# CHAPTER 6 — Whether in Rome It Was Possible to Organize a Government that Could Do Away with the Enmities Between the People and the Senate

We have discussed above the effects of the controversies between the people and the senate. Now, since these controversies continued down to the time of the Gracchi, when they were the cause of the ruin of a free way of life, someone might wish that Rome could have achieved the great results that the city realized without there being such enmities within it. It seems to me a matter worthy of consideration, therefore, to see if in Rome it might have been possible to organize a government that could have done away with these same disputes, and in wishing to examine this matter, it is necessary to refer to those republics which, without such enmities and disturbances, remained free for a long period of time and to see what kind of government they possessed and whether it could have been introduced in Rome. As an example, among the ancients there is Sparta, and among the moderns Venice, both of which I mentioned above. Sparta created a king with a small senate * to govern itself; Venice did not distinguish the parts of its government by specific names, but all those who might hold an administrative post were called gentlemen under a single title. This system was given to them more by chance than by the prudence of those who gave them their laws, since, having taken shelter upon those islands where their city now stands for the reasons mentioned above, the inhabitants who had increased in such numbers that they had to create laws if they wished to live together, established a form of government; they frequently met together in their councils to deliberate about the city, and when they felt their numbers were sufficient to form a body politic, they closed the avenue to participation * to all those who might come there to live in the future; and in time, when a considerable number of the inhabitants in that city found themselves outside the government, they enhanced the reputation of those who governed by calling the latter gentlemen and the others commoners. It was possible for this system to arise and maintain itself without any disturbance, because when it was born, whoever then lived in Venice was made part of the government, so that no one could complain; those who later came there to live found the government fixed and limited, but they had no motive or opportunity to cause a disturbance. There was no motive, because nothing of theirs had been taken away; there was no opportunity, because those who ruled kept them in check and did not use them in matters through which they might acquire authority. Moreover, those who later came to live in Venice were not many or of a sufficient number to create a disproportion between those who govern and those who are governed, * for the number of gentlemen was either equal to or superior to their number, so that for these reasons Venice was able to establish that kind of government and keep it united.

Sparta, as I said, was governed by a king and a senate of limited size. It was able to sustain itself for such a long time because it had few inhabitants and access to participation had been taken away from those who came there to live, and once the laws of Lycurgus, the observance of which removed all causes for strife, were adopted to good effect, the Spartans were able to live in unity over a long period of time. With his laws, Lycurgus created in Sparta greater equality of property and less equality of rank, so that there was an equality of poverty there, and the plebeians were less ambitious since the high ranks of the city, extended to few citizens, were denied to them; nor did the nobles ever give the plebeians any desire to obtain these ranks by mistreating them. This was due to the Spartan kings, who, being set up in that principality and placed in the midst of that nobility, had no better way to secure their office than to protect the plebeians from every injury; this meant that the plebeians did not fear nor did they desire power, and neither possessing power nor fearing it, the competition they might have had with the nobility and the cause of such disturbances were eliminated, and they were able to live in unity for a long period of time. But there were two principal causes for this unity: first, the fact that Sparta had few inhabitants and could therefore be governed by few men; second, the fact that by not accepting foreigners into their republic, they did not have the opportunity either to become corrupt or to grow to such an extent that the city became an intolerable burden for the few who governed it.

