# CHAPTER 15 — That One Man and Not Many Should Be Placed in Command of an Army, and How More Than One Commander Is Harmful

After the people of Fidenae rebelled and massacred the colony the Romans had sent to that city, the Romans created four tribunes with consular power to respond to this attack; one of them was left to guard Rome, and three others were sent against the people of Fidenae and the Veientes; and since these men were divided among themselves and disunited, they derived dishonour from the campaign but not harm, because they brought dishonour upon themselves, while the fact that they were not harmed was due to the exceptional ability of their soldiers. Upon seeing such disorder, the Romans had recourse to the creation of the dictator, so that a single man would reorganize what three others had disorganized. Hence, it is possible to recognize the uselessness of having many commanders in a single army or in a city that has to be defended, and Livy cannot say it any more clearly than with these words: ‘Three tribunes with consular power were appointed . . . where they gave signal proof of the inefficacy of a divided command. Unable ever to agree with his colleagues, each man persisted in following his own judgement, to the obvious advantage of the enemy.’ * Although this example is sufficient to demonstrate the disorder that more than one commander can create in a war, I should like to cite a few others, both modern and ancient, for a fuller explanation of the matter.

In 1500, after the king of France, Louis XII, recaptured Milan, he sent his troops to Pisa to restore that city to the Florentines; Giovambattista Ridolfi and Luca di Antonio degli Albizi were sent to that city as commissioners. Since Giovambattista was a man of some renown and was older, Luca left the task of managing everything completely to him; and if he did not display his ambition by opposing Giovambattista, he displayed it by keeping his silence and by disregarding and showing his contempt for everything, so that he failed to assist actions in the field either through deeds or counsel, as if he had been a man of no importance. But then completely the opposite was observed when Giovambattista, through a certain turn of events, had to return to Florence; now alone, Luca showed how much his spirit, hard work, and counsel were worth, all of which had been lost while he had a companion. * In confirmation of this, I want to cite once again the words of Livy, who tells us that when Quinctius and Agrippa, his colleague, were sent by the Romans against the Aequi, Agrippa wanted the entire administration of the war to be in Quinctius’ control, and Livy declares: ‘It is most salutary that in the administration of great undertakings, the supreme command should be in the hands of a single man.’ * This is exactly the opposite of what our republics and principalities do today, when, in order to administrate them better, they send into places more than one commissioner and more than one leader; this creates an immeasurable confusion. If the reasons for the ruin of the Italian and French armies in our times were to be sought, this would be the principal explanation. It is truly possible to conclude that it is better to send one man of average prudence on an expedition alone than two extremely capable men with the same authority together.