# CHAPTER 13 — Where Should One Place More Trust, in a Good Commander With a Weak Army, or in a Good Army With a Weak Commander?

After Coriolanus had gone into exile away from Rome, he went to the Volscians, from where, after having raised an army to take revenge against his fellow citizens, he marched on Rome, from which he then departed, owing more to his mother’s piety than to the strength of the Romans. * Concerning this matter, Livy says it reveals that the Roman republic grew more through the exceptional ability of its commanders than of its soldiers, considering that the Volscians had in the past been defeated and only later had won when Coriolanus was their commander. Although Livy holds this opinion, it is nevertheless evident in many passages in his history that the exceptional ability of soldiers without a commander accomplished miraculous feats, and that they were more organized and ferocious after the death of their consuls than before they were killed. This happened to the army the Romans had in Spain under the Scipios; after the two commanders were killed, the army, through its exceptional ability, was not only able to save itself but to vanquish the enemy and to save that province for the republic. * Thus, all things considered, many examples can be found where only the exceptional skill of the troops will win the day, and many others where only the exceptional skill of the commanders will produce the same effect, so that it can be determined that the former has need of the latter and the latter of the former.

It is well to consider, first, what is most to be feared, either a good army badly commanded or a good commander accompanied by a bad army. Following the opinion of Caesar on this matter, either choice can be deemed of little use. Thus, when Caesar marched into Spain against Afranius and Petraeus, who had an excellent army, he declared that he had little esteem for them, ‘since he went against an army without a leader’, pointing out the weakness of the commanders. On the contrary, when he marched into Thessaly against Pompey, he stated: ‘I go against a leader without an army.’ *

It is possible to consider something else: is it easier for a good commander to create a good army or for a good army to create a good commander? On this topic, I would say that this question seems settled, because it is much easier for many good men to find or to instruct one man so that he may become good than it is for one to do so with many. When Lucullus was sent against Mithridates, he was completely inexperienced in war; nevertheless, this good army which contained many outstanding leaders very quickly turned him into a good commander. * For lack of men, the Romans armed many slaves, and for training gave them to Sempronius Gracchus, who in a brief time created an excellent army. * As we have said elsewhere, * Pelopidas and Epaminondas, having negotiated to free Thebes, their native city, from enslavement by the Spartans, in very little time created out of Theban peasants excellent soldiers, who were able not only to withstand the Spartan militia but to conquer it. Hence, the matter is even, because one good thing can find another. None the less, a good army without a good leader usually becomes insolent and dangerous, like the army of Macedonia after the death of Alexander, and the Roman soldiers who were veterans of the civil wars. For this reason, I believe more confidence can be placed in a commander who has the time to teach his men and the opportunity to arm them than in an insolent army with a leader created by the army on the spur of the moment. On that account, double glory and praise are due to those commanders who have not only had to vanquish the enemy but, before they came to blows with them, were forced to teach their army and to make it good; because in such men a double ability is demonstrated, and this is so rare that if such a labour were assigned to most men, they would be respected and esteemed much less than they are.