# CHAPTER 11 — That Anyone Who Has to Fight Many Enemies, Although He Is Inferior in Numbers, May Yet Win the Victory If He Can Withstand the First Onslaught

In the city of Rome, the power of the tribunes of the plebeians was great, and it was necessary (as we have said many times), because otherwise it would not have been possible to place a check on the ambition of the nobility, which would have corrupted that republic much earlier than actually occurred. Nevertheless, because everything holds within it some hidden evil that can give rise to new circumstances, as we have said on other occasions, it is necessary to provide against such evils with new institutions. Once tribunal authority became insolent and frightening to the nobility and to all of Rome, some difficulty would therefore have arisen that would have been harmful to Roman liberty, if Appius Claudius had not demonstrated the method by which they could defend themselves against the ambition of the tribunes; his method was to find among the tribunes someone who was either fearful or corruptible or who loved the common good so much that they could persuade him to oppose the will of those who wanted to bring forward some resolution against the will of the senate. This remedy was a great moderating force against such authority, and it was useful to Rome for many years. This example moves me to observe that, whenever many powerful men are united against another powerful man, even though all of them together are much more powerful than he is, one must, nevertheless, always expect more from that one man alone who is less bold than from those many men, no matter how bold they are. For leaving aside all those things in which a single person can prevail over many people, which are countless, this will always occur: the single person, with a bit of effort, can disunite the many and weaken the body that was so bold. I do not wish to cite any ancient examples of this, though there would be many of them, but I wish modern ones from our own times to suffice.

In 1483 all of Italy conspired against the Venetians, and since they were completely defeated and could no longer remain with their army in the field, they bought off Lord Ludovico who ruled Milan, and through these efforts they made an agreement in which not only did they take back the lands they lost, but occupied part of the state of Ferrara as well. In this way, those who lost the war stood in a better position after the peace. * A few years ago everyone conspired against France; nevertheless, before the end of the war Spain broke with her allies and made a truce with France, so that these allies were constrained shortly thereafter to come to terms themselves. * Thus, one should undoubtedly always make the judgement that whenever a war is started by many against one, that single individual will remain in a better position when he possesses sufficient ability to withstand the first onslaught and can temporize to await the proper moment. Whenever this is not the case, he will encounter a thousand dangers, as happened in 1508 to the Venetians, who, had they been able to temporize with the French army, and to find the time to win over some of those who were allied against them, would have avoided their downfall; but being without able armies so that they could temporize with the enemy, and for this reason lacking the time to separate any of them from the alliance, they came to ruin. Subsequently, we saw that the pope, once he regained his possessions, became their friend, and the king of Spain did the same, and had they been able, both of these two rulers would very willingly have saved the state of Lombardy for them against the king of France, in order to keep him from becoming too powerful in Italy. The Venetians, therefore, could have given up part in order to save the rest; if they had done so in time to make it look as if they were not forced to do so, especially before the events of war, this would have been an extremely wise plan; but as a result of the events of this war, their policy was contemptible and perhaps less than profitable. But before the war broke out few of the citizens in Venice could see the danger, very few could see a remedy, and nobody advised it. But to return to the beginning of this discourse, let me conclude by saying that, just as the Roman senate had a remedy for the health of their native city against the ambition of the tribunes by virtue of being many, in like manner any prince who is attacked by many will have a remedy whenever he knows how, with prudence, to employ measures apt to disunite them.
