# CHAPTER 1 — What Was the Main Reason for the Empire the Romans Acquired, Ability or Fortune? *

Many have held the opinion, among them Plutarch, a most authoritative writer, * that the Roman people, in acquiring their empire, were favoured more by fortune than by exceptional ability. Among the other reasons he sets forth, Plutarch declares that the Roman people by their own admission attributed all their victories to fortune, since they built more temples to the goddess of fortune than to any other deity. It seems that Livy adheres to the same opinion, because he rarely has any Roman deliver a speech in which he speaks of ability without mentioning fortune. This is an argument I do not want to accept, nor do I believe that it can be supported, because, if no republic has ever made gains equal to those of Rome, this arises from the fact that no republic was ever organized so that it could acquire territory as Rome did. The exceptional ability of its armies enabled Rome to acquire its empire, and its mode of conduct and its own way of existence, discovered by its first lawgiver, allowed it to hold on to its conquests, as will be recounted in more detail in the discourses to follow. These writers declare that it was due to fortune and not the exceptional ability of the Roman people that they never became involved in two great wars at the same time; for they did not go to war against the Latins until they not only defeated the Samnites but actually waged war in their defence; nor did they ever fight the Etruscans until they had first subjugated the Latins and had completely weakened the Samnites by frequent routs: if two of these powers had joined together when they were fresh and whole, it is no doubt possible to speculate that the downfall of the Roman republic would have ensued. But, however these things came about, the Romans never happened to wage two crucial wars at the same time: on the contrary, it seems that the beginning of one war always saw the end of another, or the ending of one war gave rise to another. This can easily be seen from the order of the wars they waged, because, if we set aside the wars they waged before Rome was sacked by the Gauls, we see that while they fought with the Aequi and the Volscians, so long as these two peoples were powerful no others ever engaged them in warfare. After they had been subdued the war against the Samnites broke out, and although the Latin peoples rebelled against the Romans before this war was over, when this rebellion took place the Samnites had nevertheless already formed an alliance with Rome, and they assisted the Romans with their armies to curb the insolence of the Latins. When the Latins were subdued, the war with the Samnites broke out again. Once the Samnites were broken by the many defeats they suffered, the war against the Etruscans began. When this one was concluded, the Samnites once again rose up when Pyrrhus passed into Italy. After Pyrrhus was repulsed and driven back into Greece, the Romans started the first war against the Carthaginians, which scarcely ended before all the Gauls on both sides of the Alps conspired together against the Romans until, between Popolonia and Pisa, where the tower of St Vincent stands today, they were overcome in a great slaughter. When this war was over, for the space of twenty years the Romans experienced wars of little consequence, because they did not fight with anyone except the Ligurians and the Gauls who remained in Lombardy. And they continued in this fashion until the second Carthaginian war broke out, which kept Italy occupied for sixteen years. When this war ended with the greatest glory, the Macedonian war broke out; when this was over, the war with Antiochus and Asia followed. After that victory there remained in all the world neither prince nor republic that, individually or altogether, could oppose Roman forces.

But before this last victory, anyone who will give careful thought to the order of these wars and the manner in which they were conducted will discover in them good fortune mixed with exceptional skill and the greatest prudence. Thus, anyone examining the cause of such good fortune would find it quite easily, because it is certainly true that when a prince or a people achieves such a reputation that every other prince or people nearby is afraid to mount an attack alone and remains in a state of fear, it will always happen that none of them will ever attack unless driven by necessity, so that such a powerful prince or people will have, as it were, the choice of waging war upon whichever of its neighbours it chooses, while holding the others at bay with its diligence. Such neighbours will easily be kept at bay, partly because they respect this power and partly because they are deceived by the means used to lull them to sleep. Other, more distant powers which have no dealings with them will consider these matters too remote to concern them; they will continue in this error until the fire reaches them, and when this occurs they will have no means of extinguishing it, unless they employ their own forces, and their own forces will be insufficient, since this one will have become extremely powerful. I should like to pass over how the Samnites stood by and watched while the Roman people conquered the Volscians and the Aequi, and in order not to be too long-winded, I shall mention only the Carthaginians, who were a great power and enjoyed great esteem when the Romans were fighting with the Samnites and the Etruscans, because they already held all of Africa, Sardinia, and Sicily, and they had partially conquered Spain. Their power, along with their great distance from the confines of the Roman people, caused them never to think about attacking Rome or of assisting the Samnites and the Etruscans; on the contrary, they acted as people are apt to act when things progress more or less in their favour, forging links with the Romans and seeking their friendship. Nor did they ever become aware of the error they had made until the Romans, having conquered all the peoples between them and the Carthaginians, began to fight them for control of Sicily and Spain. The same thing happened to the Gauls that happened to the Carthaginians, and also to King Philip of Macedonia and to Antiochus: each one of them believed that while the Roman people were occupied with another power, this other power would conquer the Romans and that they would have time to defend themselves against them through either peace or war. In this sense, I believe that the good fortune the Romans enjoyed in this regard would be enjoyed by all those rulers who would conduct themselves as did the Romans and who possessed the same special ability as they did.

It would be pertinent to demonstrate the means adopted by the Roman people in entering the territories of others if we had not discussed them at length in our treatise on principalities, * where this matter is discussed at length. I shall say only this, to be brief: the Romans always sought to have some friend in new territories to serve as a ladder to climb up or a gate through which to enter or as a means to hold on to them; this is evident from the way they entered Samnium with the assistance of the Capuans, * Etruria with that of the Camertines, * Sicily with that of the Mamertines, * Spain with that of the Saguntines, * Africa with that of Masinissa, * Greece with that of the Aetolians, * Asia with that of Eumenes and other Asian princes, * and Gaul with that of the Massilienses and the Aedui. * And so the Romans never lacked such support to facilitate their undertakings, or to acquire and to hold such provinces. Thus, the peoples who observe their practice will discover that they have less need of fortune than those who are not good observers. So that everyone can better understand how much more effective their exceptional skill was than their fortune in acquiring their empire, we shall discuss in the following chapter the character of those peoples with whom the Romans had to fight, and the stubbornness with which they defended their liberty.