# CHAPTER 4 — Republics Have Employed Three Methods of Expansion

Anyone who has studied the ancient histories discovers that republics have employed three methods of expansion. One is that which the ancient Etruscans employed, which consisted of a confederation of many republics in which none surpassed the others in either authority or rank; and as they acquired territory, they made the other cities their companions just as the Swiss have done in our own times, and as in ancient times the Achaeans and the Aetolians did in Greece. Since the Romans waged many wars with the Etruscans, I shall present a detailed account of them in order better to demonstrate the merits of this first method.

In Italy before the advent of the Roman empire, the Etruscans were extremely powerful on both land and sea, and although no detailed historical account of their affairs exists, there nevertheless still remain some brief record and some trace of their greatness. It is known that they sent a colony, which they called Adria, to the sea-coast above them, which was so noble that it gave its name to the sea that the Latins still call the Adriatic. It is also known that their forces were obeyed from the shore of the Tiber to the foot of the Alps that now circle the largest section of Italy, notwithstanding the fact that 200 years before the Romans grew so greatly in strength, the Etruscans lost their dominion over that territory which is now called Lombardy, the province which was occupied by the Gauls. Driven either by necessity or attracted by the sweetness of the fruits, and especially of the wine, the Gauls entered Italy under their duke Bellovesus. After defeating and driving away the inhabitants of that province, they settled in that place where they built many cities; they called the province Gaul after the name they then bore, and they retained this land until they were conquered by the Romans. Thus, the Etruscans lived in equality and proceeded to enlarge their territory employing the first method that was mentioned above: there were twelve cities, among which were Chiusi, Veii, Arezzo, Fiesole, Volterra, and other such cities, which governed their empire through a confederation. Nor were they able to pass beyond Italy in making conquests, and the greater part of Italy remained intact for reasons that will be explained below.

The second method is to make alliances for yourself, but not to the extent that you do not retain the position of command, the seat of the empire, and the credit for its achievements: the method that was employed by the Romans. The third method is quickly to obtain subjects rather than allies for yourself, as did the Spartans and Athenians. Of these three methods, this last one is entirely useless, as can be seen in the cases of the two republics mentioned above, which came to ruin for no other reason than because they had acquired territory that they were unable to hold. Thus, assuming the burden of ruling a city with violence, especially those accustomed to living in liberty, is a difficult and trying undertaking, and if you are not armed and well equipped, you can neither command nor rule them. In order to be organized like this, it is necessary to have allies who will assist you and increase the population of your city. Since these two cities did neither the one nor the other, their mode of conduct was useless; since Rome, which is an example of the second method, did both the one and the other, it rose to the heights of power. And since it was the only city to live in this manner, it was also the only one to become so powerful; for after it had made many allies for itself throughout all of Italy who lived, in many respects, under laws similar to its own, and on the other hand, as was previously mentioned, since Rome always retained the seat of empire and the position of command, its allies, without realizing it, came to subjugate themselves through their own labours and with their own blood. Thus, the Romans began to march outside of Italy with their armies, where they reduced kingdoms to provinces, and subjugated peoples who, accustomed to living under kings, did not care about becoming subjects and who, having Roman governors and being conquered by armies with the Roman name, recognized no superior other than Rome itself; so that Rome’s allies inside Italy all at once found themselves surrounded by Roman subjects and overcome by an enormous city as Rome then was. When they recognized the deception under which they had been living, they were not in time to find a remedy, because Rome had assumed so much authority with its foreign provinces and had created so much strength within its own walls, being in possession of an enormous and extremely well-armed city. Even though Rome’s allies formed an alliance against that city in order to avenge themselves for their injuries, they lost the war in a short time, making their conditions worse, since from being allies they, too, were reduced to subjects. This mode of conduct, as has been said, has been employed only by the Romans; nor can a republic wishing to expand its territory employ any other method, because experience has shown us none other more certain or more true.

The previously mentioned method employed by the leagues, under which the Etruscans, the Achaeans, and the Aetolians lived and under which the Swiss live today, is the next best after that of the Romans, because although it is impossible to expand very much with it, two benefits derive from it: first, you do not easily bring wars down on your own back; secondly, you can easily keep all that you take. The reason for not being able to expand is because such a republic is disjointed and has several seats of power, which makes it difficult for them to consult and reach decisions. It also makes them less anxious to acquire power, because, with so many communities participating in the dominion, they do not place as high a value on such acquisitions as a single republic, which can hope to enjoy them all by itself. Besides this, leagues govern themselves through councils and are necessarily slower in deliberation than those who live within the same circle of walls. It is also evident from experience that a similar mode of conduct has a fixed limit, which no example proves capable of being exceeded; and this is to arrive at a confederation of twelve to fourteen communities and then to cease trying to expand any further, since when they reach the level where they feel able to defend themselves from everyone else, they seek no greater dominion, both because necessity does not force them to acquire more power and because they do not recognize any utility in such acquisitions, for the reasons stated above.

Thus, they would have to do one of two things: either they must continue to make allies for themselves (and their great number would create confusion), or they must create subjects for themselves (and since they see the difficulty and not the advantage in this course of action, they do not value it). Consequently, whenever they reach such a number that they seem to be living in security, they turn to two other policies: first, they receive taxes and take protectorates, and through these means obtain money from every direction, which they can easily distribute among themselves; secondly, they fight for others and take money for doing this from the prince who hires them on for his undertakings, as we see the Swiss doing today, and as we read that the previously mentioned confederations once did. Livy bears witness to this, where he declares that Philip, king of Macedonia, who came to confer with Titus Quinctius Flaminius, discussed an agreement in the presence of a praetor of the Aetolians, and when the praetor began arguing with Philip, the king rebuked him for avarice and infidelity, declaring that the Aetolians were not ashamed to fight with one man and later to send their men off into the service of his enemy, so that the banners of Aetolia were often seen flying in two opposing camps. It is evident, therefore, that this mode of conduct on the part of leagues has always been similar and has always produced similar effects. It is also clear that this method of acquiring subjects has always been weak and has always produced little gain, and that when these confederations go beyond their limits, they soon come to ruin. Furthermore, if this method of acquiring subjects is ineffective in armed republics, it is totally ineffective in republics that are unarmed, as the republics of Italy have been in our own times.

It is evident, therefore, that the only effective method is the one followed by the Romans, which is even more admirable in so far as no example of it existed before that of Rome, and after Rome’s fall, no one has been capable of imitating it. As for leagues, only the Swiss and the Swabian League imitate them. And, as will be discussed in the conclusion to this book, so many of the institutions set up by Rome, as relevant to domestic affairs as to foreign affairs, are not only not imitated in our present times but are not even taken into account, since some people judge them as being untrue, others as impossible, and still others as inappropriate or useless, so that remaining in this state of ignorance, we are prey to anyone who wants to invade this province. Even though imitation of the Romans may seem difficult, imitation of the ancient Etruscans should not seem so difficult, especially to the Tuscans of the present, for if the Etruscans were unable to establish an empire similar to that of Rome for the reasons we outlined, they were still able to acquire in Italy that power that their mode of conduct accorded them. This power was secure for a long period of time, accompanied by the highest glory in empire and arms and the greatest renown for their customs and religion. Their power and glory were first diminished by the Gauls and later destroyed by the Romans: they were so completely destroyed that there is hardly any record of them at the present, even though 2,000 years ago the power of the Etruscans was immense. This has caused me to reflect upon how things fall into oblivion, as will be discussed in the following chapter.