Hence, taking into consideration all these things, one sees that Rome’s legislators had to do one of two things if they wanted Rome to remain as peaceful as the two republics mentioned above: either they could avoid using the plebeians in warfare, as the Venetians did, or they could avoid giving open access to foreigners, as the Spartans did. The Romans did both the one and the other: this gave the plebeians strength and an increase in their numbers, as well as countless opportunities to create disturbances. But had the Roman state become more peaceful, another disadvantage that would have arisen is that it would have also been weaker, because it would have cut itself off from the path to realizing the greatness it attained, so that, had Rome wished to eliminate the causes of her disturbances, she would also have eliminated the causes for her expansion. And in all human affairs, anyone who examines them closely will see that one can never cancel one disadvantage without another arising from it. Consequently, if you wish to create a numerous and well-armed people, in order to build a great empire, you create it with such qualities that you cannot then manage it as you wish, and if you keep it either small or disarmed in order to manage it, once you acquire territory you cannot hold it, or you become so helpless that you are easy prey to anyone who attacks you. Thus, in all our deliberations, we must consider where the fewest drawbacks lie and take that as the best alternative, because an option that is completely clear and completely without uncertainty cannot ever be found. Rome like Sparta could, therefore, have created a prince for life and a small senate, but she could not, like Sparta, have avoided increasing the number of her citizens if she wished to establish a great empire; this means that having a king for life and a small number in the senate would have been of little benefit in so far as her unity was concerned.

If anyone wishes, therefore, to organize an entirely new republic, he should examine whether he would like it to expand in size and power like Rome, or to remain within narrow limits. In the first case, it is necessary to organize it like Rome and make room for the disturbances and widespread disagreements as best one can, because without a large number of well-armed men, no republic will ever be able to grow or, if it does so, to maintain itself. In the second case, you can organize it like Sparta or Venice, but since expansion is the poison of such republics, anyone who organizes them must, in all the ways possible, prevent them from acquiring territory, for such acquisitions built upon a weak republic constitute its complete ruin. This came about in Sparta and in Venice: the former, having subjugated almost all of Greece, demonstrated her fragile foundations in a minor incident, because when the rebellion of Thebes brought on by Pelopidas persisted, other cities rebelled, and that brought about the complete ruin of the republic. * In like manner, after Venice had occupied a large part of Italy, in the main with money and cleverness rather than war, she had to test her strength, and lost everything in a single day. * I should think that the way to create a republic that could endure for a long period of time would be to organize it internally like Sparta or Venice, and to place it in a strong location with such power that no one would believe he could suddenly subjugate it, although the republic should not be so large that it seems formidable to its neighbours; and in this fashion the city could enjoy its form of government over a long period of time. Hence, there are two reasons to wage war upon a republic: first, to become its ruler; second, for fear it will take possession of your own. The above-mentioned method almost entirely eliminates these two reasons, because if the republic is difficult to destroy, as I assume it will be, since it is well organized for defence, rarely or never will anyone try to develop a plan to seize it. If it remains within its own boundaries, and experience shows that it lacks ambition, no one will ever have to wage war against it out of fear, and this would be even more likely if it had a constitution or laws which prohibited expansion. I believe, without any doubt, that if such an entity could be held in balance this way, the result would be a true body politic and true tranquillity in a city. But since all human affairs are in continual motion and cannot remain fixed, they must either rise or fall, and reason does not always lead you to the many things to which necessity leads you, so that if a republic were to be capable of maintaining itself without expansion, and necessity forced it to expand, its foundations would be demolished and it would be brought to ruin very quickly. Thus, on the other hand, even if heaven were so kind that it never had to wage war, it might happen that idleness would make it either weak or divided, and these two things together, or each one in itself, would be the cause of its ruin. Consequently, being unable, in my opinion, to find a balance in this matter or strictly to maintain this middle way, it is necessary in the organization of a republic to consider the most honourable elements and to organize them in such a way that even when necessity forces it to expand, the republic may conserve what it has acquired. To return to my first argument, I believe it is necessary to follow the political organization of Rome and not that of other republics, because I cannot believe it is possible to find a middle way between the one alternative and the other, and it is necessary to tolerate those enmities that arose between the people and the senate, taking them as a disadvantage necessary to attain Roman greatness. Thus, besides the other reasons I have set forth, where I demonstrated the authority of the tribunes to have been necessary for the protection of liberty, it is easy to observe the benefit republics derive from the right to make public accusations, which was among the other powers granted to the tribunes, as will be discussed in the following chapter.