# CHAPTER 5 — Whether the Guardianship of Liberty May Be More Securely Lodged in the People or in the Upper Classes; and Who Has More Reason to Create an Uprising, He Who Wishes to Acquire or He Who Wishes to Maintain

Among the most necessary things established by those who have founded a republic in a prudent fashion is a safeguard for liberty, and according to whether it is well established or not, that free way of life is more or less enduring. Because in every republic there are men of prominence and men of the people, some doubt has arisen over whose hands into which this guardianship would best be placed. Among the Spartans and, in our own times, among the Venetians, it was placed in the hands of the nobles, but among the Romans it was placed in the hands of the plebeians.

For this reason, it is necessary to examine which of these republics made the best choice. If we were to explore the reasons, something could be said for both sides, but if we examine the results, we would choose the side of the nobles, since the liberty of Sparta and Venice endured longer than that of Rome. Turning to the causes, let me say, while first taking the side of the Romans, that the guardianship must be given to those who have less of an appetite to usurp it. No doubt, if we consider the goal of the nobles and that of the common people, we shall see in the former a strong desire to dominate and in the latter only the desire not to be dominated, and, as a consequence, a stronger will to live in liberty, since they have less hope of usurping it than men of prominence; just so, since the common people are set up as guardians of this liberty, it is reasonable to think that they will take better care of it, and, being incapable of appropriating it for themselves, they will not permit others to do so. On the other hand, those who defend the organization of Sparta and Venice declare that those who place the guardianship in the hands of the powerful accomplish two good things: first, they better satisfy their ambition, and since they have a larger part to play in the republic with this club in their hands, they have more reason to be content; second, they remove a kind of authority from the restless minds of the plebeians that is the cause of countless conflicts and disagreements in any republic and is likely to drive the nobility to despair, which, in the passing of time, will produce harmful consequences. As an example they offer Rome itself, where, once the tribunes of the people had this authority in their hands, they did not consider it sufficient to have one plebeian consul and wanted two of them. * After this, they wanted the censorship, * the praetorship, * and all the other positions of power in the city; nor did this suffice, for led by this same consuming desire, they then began in time to idolize those men they saw capable of beating down the nobility; and from this arose the power of Marius and the ruin of Rome. * Truly, anyone who properly considers one side or the other could remain in doubt about which of the two should be chosen as the guardian of such liberty, not knowing which human disposition is more harmful in a republic: either that which wishes to preserve honour already acquired, or that which wishes to acquire honour yet to be possessed.

In the end, anyone who examines everything closely will draw this conclusion: either you discuss a republic that wishes to create an empire, like Rome, or you discuss one that is satisfied to maintain itself. In the first case, it is necessary to do everything as Rome did; in the second case, it is possible to imitate Venice or Sparta for reasons to be explained in the following chapter.

But to turn to a discussion of what kinds of men are most harmful to a republic—either those who wish to acquire something, or those who fear losing what they have acquired—let me say that Marcus Menenius and Marcus Fulvius, * both plebeians, had been made respectively dictator and master of the horse in order to investigate certain conspiracies which were being plotted in Capua against Rome, and the people afterwards also granted them authority to seek out anyone in Rome who, through ambition and extraordinary means, might contrive to obtain the consulate and the other offices of the city. Furthermore, the nobility, feeling that such authority was given to the dictator to oppose them, spread the rumour throughout Rome that it was not they who sought the offices out of ambition and through extraordinary means but was, instead, the commoners, who, lacking confidence in their own blood and ability, were seeking through extraordinary measures to rise to these ranks, and in particular they blamed the dictator. This accusation had such force that, having delivered a speech and having complained about the false accusations lodged against him by the nobles, Menenius renounced the dictatorship and submitted himself to the judgement that would be pronounced upon him by the people, and later, when his case had been examined, he was absolved, whereupon it was widely debated as to who was more ambitious, either a man who wishes to keep something or a man who wishes to acquire it, since one or the other can easily become the cause of the greatest disturbances. At any rate, in most cases such disturbances are caused by those who possess something, since the fear of losing it generates in them the same desires as exist in those who wish to acquire something, because men do not believe they truly possess what they own if they do not acquire still more from others. In addition, those who possess a great deal can with greater power and speed bring about change, and still more, their improper and ambitious conduct kindles in the breasts of those who possess nothing the desire to possess something, either in order to gain revenge upon the rich by despoiling them, or in order to be able themselves to come into that wealth and those offices that they see so badly used by others.