# CHAPTER 18 — Why One Should Hold the Infantry in Higher Regard Than the Cavalry, Based on the Authority of the Romans and the Example of the Ancient Militia

It can be clearly demonstrated through many arguments and examples that the Romans in all their military actions valued foot-soldiers more than those on horses and based all the battle plans for their forces on them; this can be seen in numerous examples, including the occasion when the Romans were fighting the Latins near Lake Regillus, * where with the Roman army already faltering, the Romans ordered the men on horseback to dismount in order to give assistance, and in this way, having renewed the battle, they achieved victory. In this case, it is obvious that the Romans had more confidence in having their troops on foot than in keeping them mounted on horseback. They employed this same expedient in many other battles, and they always found it to be an excellent remedy to their dangers.

We should not counter this with the judgement of Hannibal, who, upon seeing that the consuls had made their cavalrymen dismount from their horses during the battle of Cannae, declared, mocking such a decision: ‘Quam mallem vinctos mihi traderent equites!’—that is to say: ‘I would have preferred that they hand them over to me in chains.’* Although this judgement came from the mouth of a most excellent man, none the less, if one must believe in authority, it is necessary to give more credence to the Roman republic and to the many excellent military leaders that it possessed than to the single example of Hannibal. Furthermore, without citing any authorities, there are obvious reasons for this: a foot-soldier can go in many places where a horse cannot follow; it is possible to teach a foot-soldier to stay in formation and, whenever he falls out of line, to return to it; it is difficult to make horses stay in formation, and it is impossible, whenever they fall out of line, to reorder them. Besides this, some horses, just like some men, have little courage and others have a great deal of it, and it often occurs that a courageous horse is ridden by a cowardly man and a cowardly horse by a courageous man; and whatever the form this disparity may take, disadvantage and disorder arise from it. Infantry in formation can easily break the cavalry and can be broken by them only with difficulty. This opinion is corroborated not only by many ancient and modern examples but also by the authority of those who make rules for civic affairs, where they show that wars first began to be waged with cavalry, because the institution of the infantry did not yet exist; but as these foot-soldiers were organized, it was immediately recognized that foot-soldiers were more useful than cavalrymen. It is not for this reason true, however, that cavalry is unnecessary in armies to do reconnaissance, to raid and plunder the countryside, to pursue the enemy when they are in flight, or to provide some opposition for the enemy’s cavalry; but the foundation and the sinew of the army, and the type of troops that should be valued most, must be the infantry.

Among the sins of Italian princes, who have made Italy the slave of foreigners, there is none more serious than to have paid little attention to the institution of the infantry and to have turned all of their attention to the militia on horseback. This disorder has arisen because of the wickedness of commanders and the ignorance of those who have ruled states. Some twenty-five years ago, * once the Italian militia had been given over to the command of men without states who were like soldiers of fortune, these commanders immediately thought about how to maintain their own prestige, since they were armed and the princes unarmed. Since they could not continuously pay a large number of foot-soldiers, and did not have subjects they could make use of, and since a small number of men would not bring them any reputation, they turned to keeping cavalry, because two or three hundred horsemen who were paid by a condottiere would maintain his prestige, and the payment was not such that it could not be met by men who ruled a state. So that this would more easily come to pass and bring them more prestige, they took all of the esteem and reputation away from the infantry and bestowed it upon their cavalry, and they so enlarged on this confused policy that in the greatest army there was only a minimal number of infantry. This practice, along with many defects mixed in with it, made the Italian militia so weak that this province has been easily trampled upon by all the Ultramontanes.

