# CHAPTER 19 — Conquests Made by Republics Which Are Not Well Organized, and Which Do Not Proceed According to Roman Standards of Excellence, Bring About Their Ruin Rather Than Their Glorification

These opinions contrary to the truth and founded upon the bad examples that our corrupted times have introduced prevent men from thinking about deviating from their usual methods. Could one have persuaded an Italian of thirty years ago that 10,000 infantrymen could attack 10,000 cavalry and as many infantry on level ground and not only fight them but defeat them, as we have seen in the example of Novara that we have so frequently cited? Even though histories are full of such examples, men nevertheless refuse to believe in them; or if they had believed in them, they would have said that in those times men were better armed and that a squadron of armed men on horseback would rather charge a rock than a body of infantrymen; and thus, with such false excuses, they have corrupted their judgement. Nor would they have considered how Lucullus, * with just a few foot-soldiers, defeated 150,000 of Tigranes’ cavalry, and that among those cavalrymen was a type of cavalry very much like our own men-at-arms on horseback. Thus, just as this fallacy has been revealed by the example of the Ultramontane soldiers (and for that reason, we see that everything the histories tell us about the infantry is true), so they ought to believe that all the other ancient institutions are true and useful.

If this were believed, republics and princes would err a great deal less and they would be stronger to oppose any attack made against them; they would not place their trust in flight, and those who had a civil society in their hands would know better how to direct it, either by expanding it or by maintaining it. They would believe that increasing the number of inhabitants in their city, making allies and not subjects, sending colonies to watch over acquired territories, making capital out of the spoils of war, subduing the enemy with raids and battles rather than sieges, keeping the public treasury wealthy and private citizens poor, and sustaining military training with the highest degree of diligence would be the true path to making a republic great and to acquiring power. If this method of growth is not acceptable to them, they should remember that acquisitions by any other means are the ruin of republics, and they should rein in every ambition, regulating the city carefully from within through laws and customs and prohibiting expansion, thinking only of defending themselves and keeping their defences well organized, as do the republics of Germany, which by following these methods live free and have lived free for some time. Nevertheless, as I said earlier when I discussed the difference between establishing institutions for expansion and establishing institutions for stability, it is impossible for a republic to succeed in standing still while enjoying its liberty within its narrow borders, because if the republic does not trouble others, others will trouble it, and from being troubled arises the will and the necessity for expansion, and when you have no enemy outside you will find one at home, as it seems occurs necessarily in all the great cities. If the republics of Germany can live in that manner and have endured for a long while, this arises from certain conditions that exist in that country which do not exist elsewhere and without which they could not hold on to such a way of life.

That part of Germany of which I am speaking was subjected to the Roman empire as were France and Spain, but when the imperial power later began to decline and the title of that power was transferred to that province, the most powerful of these cities, according to the cowardice or the needs of the emperors, began to free themselves, redeeming themselves from the empire by reserving for it a small annual tribute, so that little by little all those cities that were direct dependants of the emperor and were subject to no other prince redeemed themselves. At the same time that these cities were redeeming themselves, it happened that certain communities subject to the duke of Austria rebelled against him, among them being Fribourg and the Swiss and other similar communities; they prospered in the beginning and little by little they managed to expand so much that not only did they not return to the yoke of Austria, but caused all their neighbours to fear them, and these are the people who are called the Swiss. *

This province is, therefore, divided among the Swiss, into republics (which they call free cities), princes, and the emperor. And the reason that among so many diverse kinds of government wars do not arise or, if they do arise, do not last for long, is that symbol of the emperor, who, while having no forces, nevertheless has so much prestige among them that he acts as their conciliator and, interposing himself with his authority as a mediator, quickly puts a stop to any disagreements. The greatest and longest wars that have occurred there are those between the Swiss and the duke of Austria, and although the emperor and the duke of Austria have been one and the same thing for many years, he has nevertheless been unable to overcome the daring of the Swiss, with whom no agreement is ever possible without force. Nor has the rest of Germany given the emperor much help, both because these communities do not wish to attack anyone who wishes to live free like themselves, and also because some of those princes cannot, since they are poor, while others will not, since they are jealous of his power. These communities can, therefore, live content with their small dominion, since they have no reason, with respect to imperial authority, to desire to become larger; they can live united within their city walls, since they possess a nearby enemy who would seize any opportunity to attack them whenever they find themselves at odds. Thus, if that province were set up differently, it would be necessary for them to seek to expand and to destroy their own tranquillity.

But since such conditions cannot be found elsewhere, it is not possible to choose this way of life, and it is necessary either to expand by means of leagues or to expand as the Romans did. Anyone who acts otherwise seeks not his life but his death and ruin, since in a thousand ways and for many reasons, conquests are damaging. Thus, it is quite possible to acquire dominion but not strength at the same time, and anyone who acquires dominion but not strength along with it of necessity comes to ruin. Anyone who is impoverished by wars cannot acquire strength, even if he is victorious, since he puts more into the affair than he derives from his acquisitions: just as the Venetians and the Florentines did, who were much weaker when Venice held Lombardy and Florence controlled Tuscany than they were when one was content with the sea and the other with six miles of surrounding territory. In fact, all this is born from wishing to expand without knowing how to select the method of doing so; and these cities deserve even more criticism inasmuch as they have less excuse, since they saw the method employed by the Romans and could have followed their example, while the Romans, without any example to follow, through their own prudence knew on their own how to find the right method.

Besides this, conquests sometimes cause no little damage to a well-organized republic, when a city or a province full of luxuries is acquired, where it is possible to take on some of those habits through one’s own experience with them; this happened first to Rome, in the acquisition of Capua, and then to Hannibal. And if Capua had been farther away from Rome, so that the remedy for the soldiers’ error was not so close at hand, or if Rome had been corrupt to some degree, without a doubt this acquisition would have been the ruin of the Roman republic. Livy bears witness to the truth of this with these words: ‘Capua was even then a most unhealthy spot for military discipline, seducing the minds of the soldiers by all the pleasures it could provide, so that they forgot their homeland.’ * And truly, such cities or provinces have their revenge against the conqueror without battles or shedding of blood, because by filling him with their own bad habits, they make him vulnerable to being conquered by anyone who attacks him. And Juvenal could not have said it better when, in considering this matter in his Satires, he declares that as a result of acquiring foreign territories, foreign customs entered Roman hearts, and in place of frugality and other excellent qualities, ‘gluttony and luxury took over, avenging the conquered world’. * If expansion risked being harmful to the Romans during the times when they were conducting themselves with so much prudence and skill, what will happen, then, to anyone who proceeds in a way which deviates so far from their methods and who, besides the other mistakes they make, which I have discussed in some detail above, also chooses soldiers who are either mercenaries or auxiliaries? As a result of this, they often suffer the kinds of damage that will be noted in the following chapter.