous examples of Cyrus’ humanity, correspond closely to what Livy says about Valerius Corvinus. When he was made consul against the Samnites and the day arrived in which he had to fight, he spoke to his troops with that humanity by which he governed himself, and after this speech, Livy writes these words: ‘There was nowhere a commander on more friendly terms with his men. Valerius cheerfully shared all their duties with the humblest of his soldiers; in military sports too, when trials of speed and strength took place among men of the same age, he was pleasant and courteous, accepting victory and defeat with the same expression on his face, and spurning no one who offered himself as a match for him. His practical kindliness fitted every situation, his speech showed as much concern for the other man’s freedom as for his own dignity, and he conducted himself in office in the same manner as when he was a candidate; nothing wins greater popularity than this.’ * Likewise, Livy speaks honourably of Manlius, demonstrating that his severity in the death of his son made the army so obedient to the consul that it was the cause of the victory the Roman people won over the Latins; and Livy goes so far in praising him that, after this victory, having described the entire order of that battle and shown all the dangers that the Roman people incurred in it as well as the difficulties involved in winning, he comes to this conclusion: that is, only the exceptional skill of Manlius delivered that victory to the Romans. In comparing the strength of both armies, he affirms that the other side would have won if Manlius had been their consul.

Considering, then, everything that the historians have said about these two methods, it would be difficult to choose between them. Nevertheless, in order not to leave this question undecided, I must say that as a citizen who lives under the laws of a republic, I believe Manlius’ conduct is more laudable and less dangerous; because this method is in complete support of the public good and is not in any way directed at private ambition; because no one can acquire supporters through this method, showing himself always to be harsh and to love the common good alone; and because anyone who uses this method will not acquire special friends, or what, as was mentioned above, we call supporters. Thus, such a mode of conduct cannot be more useful nor more desirable in a republic, since it is not lacking in public benefits and contains no suspicion of private power. But in Valerius’ mode of conduct, the contrary occurs, because even if it produces the same effects in so far as the public good is concerned, many doubts none the less arise from it because of the particular goodwill that such a person acquires with the troops, which might produce bad effects against liberty in a lengthy period of command. If such evil effects did not arise with Publicola, * it was because the minds and spirits of the Romans were not yet corrupted and he was not continuously in government over a long period of time.

But if we have to consider a prince, as Xenophon did, we would side completely with Valerius and abandon Manlius, because a prince must seek in his soldiers and subjects both obedience and love. Respecting institutions and being considered a man of exceptional ability bring him obedience; kindness, humanity, mercy, and the other qualities that were typical of Valerius and which, according to Xenophon, were typical of Cyrus, bring him love. * For being a prince particularly well loved who counts the army among his supporters is in conformity with all the other duties of his position, but being a citizen who counts the army among his supporters is not in conformity at all with the other requirements which oblige him to live under the laws and to obey the magistrates.

Among the ancient records of the Venetian republic, one can read that when the Venetian galleys returned to Venice, a certain dispute arose between those aboard the galleys and the people, which led to disturbances and fighting, nor could the matter be laid to rest through the power of government officials, through respect for citizens, or through their fear of the magistrates, but when suddenly before those sailors a gentleman appeared, * who had been their captain the year before, out of love for him they departed and abandoned the struggle. Their obedience generated such suspicion in the senate that a short time afterwards the Venetians protected themselves against him either by prison or by execution. I must conclude, therefore, that the conduct of Valerius is useful in a prince and harmful in a citizen, not only to his native city but to himself as well: to his native city, because such methods prepare the path to tyranny; to himself, because in suspecting his mode of conduct, the city is forced to protect itself against his methods to his detriment. And so I affirm, on the contrary, that the conduct of Manlius is damaging in a prince but useful in a citizen, especially to his native country, and yet it rarely does injury, unless the hatred your severity brings you is increased by the suspicion your other abilities bring upon you as a result of your great reputation, as will be shown below in the case of Camillus.