# CHAPTER 16 — How Far the Soldiers of Our Times Have Strayed from Ancient Institutions

The most important battle the Roman people ever fought in any war with any nation was the one they fought with the Latin peoples during the consulate of Torquatus and Decius. Every argument confirms that, just as the Latins became slaves by having lost the battle, so the Romans would have become slaves had they not won it. Livy is of this opinion, for he writes that the two armies were equal in every way—organization, exceptional ability, stubbornness, and number; the only difference between them was that the leaders of the Roman army were more able than those of the Latin army. Furthermore, it is evident that in the handling of this battle, two incidents occurred that were never before observed and rarely repeated afterwards: that is, in order to keep their soldiers firm in their convictions, obedient to the consuls’ orders, and resolute in battle, one consul killed himself and the other killed his son. * The parity that Livy declares to have existed between these two armies came about because, having fought together for a long time, they were alike in speech, organization, and arms, for in organizing the battle they held to the same methods, and the formations and the leaders of these formations bore the same names. Given that they were equal in forces and equal in ability, it was therefore necessary for something extraordinary to arise that would make the spirit of one army more determined than the other; as has been said on other occasions, victory depends upon such obstinacy, because while it abides in the hearts of those who are fighting, armies never turn their backs in retreat. And so that such obstinacy would abide longer in the hearts of the Romans than in the Latins, it was partly fate and partly the exceptional ability of the consuls that brought Torquatus to kill his son and Decius to kill himself.

In the course of demonstrating this equality of forces, Livy reveals in its entirety the organization maintained by the Romans in their armies and their battles. Since he explains it in great detail I shall not repeat it all, but I shall examine only what I deem notable and what, having been neglected by all the military leaders of these times, has created disorder in armies and battles. Let me say, therefore, that from the passage in Livy we can discern that the Roman army had three principal divisions, which in Tuscan could be called schiere [formations]: they named the first hastati, the second principes, the third triarii, and each of these formations had its own cavalry. * In drawing up the order of battle, the Romans placed the hastati in front; in the second place directly behind them they positioned the principes; and in the third place in a similar line they put the triarii. They positioned the cavalry of these three ranks to the right and to the left of the three lines; the formations of these cavalry, from their form and placement, were called alae [wings] because they looked like two wings on that body. They organized the first group, the hastati, which was in front, in a locked formation so that it could attack or resist the enemy. The second formation of the principes was not the first to offer combat but rather had the task of supporting the first formation when it was beaten or attacked, and it was not tightly ordered but rather kept its ranks open so that it could receive the first formation within its ranks without becoming disorganized, whenever the first formation was forced to retreat by the enemy’s onslaught. The third formation of triarii kept its ranks even more open than the second in order to receive, whenever necessary, the first two formations, of the hastati and the principes. Arranged in this manner, then, these formations gave battle, and if the hastati were forced back or conquered, they retreated into the openings in the ranks of the principes, and, all united together, they created one body out of the two formations and re-entered the battle. If these two formations were repulsed and driven back, they all retreated into the openings in the ranks of the triarii, and all three formations having become a single body renewed the struggle; if they were overcome at this point, because they could no longer reorganize, they would lose the battle. And since whenever this last formation of triarii was employed, the army was in grave danger, this proverb arose: ‘to have reached the triarii’, which in Tuscan usage would mean: ‘we have played our last card.’ *

Military leaders of our times, who have abandoned all the other institutions and who fail to observe any part of ancient discipline have likewise abandoned this one, which is of no little importance, for anyone who organizes himself so that he can regroup three times in a battle will lose only if fortune is hostile to him three times, and he must encounter a skill that is capable of conquering him three times. But anyone who is organized to stand up only against the first assault, like all Christian armies today, can easily lose, because any disorder, any mediocre skill can snatch the victory away from him. The thing that makes our armies incapable of regrouping three times is that they have lost the method of taking one formation into another. This has arisen because at present, battles are organized with one of these two defects: either the formations are placed shoulder to shoulder one after the other, and create a battle line that is wide across but thin toward the rear, which makes it weaker, because there is no depth from front to rear; or when instead, in order to make it stronger, they shorten the formations in the Roman manner, and if the first line is broken, since there is no arrangement for receiving them into the second line, they become entangled and break themselves up. For, if the formation in front is pushed back, it collides with the second, and if the second wants to advance, it is impeded by the first, so that with the first formation colliding with the second and the second with the third, so much chaos arises that often only a very small incident can destroy an army. The Spanish and French armies at the battle of Ravenna (where Monsieur de Foix, leader of the French troops, was killed), a battle considered in our times to be very well fought, organized themselves in one of the ways described above: that is, both armies advanced with all their troops lined up shoulder to shoulder, so that neither could have more than a single front line, and they were much stronger in breadth than in depth. * This always happens to them wherever they have a large battlefield, as they had at Ravenna. For, knowing the disorder they produce in retreating, they avoid it when they can by placing their soldiers in a single file, and creating a broad front, as we have said, but, when the countryside restricts them, they remain in the poorly organized position described above without thinking of any remedy. With this same poor organization they ride through hostile territory, either plundering or carrying on any other tactic of warfare. At Santo Regolo in the Pisan territory and elsewhere, wherever the Florentines were defeated by the Pisans during the war between Florence and Pisa after the Pisan rebellion when Charles, king of France, passed through Italy, such ruin arose from nothing other than friendly cavalry: being situated in the front line and driven back by the enemy, it ran through the Florentine infantry and broke it up, so that all the rest of the soldiers turned back. And Messer Ciriaco dal Borgo, the old leader of the Florentine infantry, has affirmed in my presence many times that he was never defeated except by friendly cavalry. The Swiss, who are the masters of modern warfare, above all else take care when they fight with the French to put themselves on one side so that friendly cavalry, if driven back, will not run into them. Although these matters seem easy to understand and extremely easy to put into practice, nevertheless, not even one of our contemporary commanders can be found who imitates ancient institutions and reforms the modern ones. Although they may still have three parts in their army, one called the vanguard, one the main force, and one the rearguard, these divisions serve no other purpose than to keep them under control in camp, but in using them, as we have said above, it is rare that they do not make all these forces subject to the same destiny.

And because many, to excuse their ignorance in these matters, allege that the violence of artillery does not permit many of these ancient institutions to be employed in these times, I want to debate this subject in the following chapter, and I want to examine the question of whether artillery prevents us from employing ancient skill.