# CHAPTER 35 — The Reason Why the Creation of the Decemvirate in Rome Was Harmful to the Liberty of That Republic, Notwithstanding the Fact that It Was Created by Free and Public Elections

The election of ten citizens invented by the Roman people to make laws in Rome may seem to contradict what was said above (that authority seized by violent means, not authority given by means of free elections, is harmful to republics): these men in time became tyrants and without any respect whatsoever deprived Rome of its liberty. * At this point, we must consider the means of conferring authority and the period of time for which it is conferred, for when unlimited authority is conferred for a lengthy period of time—calling one year or more a long time—it will always be dangerous, and its effects will be good or evil according to how evil or good those are to whom it is given. If we consider the authority held by the decemvirs and that by the dictators, we will see that the power of the decemvirs was without any comparison greater. Once the dictator was created, the tribunes, the consuls, and the senate with their respective powers remained, nor could the dictator take them away, and even if he could have deprived a man of the consulate or another of his senatorial rank, he could not dissolve the senatorial order or create new laws. In this manner, the senate, the consuls, and the tribunes, remaining with their authority, came to be like his guardian to keep him from straying from the straight path. But the exact opposite occurred in the creation of the decemvirs, because the consuls and tribunes were annulled, and the decemvirs given authority to create laws and to act in every way as if they were the Roman people. Thus, finding themselves alone, without consuls, without tribunes, without appeals to the people, and as a consequence, having no one to watch over them, during their second year they were able, moved by the ambition of Appius, to become insolent. For this reason, it should be noted that when it is said that an authority conferred by free elections never injures a republic, it is presumed that a people can never be led to confer it except under proper circumstances and for proper periods of time, but when, blinded either by deception or some other cause, a republic is led to confer such authority imprudently and in the manner in which the Roman people conferred it upon the decemvirs, then the same thing that happened to the Roman people will always happen to it. This can be easily proved if we consider the reasons that kept the dictators good and those which made the decemvirs bad, and if we consider, in addition, the actions of those republics that have maintained good institutions while conferring authority for long periods of time, as the Spartans did upon their kings or the Venetians upon their doges, for in both instances it will be seen that safeguards were put in place to make them unable to abuse their authority. Nor is it of any advantage in such a case to have material that is not corrupt; * for an absolute authority corrupts the material in the shortest time and creates friends and partisans. * Nor is it any disadvantage to be poor or to lack family ties, for wealth and every other favour quickly pursue authority, as we shall discuss in a detailed manner with respect to the creation of these previously mentioned decemvirs. *