# CHAPTER 15 — Weak States Are Always Ambiguous in Their Decisions; and Slow Decisions Are Always Harmful

In this same matter and in these same beginnings of war between the Latins and the Romans, we can observe how in every assembly it is well to come to the specifics of what must be decided and to avoid being ambiguous and uncertain about the case. This can be clearly seen in the assembly the Latins called when they were thinking about severing relations with the Romans, for once the Romans had anticipated the evil humour that had affected the Latin peoples, in order to assess the matter and to see whether, without resorting to arms, they could regain the support of those peoples, the Romans let it be known that they should send eight citizens to Rome, because they needed to consult with them. Having understood this and being aware that they had done many things against the will of the Romans, the Latins held a council to determine who should go to Rome and to give them instructions about what they should say. While in the council during this debate, their praetor Annius spoke these words: ‘I still think that how we should act will affect the main issue more than what we should say. It will be easy to find words to fit our actions once we have set our plans in order’. * These words are without any doubt completely true, and they should be valued by every prince and by every republic, because in the midst of doubt and uncertainty about what others wish to do, it is impossible to match words with deeds, but once a decision has been taken and what is to be done has been determined, it is an easy matter to find the right words. I have all the more willingly stressed this point, inasmuch as I have on many occasions known such ambiguity to have harmed public actions, to the damage and the disgrace of our republic. And it will always happen that in doubtful cases and where courage is required for making decisions, such ambiguity will exist when it is weak men who deliberate and make such decisions. Nor are slow and tardy decisions any less harmful than the ambiguous ones, especially those which must be decided in favour of some ally, since slowness helps no one and is harmful to oneself. Decisions of this kind derive either from weakness of mind or weakness in your forces, or from some malignant disposition on the part of those who have to deliberate, who, moved by their own selfish passion to destroy the state or to fulfil some other desire, do not allow any decision to be reached but impede and block it. Good citizens, even when they see popular sentiment turning toward a pernicious choice, never impede the deliberations, and especially in matters where there is little time.

After the death of Hieronymus, the tyrant of Syracuse, while there was a great war raging between the Carthaginians and the Romans, the citizens of Syracuse argued about whether they should pursue the friendship of Rome or of Carthage. So great was the fervour of the parties that the question remained unsettled and no decision was ever reached, until Apollonides, one of the foremost Syracusan citizens, demonstrated in an oration full of prudence that no one was to be blamed for holding the opinion that they should ally themselves with Rome, just as no one was to be blamed for wishing to take the Carthaginian side; that it was well to detest such uncertainty and tardiness in choosing a policy, since he saw in such uncertainty the ruin of the republic; and that once a decision was taken, no matter what it might be, it was possible to hope for some good to result from it. * Nor could Livy demonstrate any better than in this section the damage that remaining undecided brings along with it. He demonstrates it again in this case of the Latins, since once they had asked the Lavinians for assistance against the Romans, the Lavinians delayed so long in deliberating the question that they had scarcely gone through the city gates with their men to bring the Latins help when news arrived that the Latins had been routed. At this point, their praetor Milionius declared: ‘This short march will cost us dearly with the Roman people.’ * Thus, if the Lavinians had decided at first either to aid or not to aid the Latins, they would not have provoked the Romans by not aiding them; by aiding them and by sending aid in time, they could have made the Latins victorious with the addition of their forces, but by deferring the decision, they would have come to lose in any case, as happened to them. If the Florentines had noted this passage, they would not have had so much damage or trouble inflicted upon them by the French as they had during the expedition of King Louis XII of France into Italy against Ludovico, duke of Milan, * since in making preparations for this expedition, the king sought out an alliance with the Florentines, and the ambassadors at the king’s court agreed with him that they would remain neutral and that when the king entered Italy, he would have to maintain their state and receive them under his protection; and he gave the city the space of one month to ratify this agreement. The ratification was postponed by those who, out of a lack of prudence, took the side of Ludovico until finally, when the king was already certain of victory and the Florentines wanted to ratify the agreement, the ratification was not accepted, since the king recognized that the Florentines had allied themselves with him out of necessity and not of their own will. This cost the city of Florence a great deal of money and left it on the verge of losing control of the government, as later happened for a similar reason. * Thus, this decision deserves condemnation, because it was of no use to Duke Ludovico, who, if he had won, would have shown many more signs of hostility against the Florentines than did the king. Although the harm which arises in republics on account of this weakness has been discussed above in another chapter, * none the less, having another occasion to discuss it because of a new circumstance, I have decided to discuss it again, since it is, in my opinion, a most important matter of which republics similar to our own ought to take note.