# CHAPTER 23 — To What Extent the Romans Avoided a Middle Course of Action in Passing Judgements on Subjects for Some Incident Requiring Such a Verdict

‘The situation in Latium was already one where peace and war were equally intolerable.’ *

Of all the unhappy situations, the most unhappy is that of a prince or a republic reduced to a state where it can neither accept the peace nor continue the war; and those are reduced to such a state who, by the terms of a peace agreement, are harmed too much and who, on the other hand, are obliged to become prey to those who assist them or to the enemy, in their wish to make war. All of them finish in such dire straits through poor advice and poor planning, through not having taken careful measure of their own forces, as we said above. * Thus, any republic or prince who takes good measure of these matters will only with great difficulty be brought to the end suffered by the Latins, who, when they should not have reached an agreement with the Romans, did so, and when they should not have declared war upon the Romans, did so, and in this way managed to bring about a situation in which both the enmity and the friendship of the Romans were equally damaging to them. The Latins were therefore defeated and totally overwhelmed, first by Manlius Torquatus and later by Camillus, * who, after forcing them to surrender and to place themselves back in the hands of the Romans, and after placing garrisons in all the cities of Latium and taking hostages from them all, returned to Rome and reported to the senate that the entire territory of Latium was in the hands of the Roman people. And because this judgement is notable and worthy of being observed by those rulers who might imitate it when similar situations arise, I should like to cite Livy’s own words placed in the mouth of Camillus, which bear witness both to the means employed by the Romans in expansion and to the fact that, in governmental decisions, the Romans always avoided a middle course of action and turned to extreme measures.

In substance, a government is nothing more than the control of subjects in such a way that they cannot and must not harm you; this is achieved either by making yourself completely safe from them, by taking away from them every means of doing you harm, or by bringing them benefits in such a way that it would not be reasonable for them to desire some change in fortune. All this is perfectly clear, first from Camillus’ remarks and then from the judgement pronounced on them by the senate. His words were these: ‘The immortal gods have put you in control of the situation, so that the decision whether Latium shall exist in future or not is left in your hands; as far as the Latins are concerned, therefore, you have the power to create a permanent peace for yourselves by exercising either cruelty or forgiveness. Do you wish to adopt harsh measures against men who have surrendered or suffered defeat? You may destroy the whole of Latium, and create vast deserts out of the places from where you have often drawn a splendid allied army to make use of in many a major war. Or do you want to follow the example of your ancestors and extend the State of Rome by admitting your defeated enemies as citizens? The material for such increase is there in abundance, with glory to be won of supreme kind. Certainly by far the strongest government is one to which men are happy to be subject. But whatever you decide to do, you must make haste; you are keeping so many peoples in suspense, between hope and fear. You must resolve your own doubts concerning them as soon as possible, and while their minds are benumbed with apprehension, give them either the certainty of punishment or generous treatment.’ * The deliberation of the senate following this proposal was in accord with the words of the consul, and city by city, bringing forward all those of some importance, the Romans either rewarded them or destroyed them; to those they rewarded, the Romans granted exemptions, privileges, and citizenship, in every way making them secure; as for the other cities, their lands were destroyed or colonies were sent there or their citizens were sent back to Rome, scattering them so that they could nevermore do harm through arms or intrigue. Nor did the Romans, as I have stated before, ever take a neutral course in these matters of crucial importance.

Rulers should imitate this judgement. The Florentines should have followed this course of action when Arezzo and the entire Valdichiana rebelled in 1502; * had they done so, they would have secured their dominion and made the city of Florence great, and they would have given it the countryside that it lacked for provisions. But they employed that middle course of action which is extremely damaging in passing judgement on men; they banished some of the citizens of Arezzo, and they condemned others to death; they took away their honours and ancient ranks from everyone in the city; and they left the city intact. But if some citizen in the course of their deliberations advised that Arezzo be destroyed, those who seemed to be wiser declared that would bring little honour upon the city, since it would appear that Florence lacked the strength to hold it. These arguments are of the kind that appear to be true but are not, because by this same reasoning one would never execute a traitor or a wicked and seditious man, since to do so would shamefully demonstrate that the ruler lacked the power to restrain a single individual. Those men who hold such opinions fail to see that men taken individually, and a city as a whole, sometimes sin against the state in such a way that in order to make an example to others for one’s own security, a ruler has no other remedy than to destroy them. Honour consists in being able and knowing how to punish them, not in being able to hold them amidst a thousand dangers, because a ruler who does not punish a man who errs in such a way that he cannot err again is held to be either ignorant or cowardly.

The necessity of the judgement that the Romans rendered is also confirmed by the sentence they pronounced upon the people of Privernum. In this matter, two things in Livy’s text must be noted: first, as was mentioned above, that subjects must be either given benefits or destroyed; secondly, how much generosity of spirit and telling the truth matters when speaking in the presence of wise men. The Roman senate was gathered together to pass judgement upon the people of Privernum, who had rebelled and had then been brought back by force under Roman control. Many citizens were sent by the people of Privernum to ask for the pardon of the senate, and when they were in the senators’ presence, one of the senators asked one of them: ‘what punishment he thought the Privernates deserved.’ * To this the citizen of Privernum replied: ‘the punishment deserved by those who think themselves worthy of freedom’. To this the consul replied: ‘Suppose we let you off punishment, what sort of a peace may we hope to have with you?’ To this the citizen of Privernum responded: ‘If you grant us a good one, it will be loyally kept and permanent. If a bad one, it will not last long.’ At this point, the wisest part of the senate, even though many others were angered, declared that ‘the voice they heard was that of a man, and a man free-born. Was it credible, they asked, that any people, or indeed, individual, would remain longer than was necessary in a situation that was painful? A peace was loyally kept when its terms were voluntarily accepted; loyalty could not be expected from those on whom they wished to impose servitude.’ On the basis of these words the senators decided that the people of Privernum should become Roman citizens, and they honoured them with the privileges of citizenship, saying, ‘only those who took thought for nothing except freedom are worthy of becoming Romans’. This sincere and generous reply greatly pleased generous spirits, because any other reply would have been deceptive and cowardly. Those who believe otherwise about men, especially about those accustomed to being, or thinking themselves, free, are deceiving themselves; and under this deception, they choose policies that are neither good for themselves nor likely to satisfy others. From this circumstance arise frequent rebellions and the ruin of states. But to return to our topic, let me conclude by saying that, based on this judgement and the one pronounced against the Latins, when one has to judge powerful cities and cities that are accustomed to living in liberty, it is necessary either to destroy them or to give them benefits; otherwise every judgement is made in vain. Above all one must avoid a middle course of action, which is harmful, as it was to the Samnites when they trapped the Romans at the Caudine Forks and did not wish to accept the opinion of the old man who advised them that all the Romans should either be released with honour or killed, but, choosing a middle course of action, they disarmed the Romans and forced them to march under the yoke, allowing them to depart full of shame and indignation. As a result, not long afterwards they learned, at great cost to themselves, that the old man’s judgement had been useful and their own decision harmful, as will be discussed at greater length in the proper place. *