# CHAPTER 12 — Whether It Is Preferable, Fearing an Assault, to Start a War or to Await Its Outbreak

I have overheard men very experienced in warfare debate this question on occasion: if there are two princes of almost equal power and the bolder one has declared war on the other, what would be the best choice for the second prince: to wait for the enemy within his borders or to seek him out in his homeland and attack him? I have heard arguments on both sides. Those who argue in favour of attacking others cite the advice that Croesus gave to Cyrus when, after his arrival at the borders of the Massagetans to make war on them, their queen Tomyris sent him a message saying that he might wish to choose one of two alternatives: either enter her kingdom, where she would await him, or wait for her to come to attack him. When the question came to be debated, Croesus, against the opinion of others, said to go and to seek her out, claiming that if he defeated her at a distance from her kingdom he would be unable to seize the kingdom from her, because she would have the time to regroup, but that if he conquered her within her own borders he could follow her as she fled, and, by not giving her time to regroup, seize the state from her. They also cite the advice that Hannibal gave to Antiochus when that king developed a plan to wage war upon the Romans, in which he demonstrated that the Romans could not be conquered except inside Italy, because an invader could make use of their arms, wealth, and allies, but that anyone who fought the Romans outside of Italy and left Italy free would leave them a source that would never fail to supply them with forces wherever necessary; and Hannibal concluded that Rome could be more quickly taken from the Romans than the empire, and Italy before the other provinces. They also cite the example of Agathocles, * who, being unable to sustain the war at home, attacked the Carthaginians, who were again waging war against him, and forced them to sue for peace, as well as that of Scipio, who, in order to stop the war in Italy attacked Africa.

Those who hold a contrary opinion declare that whoever wishes harm to befall an enemy should draw him away from home. They cite the Athenians, who remained superior as long as they waged a convenient war in their own backyard, but upon finding themselves at a distance from home, they went with their armies to Sicily and lost their liberty. * They cite the poetic fables that show how Antaeus, king of Libya, under attack by Hercules the Egyptian, was invincible as long as he remained within the confines of his kingdom, but when he went beyond them, because of Hercules’ ingenuity, he lost his state and his life. This gave rise to the fable that while Antaeus stood on the ground, he regained his strength from his mother who was the earth, and when Hercules realized this, he lifted him up and moved him away from the earth. * They also cite modern opinions. Everyone knows that Ferdinand, king of Naples, was considered to be a very wise prince in his own times, and two years before his death, when he heard a rumour about how Charles VIII, the king of France, wanted to come to attack him, he fell ill after having made a great many preparations, and as he was dying, among the other pieces of advice he left Alfonso, his son, was that he should wait for the enemy inside the kingdom and that for no reason in the world should he take his forces outside his state, but rather await Charles inside his domain with his entire army. This advice was not followed by Alfonso, but, upon sending an army into the Romagna, Alfonso lost it without fighting, along with his state. *

Besides the ones already mentioned, the arguments brought forward by each side are these: anyone who attacks does so with more courage than anyone who awaits an attack, which makes the attacker’s army more confident; attacking also takes away many of the enemy’s advantages by depriving him of his ability to avail himself of his possessions, since he cannot avail himself of subjects who are being plundered; and with the enemy in his home territory, a ruler is obliged not to overtax his subjects or to overburden them, so that the invader can eventually dry up the source that, as Hannibal declared, makes it possible for the defender to sustain the war. Besides this, the attacker’s soldiers, by virtue of being in another country, are more obliged to fight, and this necessity produces exceptional skill, as we have stated many times. On the other hand, it is said that when you await the enemy you wait with a considerable advantage, since without any hardship of your own you can cause him great hardships in securing provisions and everything else an army requires; you can more efficiently impede his plans through your greater knowledge, and you can confront him with greater forces and easily keep them united, even though you cannot move them all away from home; you can easily reorganize if you are defeated, because most of your army will save itself by virtue of having refuges nearby and reinforcements that need not come over a long distance, so that you eventually risk all your forces but not your entire fortune, whereas going off to a distant place, you risk your entire fortune but not all of your forces. And there have been some who, in order to weaken the enemy more efficiently, have allowed them to enter for a few day’s march into their own territory and to seize a number of towns, so that by leaving garrisons in them all, they have weakened their army, and it is then easier to fight them.

But in order to say now what I understand of this matter, I believe that one must make this distinction: either I possess my own armed country, like the Romans in the past or the Swiss in the present; or I possess an unarmed country, like the Carthaginians in the past or the king of France and the Italians in the present. In the latter case, an enemy must be kept far from your home territory because your strength resides in your wealth and not in your army, so that whenever access to your wealth is cut off, you are finished, and nothing will block access to your wealth more than a war in your home territory. As examples, we have the Carthaginians who, while their homeland was free, could wage war against the Romans with their income, but when it was attacked, could not resist Agathocles. The Florentines had no remedy whatsoever against Castruccio, lord of Lucca, because he waged war on them in their own home territory, to the point that, in order to defend themselves, they had to give themselves over to King Robert of Naples. But once Castruccio was dead, these same Florentines had the courage to attack the duke of Milan in his home territory and to hope to take his kingdom away from him, so much of that exceptional ability did they demonstrate in distant wars and so much weakness in those nearby. * But when kingdoms are armed, as Rome was armed and as the Swiss are now armed, it is much more difficult to conquer them the nearer you come to them, because these bodies can unite more forces to resist an onslaught than to attack someone else. Nor does the authority of Hannibal convince me in this instance, because passion and profit made him give the advice he gave to Antiochus. If the Romans had suffered in France in the same space of time the three defeats Hannibal inflicted on them in Italy, they would undoubtedly have been crushed, because they would not have been able to avail themselves of the remainder of their armies, as they did in Italy; in reorganizing themselves, they would not have been able to enjoy the advantages they enjoyed, nor could they have resisted the enemy with the forces that they employed. There are no instances of the Romans attacking a province without sending armies that exceeded the number of 50,000 men, but to defend their home territory, after the First Punic War, they assembled against the Gauls 1,800,000 armed men. * Nor could they have defeated them in Lombardy as they defeated them in Etruria, because against such a large number of enemies they could not have moved so many forces over such a distance, nor could they have fought them with such ease. The Cimbri routed a Roman army in Germany, nor had the Romans any remedy there. But when the Cimbri reached Italy and the Romans were able to bring together all their forces, they destroyed the Cimbri. * The Swiss are easily conquered outside their home territory, where they cannot send more than 30,000 or 40,000 men, but to conquer them at home, where they can put together 100,000 men is extremely difficult. Once again I conclude, therefore, that the prince whose people are armed and organized for warfare should always wait at home for a violent and dangerous war and should not go out on the attack. But the prince who has unarmed subjects and a country unused to war should always go as far away from home as possible. In this way, both the one and the other, each according to his own circumstances, will defend himself more effectively.