# CHAPTER 34 — Dictatorial Authority Did Good, Not Harm, to the Roman Republic; and How Authority Citizens Take for Themselves, Not That Which Is Granted Them Through Free Elections, Is Harmful to Civic Life

Some writers have condemned those Romans who found a way to create a dictator in their city as if it had, with the passage of time, brought a tyranny to Rome, alleging that the first tyrant to exist in that city ruled it under the title of dictator, and stating that if this title had not existed, Caesar would never have been able to disguise his tyranny under some public title. This matter was not carefully explored by those who hold this opinion, however, and it was accepted without good reason, because it was neither the title nor the rank of dictator that enslaved Rome but rather the authority taken from its citizens by the length of his dominion, and if in Rome the title of dictator had not existed, they would have chosen another, because power easily acquires titles but titles do not acquire power. Moreover, we can see that the dictatorship, as long as it was bestowed in accord with public laws and not by private authority, always benefited the city, because it is the creation of magistrates and the granting of power by extraordinary means which harm republics, not those which are created by ordinary means: this is clear from what happened in Rome over a long period of time during which no dictator ever did anything but good for the republic.

There are some very obvious explanations for this. First, if a citizen is able to commit an offence and to seize for himself extraordinary authority, it is necessary for him to have many qualities that in an uncorrupted republic he can never possess, for he must be extremely wealthy and have many supporters and followers, whom he cannot have wherever the laws are observed, and even if he were to have them, men of this kind are so formidable that free elections never favour them. Besides this, the dictator was named for a fixed period and not in perpetuity, and only to deal with the problem that caused him to be appointed; the dictator’s authority included the power to decide by himself on the remedies against that urgent danger, to undertake everything without consultations, and to punish anyone without appeal, but he could do nothing to curtail the government, such as taking authority away from the senate or from the people, or abolishing the city’s old institutions and creating new ones. Thus, in combination, the brief duration of the dictator’s appointment, his limited authority, and the fact that the Roman people was uncorrupted made it impossible for the dictator to go beyond his limitations and to harm the city, and experience shows the dictatorship was always a useful institution.

Among all the other Roman institutions, this one truly deserves to be considered and numbered among those which were the source of the greatness of such an empire, because without a similar system cities survive extraordinary circumstances only with difficulty. The usual institutions in republics are slow to move, since no council nor any magistrate can undertake anything alone, for in many instances they need to consult one another; and, since time is wasted in coming to an agreement, the remedies for republics are very dangerous when they must find one for a problem that cannot wait. Republics must therefore have among their laws a procedure like the following: the Venetian Republic, which among modern republics is most excellent, has reserved to a small number of citizens the authority to deliberate on matters of urgent need without consulting anyone else, if they are in complete agreement. When a republic lacks such a procedure, it must necessarily come to ruin by obeying its laws or break them in order to avoid its own ruin. But in a republic, it is not good for anything to happen which requires governing by extraordinary measures. Although extraordinary measures may be beneficial at a certain moment, the example nevertheless causes harm, because if one establishes the habit of breaking the laws for good reasons, later on, under the same pretext, one can break them for bad reasons. Thus, no republic will ever be perfect unless its laws contain a provision for everything and establish a remedy for every circumstance and set up a means for dealing with it. In conclusion, then, I would say that those republics which have no recourse during the most pressing dangers either to a dictator or to some similar authority will always come to ruin during serious misfortunes.

It is to be noted, in connection with this new institution, how wisely the Romans provided for the method of electing the dictator. Since the creation of the dictator brought some shame to the consuls, who from being the rulers of the city were reduced to obedience like everyone else, and since they assumed this would create contempt toward them among the citizens, the Romans decided that the power to elect the dictator would remain with the consuls, believing that when the circumstance came about and Rome needed this royal authority, they would do it willingly, and since they did it themselves, it would be less painful. The wounds and all the other evils that men inflict upon themselves voluntarily are far less painful than those which are inflicted upon them by others. Yet, afterwards in the later periods, the Romans were accustomed to granting such dictatorial authority to the consul, instead of a dictator, with these words: ‘that the consul shall see to it that the state takes no harm.’ * But to return to our subject, let me conclude that Rome’s neighbours, in seeking to conquer the city, caused it to create institutions that not only enabled it to defend itself but also to attack its neighbours with greater strength, better advice, and more authority.