This error of holding the cavalry in higher esteem than the infantry can be shown even more clearly in another Roman example. The Romans were encamped at Sora, and when a squadron of cavalry went forth from the city to attack their camp, the Roman master of horse went to meet them with his own cavalry; once they charged each other, fate decreed that in the first encounter both commanders would die, and although the rest of the men were left without their commanders and the battle nevertheless went on, the Romans dismounted in order more easily to overcome the enemy, and they compelled the enemy cavalry to do the same, if they wished to defend themselves; and with this tactic the Romans carried off the victory. There could be no better example to demonstrate how much more ability there is in infantry than in cavalry, because if in other actions the consuls made their cavalry dismount, it was to give assistance to the infantry who were suffering and needed help; in this instance, however, the cavalry dismounted, not to assist the infantry nor to combat the enemies on foot, but while fighting on horseback against cavalry, they concluded that if they could not overcome the enemy on horseback, they could, by dismounting, conquer them more easily. I should like to conclude, therefore, that a well-organized infantry can be overcome only with the greatest difficulty, except by another infantry. The Romans Crassus and Mark Antony marched for many days through the dominion of the Parthians with very few cavalry and many infantry, and in opposition to them they had the innumerable cavalry of the Parthians. Crassus was killed with a part of his troops; Mark Antony saved himself through great skill. Nevertheless, in the hardships the Romans experienced, it is evident that the infantry prevailed over the cavalry, because while being in a large country with few mountains and even fewer rivers, far away from the sea and from any assistance, Mark Antony nevertheless saved himself, in the judgement of the Parthians themselves, through the greatest skill; nor did all the Parthian cavalry ever dare to test the formations of his army. If Crassus died there, anyone who reads about his actions with attention will see that he was deceived rather than overwhelmed by force; never in all his troubles did the Parthians ever dare to charge him directly; on the contrary, remaining on his flanks at all times, they cut off his supplies, and by making promises which they did not observe, they brought him to a state of utter distress.

I should think I need to take more trouble to argue the case that the ability of infantry is so much greater than that of cavalry, if there were not so many modern examples that provide the most abundant testimony. As we mentioned earlier, we have seen 9,000 Swiss soldiers at Novara march to confront 10,000 cavalry and as many infantry and overcome them; the cavalry could not harm them, and since the infantry were largely men from Gascony and very poorly organized, the Swiss considered them of little consequence. Then we have seen 26,000 Swiss troops north of Milan * march to attack Francis, king of France, who had with him 20,000 cavalry and 40,000 foot-soldiers along with 100 artillery pieces, and if the Swiss did not carry the day as they did at Novara, they fought valiantly for two days, and then, when they were defeated, half of them escaped. Marcus Regulus Attilius was so bold as to attack not only cavalry with his infantry but elephants as well, and if his plan did not succeed, it was not because the skill of his infantry was such that he could not rely upon them well enough to believe he could overcome that difficulty. I repeat, therefore, that to overcome well-organized infantry, it is necessary to oppose them with infantry even better organized than they are; otherwise one marches to certain defeat. In the times of Filippo Visconti, duke of Milan, around 16,000 Swiss troops descended into Lombardy, whereupon that duke, who, at that time, had Carmignuola as his general, sent him with about 1,000 cavalry and a few foot-soldiers to confront the Swiss. Not knowing their battle formation, Carmignuola attacked the Swiss with his cavalry, presuming he would immediately be able to defeat them. But when he found them invincible, he retreated after losing many of his men, and since he was a most capable man and knew how to design new policies according to new circumstances, Carmignuola reinforced his army and went to meet the Swiss; and when he approached, he made all his men-at-arms dismount, and after placing them at the head of his infantry, he went to assault the Swiss. The Swiss had no remedy for this, because Carmignuola’s men-at-arms were on foot and well armed and could easily enter the Swiss formations without suffering any harm, and once they had entered them, they could easily harm them, with the result that of this entire number, only those who were spared by Carmignuola’s humanity remained alive. *

I believe that many recognize the difference in ability between these two different kinds of military institutions, but so great is the wretchedness of these times that neither ancient examples nor modern ones, nor even the confession of error, suffices to make modern princes reconsider and understand that in order to give prestige to the militia of a province or of a state, it is necessary to restore these institutions, to observe them closely, to give them prestige, to give them life, so that they may bring him strength and prestige. * But since they deviate from these methods, they also deviate from the other methods discussed above. Hence, it happens that acquisitions bring harm rather than greatness to a state, as will be discussed below.