# CHAPTER 22 — How Often the Opinions of Men Are Mistaken in Their Judgements About Important Matters

How false the opinions of men are on many occasions, those who have been witnesses of their decisions have seen and still see; often when such decisions are not made by excellent men, they are contrary to every truth. Because excellent men in corrupt republics (especially in tranquil times) are considered enemies, both out of envy or other ambitions, the people follow either a man who is judged to be good by common self-deception or someone put forward by men who are more likely to desire special favours than the common good. Later, in adverse times, this deception is revealed, and out of necessity the people turn to those who in tranquil times were almost forgotten, as will be amply discussed in the appropriate place. * Certain situations also arise in which men who have little experience of things are easily deceived, since in such incidents there is much that seems so true that it makes men believe their judgements in these matters are accurate. I have made these remarks because of what Numisius, the praetor, persuaded the Latins to do after they were defeated by the Romans, * and also because of what many people were given to believe a few years ago when Francis I, king of France, came to take possession of Milan, which was defended by the Swiss. On that account, let me say that after Louis XII died * and Francis of Angoulême ascended the throne of France, desiring to restore the duchy of Milan to his kingdom, which a few years before had been occupied by Swiss troops with the encouragement of Pope Julius II, Francis wanted to have allies in Italy who would facilitate the undertaking; and besides the Venetians, whose support Louis had regained, he sounded out the Florentines and Pope Leo X, since he thought the enterprise would be easier once he had regained their support, since the king of Spain had soldiers in Lombardy and the emperor additional forces in Verona. Pope Leo did not yield to the king’s wishes but was persuaded by those who gave him counsel (according to what is said) to remain neutral, demonstrating to him that in this plan lay certain victory, since it did not serve the church to have either the king or the Swiss with power inside Italy, and that if he wished to restore Italy’s ancient liberty, it was necessary to liberate Italy from servitude to both of them. Because it was not possible to conquer one or the other, either by themselves or both together, the pope needed to have one of them conquer the other, and afterwards the church with its allies could attack the one who then emerged victorious. It was impossible to find a better opportunity than the present one, since both of them were in the field and the pope’s forces were organized in such a manner that they could present themselves on the borders of Lombardy near both armies under the pretence of wishing to guard his possessions and remain there until they engaged in battle. Since both armies were strong, it could reasonably be assumed that the battle would be very bloody for both parties and would leave the victor in a weakened condition, so that it would be easy for the pope to attack and defeat him, and thus the pope would become, to his great glory, lord of Lombardy and arbiter of all of Italy. Just how false this opinion was can be seen in the actual unfolding of this incident, because once the Swiss were overcome after a lengthy struggle, the pope’s troops and those of Spain did not have the courage to attack the victors but prepared to retreat, and this would not have helped them had it not been for the humanity or the irresolute-ness of the king, who did not seek a second victory but for whom it was enough to come to an agreement with the church. *

Certain arguments supporting this opinion seem true from afar but are altogether extraneous to the truth. For it rarely occurs that the victor loses too many of his troops, because victorious troops perish in the midst of the battle, not in flight; and in the heat of battle when men are face to face, few of them actually fall, mainly because the combat lasts for a brief period of time in most cases; and even if it lasts for a long while and many of the victors perish, their victory enhances their prestige so greatly and creates so much fear that it far outweighs the damage they have suffered through the death of their soldiers. Thus, if an army, in the belief that the victor has been weakened, goes to attack him, it will find itself greatly deceived, unless the army was already such that at any time, either before or after the victory, it was capable of engaging the victor in combat. In this case it could win or lose according to its fortune and its exceptional ability, but the army that had fought earlier and won would still have the advantage over this one. The truth of this can be recognized in the experience of the Latins and the error made on the part of Numisius, the praetor, and by the damage caused to the peoples who believed him. After the Romans had conquered the Latins, he proclaimed throughout all the territory of Latium that the moment was ripe to attack the Romans, who were weakened from the battle they had waged with them; that the Romans had gained nothing more than the name of victory, while all the other damage they had suffered was tantamount to having been defeated; and that any little force which attacked them again would destroy them. As a result, the peoples who believed him created a new army and were quickly defeated, and they suffered the harm that those who hold such an opinion will always suffer.