# CHAPTER 16 — True Ability Is Sought in Difficult Times, and in Easy Ones, Men With Wealth or From Good Families, Rather Than Men of Ability, Find More Favour

It always was and always will be the case that great and uncommon men are neglected in times of peace, because the envy brought upon them by the reputation their exceptional ability has earned them causes numerous citizens to desire not only to be their equals but their superiors. A good passage regarding this is found in the Greek historian Thucydides, who shows that after the Athenian republic remained the victor over its enemies in the Peloponnesian War, having checked the pride of the Spartans and subjugated all the rest of Greece, Athens gained so much prestige that it planned to invade Sicily. This enterprise came under debate in Athens; Alcibiades and some other citizens advised that the invasion be made, like men who, thinking very little of the public good, thought only of their own honour, planning to become leaders in such an enterprise. But Nicias, who was the first among the distinguished citizens of Athens, advised against it, and the strongest reason he brought forth when addressing the people to persuade them to trust him, was this: that is, in advising them not to wage this war, he was advising them in a matter which was not in his own interest, for with Athens at peace, he knew that there were countless citizens who would want to surpass him, but with Athens at war, he knew that no citizen would be superior or even equal to him. *

It is evident, therefore, that a certain disorder exists in republics, which is that of holding worthy men in little esteem in peaceful times. This causes such men to feel indignant in two ways: the first is that they see themselves deprived of their proper rank; the other is that they see as their companions and superiors men who are unworthy and of lesser competence than they. This disorder in republics has caused many to collapse, because those citizens who see themselves slighted for no reason and understand that this is caused by the safe and easy times, contrive to stir things up, instigating new wars to the detriment of the republic. In thinking about what remedies might exist for this, I have come upon two of them: the first is to maintain the citizens in poverty, so that, lacking in exceptional ability, they cannot corrupt themselves or others with riches; the second is to be prepared for war, as the Romans were in their early days, so that it can always be waged and distinguished citizens will always be needed. Since that city always maintained armies outside the city, there was always a place for men of exceptional ability, nor was it possible to take away a rank or position from a man who had earned it and give it to another who did not deserve it, because even if this was done on some occasions by error or as a test, it immediately brought about such disorder and danger that the city quickly returned to the true path. But other republics which are not organized like Rome and who wage war only when necessity forces them to do so cannot defend themselves from such difficulties; on the contrary, they are always coming up against such difficulties, and disorder always arises from them when the neglected and able citizen is vengeful and enjoys some reputation or following in the city. At one time the city of Rome protected itself against this, but after Rome had conquered Carthage and Antiochus (as we have said elsewhere), * this city too, no longer fearing wars, believed it could entrust its armies to anyone it wished, without giving as much consideration to exceptional ability as to other qualities that find favour with the people. For this reason, Paulus Aemilius was many times refused the consulship, nor was he made consul before the Macedonian War broke out, but since this was judged a dangerous war, the consensus of the entire city entrusted the office to him. *

After 1494 in our own city of Florence, following many wars in which Florentine citizens had all made a very bad showing, the city by chance encountered a man who demonstrated how one had to command an army: this was Antonio Giacomini. While dangerous wars were to be waged, the ambition of other citizens died out, and in the election for commissioner and the leader of the army Antonio had no other competitor, but when it came to waging a war where there was no doubt of the outcome and much honour and rank involved, Antonio discovered so many competitors there that when three commissioners were elected to besiege Pisa, he was left out entirely. Although it was not immediately evident that failing to send Antonio caused harm to the public, it was, none the less, easy to speculate about this, because the Pisans no longer had anything to defend themselves with or to live on, and if Antonio had been in command he would have pressed them so hard that they would have surrendered unconditionally to the Florentines. But since they were besieged by military leaders who understood neither how to besiege them nor how to weaken them with force, they held out for so long that the city of Florence bought them off, when it could have taken them by force. Antonio’s indignation must necessarily have been great, and he must have been very patient and good not to desire to take revenge for this, either through the downfall of the city, if he could bring it about, or through the injury of some individual citizen. A republic must guard itself against this, as will be discussed in the following chapter.