# CHAPTER 18 — How a Free Government Can Be Maintained in Corrupt Cities If One Already Exists, or, If One Does Not Already Exist, How to Establish It

I do not consider it out of place or in conflict with the commentary above to consider whether or not it is possible to maintain a free government in a corrupt city if one already exists; or whether or not, if one does not already exist, it can be established there. On this subject, let me say how very difficult it is to accomplish either the one or the other, and although it is almost impossible to supply a rule for the problem, since it would be necessary to proceed according to the extent of the corruption, nevertheless I do not want to omit this, since it is always good to discuss everything. I shall assume that the city in question is extremely corrupt, which will further increase this difficulty, because neither laws nor institutions will be found in it sufficient to check universal corruption. Thus, just as good customs require laws in order to be maintained, so laws require good customs in order to be observed. Besides this, institutions and laws established in a republic at the time of its birth, when men were good, are no longer suitable later, once men have become evil, and if the laws vary in a city according to circumstances, its institutions never or rarely ever change: this means that new laws are insufficient, because the institutions that remain in place corrupt them.

In order to clarify this matter further, let me say that in Rome there was the arrangement of the government, or rather, the state, and later on the laws that along with the magistrates kept the citizens in check. The order of the state encompassed the authority of the people, the senate, the tribunes, and the consuls, the means of proposing and appointing magistrates, and the method of making the laws. These institutions changed little or not at all according to circumstances. The laws holding citizens in check varied—as occurred with the law against adultery, the sumptuary law, the one against ambition, and many others— according to the way in which the citizens, in turn, became corrupt, one by one. But since the institutions of the state, which were no longer good amidst the corruption, remained fixed, these laws, which were renewed were not sufficient to keep men good, but they would have been very useful if, along with the innovations in the laws, the institutions had been changed once again.

That such institutions in a corrupt city were not good is clearly evident, especially in two principal cases, that is, in appointing magistrates and instituting laws. The Roman people did not give the consulate or the other key positions in the city to anyone except those who sought them. This institution was good at the beginning, because no one asked for these offices except those citizens who deemed themselves worthy, and to be refused was disgraceful; as a result, in order to be deemed worthy of them everyone behaved well. This system later became extremely harmful in the corrupt city, because those with the most power rather than those who possessed the most ability asked for the magistracies, and those lacking power, no matter how able, refrained from asking for them out of fear. Rome did not arrive at this disadvantageous situation all at once, but rather by degrees, just as one falls into all the other kinds of difficulties, because once the Romans had conquered Africa and Asia and had brought almost all of Greece under their control, they became secure in their freedom and did not feel they had any other enemies capable of making them afraid. This sense of security, along with the weakness of their adversaries, caused the Roman people, in granting the consulate, to take charm rather than ability into consideration, raising to that rank those men who knew best how to please others rather than those who knew best how to conquer their enemies, and then, from those who had greater charm, they descended to giving it to men with more power, so that good men, through the defect in this institution, remained completely excluded from such offices. A tribune or any other citizen could propose a law to the people, and every citizen could speak either in favour or against it before the law was enacted. This was a good institution while the citizens were good, because it has always been proper for anyone who understood the commonweal to be able to propose a law, and it is right for anyone to be able to express his opinion of it, so that the people, after hearing them all, is then able to select the best. But once the citizens became wicked this institution became very harmful, because only the powerful proposed laws, not in the name of a common freedom but for the benefit of their own authority, and against them no one could speak for fear of reprisal, so that the people came to be either deceived or forced into deciding upon their own destruction.

It was therefore necessary, if Rome wished to remain free amid the corruption, that just as the city had created new laws in the course of its existence, it should also have created new institutions, because different institutions and ways of life must be established for a subject who is evil rather than good, nor can similar forms exist in completely different substances. But since all these institutions must either be reformed all in a single stroke as soon as it is discovered they are no longer good, or little by little before everyone recognizes they are bad, let me say that both of these two alternatives are almost impossible. The wish to reform them little by little requires a prudent man to come forward who sees this problem from some distance and in its initial stages. It is very likely that an individual of this type may never emerge in a city, and even if one were to emerge, he might not be able to persuade others of what he himself has come to understand, because men used to living in one way do not wish to change, and all the more so when they do not see the evil for themselves but must have it demonstrated to them through abstract arguments. As for changing these institutions all at once, when everyone realizes they are no longer good, let me say that this ineffectiveness, though easily recognized, is difficult to correct, because to do so ordinary practices are no longer sufficient, once ordinary methods have become wicked, and it is necessary to turn to extraordinary methods, such as violence or arms, and to become, above all else, prince of the city and able to arrange it as one wishes. Furthermore, since the reorganization of a city into a body politic * presupposes a good man, whereas becoming the prince of a republic through violent means presupposes an evil one, we will discover, for this reason, that only on the rarest occasions will a good man wish to become prince through evil means, even though his goal might be a good one; we will also discover that equally rarely will an evil man who has become prince wish to govern well, or that it would ever enter his mind to use properly the authority he has acquired in a wicked fashion.

From all the above-mentioned factors arises the difficulty or impossibility of maintaining a republic in corrupt cities or of establishing a new one in them, and even if one had to be established or maintained there, it would be necessary to lead it more towards a monarchical than towards a popular government, so that those insolent men who cannot be improved [by the laws] would be held in check by an authority which is almost kingly. To try to make them become good by other means would be either a most cruel undertaking or completely impossible, as I said above concerning what Cleomenes did: * if Cleomenes murdered the ephors in order to rule alone, and if Romulus killed his brother and Titus Tatius the Sabine for the same reasons, and afterwards they employed this authority of theirs well, we must remind ourselves, nevertheless, that neither the one nor the other had a subject stained by the corruption we have been discussing in this chapter, and they were, therefore, able to try and, trying, to put their plan into effect.